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The AISB’05 Convention 
Social Intelligence and Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents 
 
Above all, the human animal is social. For an artificially intelligent system, how could it be otherwise? 
We stated in our Call for Participation “The AISB’05 convention with the theme Social Intelligence 
and Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents aims to facilitate the synthesis of new ideas, encourage 
new insights as well as novel applications, mediate new collaborations, and provide a context for lively 
and stimulating discussions in this exciting, truly interdisciplinary, and quickly growing research area 
that touches upon many deep issues regarding the nature of intelligence in human and other animals, 
and its potential application to robots and other artefacts”. 
Why is the theme of Social Intelligence and Interaction interesting to an Artificial Intelligence and Ro-
botics community? We know that intelligence in humans and other animals has many facets and is ex-
pressed in a variety of ways in how the individual in its lifetime - or a population on an evolutionary 
timescale - deals with, adapts to, and co-evolves with the environment. Traditionally, social or emo-
tional intelligence have been considered different from a more problem-solving, often called "rational", 
oriented view of human intelligence. However, more and more evidence from a variety of different 
research fields highlights the important role of social, emotional intelligence and interaction across all 
facets of intelligence in humans. 
The Convention theme Social Intelligence and Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents reflects a 
current trend towards increasingly interdisciplinary approaches that are pushing the boundaries of tradi-
tional science and are necessary in order to answer deep questions regarding the social nature of intelli-
gence in humans and other animals, as well as to address the challenge of synthesizing computational 
agents or robotic artifacts that show aspects of biological social intelligence. Exciting new develop-
ments are emerging from collaborations among computer scientists, roboticists, psychologists, sociolo-
gists, cognitive scientists, primatologists, ethologists and researchers from other disciplines, e.g. lead-
ing to increasingly sophisticated simulation models of socially intelligent agents, or to a new generation 
of robots that are able to learn from and socially interact with each other or with people. Such interdis-
ciplinary work advances our understanding of social intelligence in nature, and leads to new theories, 
models, architectures and designs in the domain of Artificial Intelligence and other sciences of the arti-
ficial. 
New advancements in computer and robotic technology facilitate the emergence of multi-modal "natu-
ral" interfaces between computers or robots and people, including embodied conversational agents or 
robotic pets/assistants/companions that we are increasingly sharing our home and work space with. 
People tend to create certain relationships with such socially intelligent artifacts, and are even willing 
to accept them as helpers in healthcare, therapy or rehabilitation. Thus, socially intelligent artifacts are 
becoming part of our lives, including many desirable as well as possibly undesirable effects, and Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Cognitive Science research can play an important role in addressing many of the 
huge scientific challenges involved. Keeping an open mind towards other disciplines, embracing work 
from a variety of disciplines studying humans as well as non-human animals, might help us to create 
artifacts that might not only do their job, but that do their job right. 
Thus, the convention hopes to provide a home for state-of-the-art research as well as a discussion fo-
rum for innovative ideas and approaches, pushing the frontiers of what is possible and/or desirable in 
this exciting, growing area.  
The feedback to the initial Call for Symposia Proposals was overwhelming. Ten symposia were ac-
cepted (ranging from one-day to three-day events), organized by UK, European as well as international 
experts in the field of Social Intelligence and Interaction.  
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• Second International Symposium on the Emergence and Evolution of Linguistic Commu-
nication (EELC'05)  
• Agents that Want and Like: Motivational and Emotional Roots of Cognition and Action  
• Third International Symposium on Imitation in Animals and Artifacts  
• Robotics, Mechatronics and Animatronics in the Creative and Entertainment Industries 
and Arts  
• Robot Companions: Hard Problems and Open Challenges in Robot-Human Interaction  
• Conversational Informatics for Supporting Social Intelligence and Interaction - Situ-
ational and Environmental Information Enforcing Involvement in Conversation  
• Next Generation Approaches to Machine Consciousness: Imagination, Development, In-
tersubjectivity, and Embodiment  
• Normative Multi-Agent Systems  
• Socially Inspired Computing Joint Symposium (consisting of three themes: Memetic 
Theory in Artificial Systems & Societies, Emerging Artificial Societies, and Engineering 
with Social Metaphors) 
• Virtual Social Agents Joint Symposium (consisting of three themes:  Social Presence 
Cues for Virtual Humanoids, Empathic Interaction with Synthetic Characters, Mind-
minding Agents) 
I would like to thank the symposium organizers for their efforts in helping to put together an excellent 
scientific programme. 
In order to complement the programme, five speakers known for pioneering work relevant to the con-
vention theme accepted invitations to present plenary lectures at the convention: Prof. Nigel Gilbert 
(University of Surrey, UK), Prof. Hiroshi Ishiguro (Osaka University, Japan), Dr. Alison Jolly (Univer-
sity of Sussex, UK), Prof. Luc Steels (VUB, Belgium and Sony, France), and Prof. Jacqueline Nadel 
(National Centre of Scientific Research, France).  
A number of people and groups helped to make this convention possible. First, I would like to thank 
SSAISB for the opportunity to host the convention under the special theme of Social Intelligence and 
Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents. The AISB'05 convention is supported in part by a UK 
EPSRC grant to Prof. Kerstin Dautenhahn and Prof. C. L. Nehaniv. Further support was provided by 
Prof. Jill Hewitt and the School of Computer Science, as well as the Adaptive Systems Research Group 
at University of Hertfordshire. I would like to thank the Convention's Vice Chair Prof. Chrystopher L. 
Nehaniv for his invaluable continuous support during the planning and organization of the convention. 
Many thanks to the local organizing committee including Dr. René te Boekhorst, Dr. Lola Cañamero 
and Dr. Daniel Polani. I would like to single out two people who took over major roles in the local or-
ganization: Firstly, Johanna Hunt, Research Assistant in the School of Computer Science, who effi-
ciently dealt primarily with the registration process, the AISB'05 website, and the coordination of ten 
proceedings. The number of convention registrants as well as different symposia by far exceeded our 
expectations and made this a major effort. Secondly, Bob Guscott, Research Administrator in the 
Adaptive Systems Research Group, competently and with great enthusiasm dealt with arrangements 
ranging from room bookings, catering, the organization of the banquet, and many other important ele-
ments in the convention. Thanks to Sue Attwood for the beautiful frontcover design. Also, a number of 
student helpers supported the convention. A great team made this convention possible! 
I wish all participants of the AISB’05 convention an enjoyable and very productive time. On returning 
home, I hope you will take with you some new ideas or inspirations regarding our common goal of 
understanding social intelligence, and synthesizing artificially intelligent robots and agents. Progress in 
the field depends on scientific exchange, dialogue and critical evaluations by our peers and the research 
community, including senior members as well as students who bring in fresh viewpoints. For social 
animals such as humans, the construction of scientific knowledge can't be otherwise. 
 ii
Dedication: 
I am very confident that the future will bring us increasingly many 
instances of socially intelligent agents. I am similarly confident that 
we will see more and more socially intelligent robots sharing our 
lives. However, I would like to dedicate this convention to those people 
who fight for the survival of socially intelligent animals and their 
fellow creatures. What would 'life as it could be' be without 'life as we 
know it'? 
 
Beppu, Japan. 
 
Kerstin Dautenhahn 
Professor of Artificial Intelligence,  
General Chair, AISB’05 Convention Social Intelligence and Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield, Herts, AL10 9AB 
United Kingdom 
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Symposium Preface 
Agents that Want and Like:  
Motivational and Emotional Roots of Cognition and Action 
 
 
 
SYMPOSIUM OVERVIEW  
 
The recent upsurge of interest in emotion in artificial intelligence has given rise to a number of work-
shops organized over the last years at international and national conferences in Europe (including sev-
eral editions of the AISB Convention), USA and Japan. These meetings have tended to focus on topics 
such as the effects of emotion on cognitive functions (following the “paradigm shift” much stressed in 
recent years that considers emotion as a necessary element of intelligence and inseparable from cogni-
tion), emotion-based architectures, and emotions and their expression in social interaction. Other re-
lated affective phenomena such as personality and moods have also been the object of workshops, in 
particular within the human-computer interaction and user modeling communities. 
 
At the same time motivation, even though overlooked for some time under the influence of behavior-
ism, is a topic of much interest in areas such as adaptive behavior and action selection, although social 
motivation remains for the most part unexplored in AI.  
 
The interplay between emotion and motivation and their roles as “driving forces” underlying cognition 
and action (and particularly social intelligence and interaction) has however been largely neglected so 
far. Although “motivation and emotion” often constitutes one of the topics of interest at numerous AI 
conferences, researchers, with very few exceptions, tend to address only one of these topics and, to our 
knowledge, no workshop or symposium has explicitly focused on this important issue of their interrela-
tionships and how they affect the way in which agents perceive, conceptualize and relate to the world 
and other agents. This symposium aims to redress this imbalance and to raise awareness of the impor-
tance of this topic among researchers interested in affect modeling and more generally in affect.   
 
Motivation and emotion are indeed highly intertwined phenomena (e.g., emotions are often very pow-
erful motivational factors; motivation can be seen as a consequence of emotion and viceversa, etc.) and 
it is not always easy to establish clear boundaries between them. Both types of phenomena are grouped 
under the broader category of “affect”, traditionally distinguished from “cold” cognition. They lie at 
the heart of autonomy, adaptation, and social interaction in both biological and artificial agents. They 
also have a powerful and wide-ranging influence on many aspects of cognition and action. However, 
their roles are often considered to be complementary – as a first approximation, motivation would be 
concerned with the internal and external factors involved in the establishment of “goals” and the initia-
tion and execution of goal-oriented action, whereas emotion is rather concerned, among other critical 
factors, with evaluative aspects of the relation between an agent and its environment. 
 
This symposium proposes to investigate the roles and mutual interactions of motivation and emotion in 
influencing different aspects of cognition and action in biological and artificial agents that interact with 
their physical and social environment, as part of the 2005 AISB Convention general theme “Social In-
telligence and Interaction in Animals, Robots and Agents.” The nature of this topic necessitates a 
highly multi-disciplinary symposium; consequently, we have invited contributions from different rele-
vant disciplines such as psychology, biology, neuroscience, ethology, sociology and philosophy, in 
addition to AI and robotics. 
 
Further information about the symposium and the 2005 AISB Convention can be found at 
http://homepages.feis.herts.ac.uk/~comqlc/emotivation_aisb05 and at http://aisb2005.feis.herts.ac.uk. 
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This symposium would not have been possible without the collaboration of the members of the Pro-
gram Committee: Orlando Avila-García (University of Hertfordshire, UK), Ruth Aylett (Heriot-Watt 
University, UK), Cynthia Breazeal (MIT, USA), Joanna Bryson (University of Bath, UK), Dylan Evans 
(University of the West of England, UK), Philippe Gaussier (University of Cergy-Pontoise, France), 
Steve Grand (Cyberlife Research Ltd., UK), Chris Melhuish (University of the West of England, UK), 
Jean-Arcady Meyer (LIP6, France), Jacqueline Nadel (CNRS & Hôpital de la Salpetrière, France), 
Paolo Petta (ÖFAI & Medical University of Vienna, Austria), Tony Prescott (University of Sheffield, 
UK), and David Sander (University of Geneva, CH). Thanks to all of them for their participation in the 
review process and their suggestions, feedback and various contributions regarding the symposium 
topic and organization. Thanks also to the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simula-
tion of Behaviour (SSAISB) and to the AISB’05 Convention team for providing an excellent frame-
work for this symposium and for their support and help. Robert Marsh at the University of Hertford-
shire provided additional help with the symposium proceedings. Particular thanks to Dylan Evans, ini-
tially symposium co-chair, who withdrew from his active role in the organization of the symposium 
due to unforeseen circumstances: his work during all these months is sincerely acknowledged. 
  
  
 
Lola Cañamero 
Symposium Chair 
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 Emotion as a Motivated Behavior 
 
George Ainslie 
 
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville and Temple Medical School 
116A VA Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320 
Email  Ainslie@Coatesville.va.gov 
 
Abstract 
 
Emotions are conventionally treated as automatic processes that flow reflexively from assessments of 
reality.  The assumption that future reward is discounted in standard percent-per-unit-time (exponential) 
discount curves has prevented recognition that emotions are at most quasi-automatic, and might be reward-
dependent even when subjectively involuntary   Substantial evidence that the basic discount curve is not 
exponential but hyperbolic makes possible a model in which even involuntary, negative emotions compete 
in a single internal marketplace of reward.  A crude mechanical illustration of this model is described. 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Emotions are widely recognized to be 
motivating (Ortony et.al., 1988)—The name 
comes from the same Latin root, movere, the 
verb to move, the past participle of which is 
motus.  However, they are thought of as being 
themselves unmotivated, rather as being imposed 
by the same process of classical conditioning to 
which most involuntary behaviors are attributed. 
 
Certainly the major emotions have invariant 
features, are known to have specific brain 
circuits using specific neurotransmitters 
(Panksepp, 2000), and can even be induced by 
electrical brain stimulation (Delgado, 1969).   In 
the original behaviorist model of emotion it was 
evoked as a conditioned response to innately 
determined stimuli (Watson, 1924).  However, it 
proved to be hard to trace the emotional impact 
of a stimulus to a conditioning event.  Even in 
the laboratory fear is the only emotion that has 
been conditioned; actual phobias are rarely a 
consequence of trauma involving the object 
feared, and trauma rarely leads to phobia 
(Rachman, 1977).  The belief that an emotion is 
determined by a distant releasing stimulus linked 
to the immediate occasion by a chain of 
associations was a reasonable guess, but with 
little evidence behind it. 
 
Later ideas of what induces emotion have 
been less specific, but still imply that it is driven 
by external givens that a person encounters—if 
not innately determined releasing stimuli, then 
belief that she faces a condition that contains 
these stimuli.  Emotion is still a reflex of sorts, 
albeit usually a cognitively triggered reflex, a 
passive response to events outside of her 
control—hence “passion” as opposed to 
“action.”  In reviewing current cognitive theory, 
Frijda notes that the trigger may be as 
nonspecific as “whether and how the subject has 
appraised the relevance of events to concerns, 
and how he or she has appraised the eliciting 
contingency (2000, p. 68);” but this and the other 
theories of induction that he covers still involve 
an automatic response to the motivational 
consequences of the event, not a choice based on 
the motivational consequences of the emotion 
itself.  Even though emotions all have such 
consequences, “the individual does not produce 
feelings of pleasure or pain at will, except by 
submitting to selected stimulus events (ibid., p. 
63).”   That is, all emotions reward or punish, but 
they are said not to be chosen because of this 
consequence.  In every current theory they are 
not chosen at all, but evoked.   
 
2  Emotions can be shaped… 
 
The widespread agreement that emotions are 
automatic ignores both common experience and 
a fair amount of data.  Granted that emotions are 
usually occasioned by events outside of your 
voluntary control; the theory that they are 
governed by such events runs afoul of the 
widespread acknowledgment that they are 
trainable: You can “swallow” your anger or 
1
  
“nurse” it, learn to inhibit your phobic anxiety 
(Marks & Tobena, 1990) or panic (Clum et.al., 
1993; Kilic et.al., 1997) instead of “surrendering 
to it,” limit your grief (Ramsay, 1997) instead of 
“wallowing in it,” refrain from rejoicing or “give 
yourself over to it.”   Techniques to foster or 
inhibit emotions in everyday life have been 
described (Parrott, 1991), as has their use in 
preparing yourself for particular tasks (Parrott, 
1993).  Many schools of acting teach an ability 
to summon emotion deliberately (e.g. McGaw, 
1966; Strasberg, 1988), because even in actors 
actual emotion is more convincing than feigned 
emotion (Gosselin et.al., 1998).  The frequent 
philosophical assertion that emotions have a 
moral quality—good or bad (e.g. Hume as 
presented by Baier, 1991)—implies motivated 
participation; some philosophers have gone so 
far as to call the passions voluntary (e.g. Sartre, 
1939/1948).   In sum, emotions show signs of 
being goal-directed processes that are ultimately 
selected by their consequences, not their 
antecedents.  That is, they are at least partially in 
the realm of reward-governed behaviors, not 
conditioned responses; they are pulled by 
incentives rather than pushed by stimuli.  Even 
“negative” emotions like fear and grief seem to 
be urges that lure you into participating in them, 
rather than automatically imposed states.  
Conversely, the fact that emotions are usually 
involuntary does not mean that they are not 
selected by reward; after all, reward can even 
shape behavior during sleep (Granda & 
Hammack, 1961). 
 
Examples of producing emotions deliberately 
are usually dismissed as examples of self-
conditioning.  Actors, for instance, use rehearsal 
of significant emotional memories to learn the 
necessary control, and psychotherapists often use 
guided imagery to influence emotions.  
According to conditioning theories you find the 
right conditioned stimulus and provoke your own 
reflex with it, like hitting your own knee with a 
rubber hammer to produce a jerk.  It is true that 
in a given instance the goal-directed, or operant,1 
sequence of  
 cueÆ responseÆ reward  
can always be interpreted as the classically 
conditioned sequence of  
conditioned stimulusÆ conditioned 
responseÆ unconditioned or lower-order 
conditioned stimulus 
                                                          
                                                          
1 “Operant” is the favored term in behavioral psychology for 
“governed by differential reward and/or punishment.” 
and vice versa.  However, if the conditioning 
stimulus is not repeated on successive trials, a 
true conditioned response will extinguish.2  The 
memory or image will stop evoking the emotion.  
If the response grows and comes more readily, 
like the actor’s emotion as she learns to summon 
it, it must have come under the control of a 
different selection agent, which probably means 
that it has been learned as an operant behavior.  
Learning to induce an emotion follows the same 
course as a bulimic’s learning to vomit at will—
the gagging stimulus of a spoon or finger 
becomes less and less necessary, and eventually 
can be dispensed with altogether.   
 
2.1  …but how if by reward? 
 
However, theoretical problems implicit in the 
concept of reward have been an obstacle to 
building an operant model of emotion.  These 
theoretical problems follow from the 
conventional utility-based model of motivation.  
If you could produce “feelings of pleasure or 
pain at will,” why not overdose on the pleasure 
and skip the pain, without regard to the outside 
world?  If an emotion is aversive and avoidable, 
what induces people to entertain it?  If an 
emotion is pleasurable and readily accessible, 
what keeps people from indulging in it ad lib?  
 
3  Hyperbolic discounting 
supplies a mechanism 
 
A solution has been unavailable because of a 
universal but almost certainly false assumption 
about how we evaluate future incentives.  It is 
now well documented that both people and 
nonhuman animals have a robust tendency to 
devalue expected incentives in a hyperbolic 
curve.  Such a curve represents a radical 
departure from the exponential curve that has 
been the explicit assumption of behavioral 
psychology and classical economics, and is 
implied by the “rational choice theory” that has 
become the norm in all behavioral sciences that 
depend on utility theory (Sugden, 1991; Cooter 
& Ulen, 2000).  
 
 
 
2 I have argued elsewhere that all “conditioned” responses 
can be understood as operant instead (1992, pp. 39-48; 2001, 
pp. 19-22), but I am not assuming that here.  “Conditioned 
appetite” as a mechanism of preference reversal is analyzed 
in Ainslie, 2005. 
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3.1  Evidence that discounting is 
hyperbolic 
 
 Four kinds of experiment have demonstrated 
this phenomenon: 
 
 
3.1.1  Goodness of fit 
 Given choices between rewards of varying 
sizes at varying delays, both human and 
nonhuman subjects express preferences that fit 
curves of the form, 
 
V = A / (1 + kD) 
 
a hyperbola, better than the form,  
 
V = A ekD 
 
an exponential curve (where V is motivational 
value, A is amount of reward, D is delay of 
reward from the moment of choice, and k is a 
constant expressing impatience; Green, Fry & 
Myerson, 1994;Grace, 1996; Kirby, 1997; Mazur 
2001).  It has also been observed that the 
incentive value of small series of rewards is the 
sum of hyperbolic discount curves from those 
rewards (Mazur, 1986; Brunner & Gibbon, 
1995). 
 
3.1.2  Preference reversal 
 
 Given choices between smaller-sooner (SS) 
rewards and larger-later (LL) ones available at a 
constant lag after the SS ones, subjects prefer the 
LL reward when the delay before both rewards is 
long, but switch to the SS reward as it becomes 
imminent, a pattern that would not be seen if the 
discount curves were exponential (Ainslie & 
Herrnstein, 1981; Green et.al., 1981;Ainslie & 
Haendel, 1983; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995).  
Where anticipatory dread is not a factor (with 
nonhumans or with minor pains in humans), 
subjects switch from choosing SS aversive 
stimuli to LL ones as the SS ones draw near 
(Solnick et.al., 1980; Novarick, 1982; Dinsmoor, 
1998). 
 
3.1.3  Precommitment 
 
Given choices between SS rewards and LL 
ones, nonhuman subjects will sometimes choose 
an option available in advance that prevents the 
SS alternative from becoming available (Ainslie, 
1974; Hayes et.al., 1981).  The converse is true 
of punishments (Deluty et.al., 1983).  This 
design has not been run with human subjects, but 
it has been argued that illiquid savings plans and 
other choice-reducing devices serve this purpose 
(Laibson, 1997).  Such a pattern is predicted by 
hyperbolic discount curves, while conventional 
utility theory holds that a subject has no 
incentive to reduce her future range of choices 
(Becker & Murphy, 1988). 
 
3.1.4  Stabilization by bundling 
 
When a whole series of LL rewards and SS 
alternatives must be chosen all at once, both 
human (Kirby & Guastello, 2001) and nonhuman 
(Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003a) subjects choose 
the LL rewards more than when each SS vs. LL 
choice can be made individually.  The effect of 
such bundling of choices is predicted by 
hyperbolic but not exponential curves. 
 
4  Overvaluation of immediate 
reward structures the emotions 
 
The hyperbolic shape of the discount curve 
from delayed rewards makes possible an answer 
to the question raised above:  What would make 
organisms entertain painful experiences, or limit 
their indulgence in pleasurable ones? 
 
4.1  ”Negative” emotions 
 
The argument for how negative emotions 
could be motivated behaviors involves the 
commonalities of aversive emotions and 
addictive rewards (Ainslie, 2001, pp. 90-104).  
Although both are usually avoided from a 
distance, both are seductive when they might 
occur in the near future.  That is, however much 
you know that a binge will cost more than it is 
worth or that a fear is unfounded, it is sometimes 
hard not to participate in them.   
 
Addictive behaviors can be well explained by 
imminent highs that, because of hyperbolic 
discounting, are valued temporarily above the 
more delayed rewards of sobriety (Vuchinich & 
Simpson, 1998; Mitchell, 1999).  How the 
opposite rewarding and unrewarding incentives 
for negative emotions are compounded to attract 
attention but deter approach in general is still 
unclear.  The similarity to addictive behaviors 
suggests that the urge to succumb to panic, 
anger, anguish, and even physical pain might be 
based on a rapidly recurring but very brief 
reward, lasting long enough to command 
attention but not deliberate choice, and fused in 
perception with longer, unrewarding 
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consequences to form an experience both vivid 
and aversive (Ainslie, 1992, pp. 100-114).  Thus 
people who often encounter fearful situations—
or who have a low fear threshold—sometimes 
learn to resist the urge to panic (Clum et.al., 
1993), but find it hard to do so despite an 
awareness that if they do not, panic will quickly 
prove to be the more aversive response. 
 
4.2  “Positive” emotions 
 
Although emotions are physically available, 
something makes them less intense in proportion 
as the occasion for them is arbitrary.  To the 
extent that someone learns to access them at will, 
doing so makes them pale, mere daydreams.  
Even an actor needs to focus on appropriate 
occasions to bring them out with force.  But what 
properties must an event have in order to serve as 
an occasion for emotion?  The fact that there's no 
physical barrier opposing free access to emotions 
raises the question of how emotional experiences 
become the objects of often arduous striving, 
goods that seem to be in limited supply.  That is, 
how do you come to feel as if you have them 
passively, as implied by their synonym, 
"passions?" 
 
With the positive emotions, the basic 
question is, how does your own behavior become 
scarce?  I'll divide it into two parts:  Why would 
you want a behavior of yours to become scarce, 
that is, to limit your free access to it?  And given 
that this is your wish, how can you make it 
scarce without making it physically unavailable? 
 
All kinds of reward depend on a readiness for 
it that's used up as reward occurs and that can't 
be deliberately renewed.  This readiness is the 
potential for appetite.  The properties of appetites 
are often such that rapid consumption brings an 
earlier peak of reward but reduces the total 
amount of reward that the appetite makes 
possible, so that we have an amount-vs.-delay 
problem.  Where people-- or, presumably, any 
reward-governed organisms-- have free access to 
a reward that's more intense the faster it's 
consumed, they will tend to consume it faster 
than they should if they were going to get the 
most reward over time from that appetite.  In a 
conflict of consumption patterns between the 
long and pleasant versus the brief but even 
slightly more intense, an organism that discounts 
the future hyperbolically is primed to choose 
brief but intense.  Accordingly, emotional 
reward, indulged in ad lib, becomes 
unsatisfactory for that reason itself.  To get the 
most out of any kind of reward, we must have-- 
or develop-- limited access to it. 
 
With emotional rewards, the only way to stop 
your mind from rushing ahead is to avoid 
approaches that can be too well learned.  Thus 
the most valuable occasions will be those that are 
either 1. uncertain to occur or 2. mysterious-- too 
complex or subtle to be fully anticipated, 
arguably the goal of art.  To get the most out of 
emotional reward, you have to either gamble on 
uncertainty or find routes that are certain but that 
won't become too efficient.  In short, your 
occasions have to stay surprising-- a property 
that has also been reported as necessary for 
activity in brain reward centers (e.g. Hollerman 
et.al., 1998; Berns et.al., 2001).   Accordingly, 
surprise is sometimes said to be the basis of 
aesthetic value (Berlyne, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976).  
In modalities where you can mentally reward 
yourself, surprise is the only commodity that can 
be scarce.   
 
People-- and presumably nonhuman animals-
- wind up experiencing as emotion only those 
patterns that have escaped the habituation of 
voluntary access, by a selective process 
analogous to that described by  Robert Frank for 
the social recognition of "authentic" emotions 
(1988):  Expressions that are known to be 
intentionally controllable are disregarded, as 
with the false smile of the hypocrite.  By this 
process of selection, emotion is left with its 
familiar guise as passion, something that has to 
come over you. 
 
5  A motivational model of 
emotions 
 
Hyperbolic discounting greatly simplifies the 
problem of modeling the emotions.  With 
conventional, exponential curves, a person 
should be able to estimate what emotions will be 
most rewarding for what durations, and plan 
accordingly.   To correct this picture to match the 
real world, a modeler has to impose negative 
emotions on the subject, and limit her access to 
positive emotions, by a combination of 
hardwired and conditioned reflexes. By contrast, 
hyperbolic discounting lets emotions be 
behaviors that compete in the common market of  
motivation.  In such a model, emotions differ 
from deliberate but volatile behaviors like paying 
attention only in producing significant intrinsic 
reward.  The patterns of this reward determine 
both emotions’ quasi-involuntary property and 
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the motive to limit their occurrence—the 
negative emotions by an admixture of obligatory 
nonreward that overbalances their reward at all 
but very short distances, the positive emotions by 
the premature satiation that will occur unless the 
subject limits what occasions their occurrence.   
 
5.1  The Demon at the Calliope 
 
This situation can be portrayed by an 
automated model, and even a mechanical one.  I 
will describe the latter for better illustration (cf. 
Ainslie, 1992, pp. 274-291).    The individual is 
divided into a motivating part and a behaving 
part.  The motivating part is the brain function 
that generates reward, modeled by the whistles 
of steam organ (circus calliope).  The calliope 
has individual steam boilers heated by their own 
circuits—one for each separately satiable 
modality of emotion, such as anger, sexual 
arousal, laughter, and even grief and panic 
(figure).  Other boilers exist for nonemotional 
options such as muscle movements.   The 
behaving part is a demon who presses the 
calliope keys according to a strict instruction:  
“Choose the option that promises the greatest 
aggregate of loudness x duration, discounted 
hyperbolically to the present moment.”   
 
 
 
A single boiler heated by current that is controlled by one key of the calliope. The whistle can blow as long 
as it has heat and water; the water is replaced in the boiler at a rate determined by the diameter of the 
intake pipe.  A rheostat governed by hardwired factors including turnkey stimuli and current flow in other 
boilers can modify current flow, and current flow can affect rheostats on other boilers.  The loudness of the 
whistle is not a linear function of the amount of steam produced; it is disproportionately less at very low 
and very high values.  
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5.1.1  Properties of the calliope 
 
Pressing a key sends electric current through 
heating coils around its boiler, causing release of 
steam through the whistle at a delay and over a 
time course determined by several factors: 
 
 The shape of the boiler. 
Narrow necks limit loudness, and 
bigger tanks hold more water, modeling 
the potential intensity and duration of 
the emotion. 
 The density of wiring around 
the boiler neck relative to its diameter.  
This models the speed of arousal. 
 The amount of water in the 
boiler.  This models physiological 
readiness for the emotion (something 
like “drive”). 
 The rate at which the demon 
presses the key.  Pressing too slowly 
wastes the effort, too fast exceeds the 
whistle’s sound-producing capacity and 
wastes steam. 
 The diameter of intake pipe to 
the boiler, modeling the rate at which 
readiness regenerates 
 The presence of turnkeys to the 
rheostat (variable resistor) in the heating 
wire, modeling the extent to which 
hardwired stimuli (e.g. pain) facilitate 
the emotion.  Emotions vary in their 
readiness to occur without hardwired 
turnkey (“unconditioned”) stimuli, and 
a given process varies among 
individuals, as in the traits of fear- or 
fantasy-proneness.  This readiness is 
modeled by what is the lowest setting of 
the rheostat. 
 Activity in the heating coils of 
other boilers that are hardwired to raise 
or lower this rheostat.  For instance, 
pain might augment sexual arousal or 
decrease laughter. 
 
5.1.2  The behavior of the model 
 
The demon has whatever estimating ability 
the whole individual has, which I do not model 
further.  Emotions are all wired for fast partial 
payoffs, although their long run payoffs are 
variable.  Because of their fast payoffs they have 
a great ability to compete with other choices on 
the demon’s keyboard.   Because hyperbolic 
discounting makes curves from imminent 
payoffs disproportionately high, the demon will 
often be lured into negative emotions—those that 
do not have enduring payoffs and that lower the 
rheostat on other boilers—when a turnkey 
stimulus is present and/or readiness is high.  For 
the same reason he will press wastefully and not 
get the most steam from the available water in 
positive emotions if he presses keys ad lib.  Thus 
he will be motivated to tie his pressing to the 
appearance of adequately rare external cues. 
 
5.2  The value of the model 
 
A quantitatively accurate model would reflect 
the time course of neuronal processes, of course, 
most of which are still unknown.  Even the sites 
of interaction of the components that I have 
illustrated are merely the simplest that will relate 
the dynamic of hyperbolic discounting to the 
known properties of drive and emotion.  I do not 
pretend to fit the promising but still sketchy 
single neuron physiology and fMRI data that are 
beginning to emerge.  
 
 The point of this crude model is to add flesh 
to the bare mathematical fact that hyperbolic 
valuation curves describe the temporary 
dominance of some SS outcomes over some LL 
ones.  That property makes possible a model that 
uses only one selective process (reward) instead 
of the conventional two (classical conditioning 
and reward), and that requires all learnable 
processes, even emotions, to compete in the 
single internal marketplace of motivation.  A 
one-process model is not only more 
parsimonious than the conventional one, but also 
better fits the phenomenon of mixed emotions—
the strangely addictive quality shown often by 
anger and sometimes even by grief and fear.  
Beyond that, as I have argued elsewhere (2001, 
pp. 175-186), a model of emotions that has 
stimuli serve as occasions for them rather than 
rather than control them makes possible dynamic 
theories of the psychological/social construction 
of facts and of empathy as a primary (not 
instrumental) good. 
.   
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Abstract
The animat approach to artificial intelligence proposes biologically-inspired control mechanisms for
autonomous robots. One of the related subproblems is action selection or “what to do next”. Many
action selection architectures have been proposed. Motivation-based architectures implement a com-
bination between internal and external stimuli to choose the appropriate behavior. Recent studies have
pointed out that a second order mechanism to control motivation-based architectures would improve
dramatically their performance. Drawing on the notion of biological hormones we have modeled two
of the functionalities ascribed to them in order to improve the adaptivity of motivation-based architec-
tures. We have tested our “hormone-like” mechanisms in dynamic and unpredictable robotic scenarios.
We analyze the results in terms of interesting behavioral phenomena that emerge from the interaction
of these artificial hormones with the rest of architectural elements.
1 Introduction
Within the “behavior-based” (Brooks, 1986; Steels
and Brooks, 1995) or animat approach (Wilson,
1985; Meyer, 1995) to AI, the ultimate goal of an
autonomous agent is survival in a given dynamic,
unpredictable and possibly threatening environment.
Following inspiration from models in biology, neuro-
science and cybernetics, animat’s survival needs are
commonly represented as internal essential variables.
In order to remain “alive” the animat must main-
tain homeostasis, i.e., keep the level of those essen-
tial variables within certain ranges of viable values
(Ashby, 1952; Aubin, 2000). Since different courses
of action can be taken to maintain homeostasis, one
of the related subproblems is action selection (Maes,
1995), i.e., making a decision as to what behavior to
execute in order to guarantee survival in a given envi-
ronment and situation.
Many action selection architectures have been pro-
posed (see Tyrrell (1993) or Guillot and Meyer (1994)
for an overview). Following the behavior-based ap-
proach to robotics, architectures started to be es-
sentially reactive. Later on it became apparent
that some internal stimuli—e.g., the level of the es-
sential variables—-were necessary in order to keep
those internal variables within their ranges (Arkin,
1992). Following inspiration from ethology (Timber-
gen, 1951; McFarland, 1999) and motivational sys-
tems (McFarland, 1974; Toates, 1986), different ways
of combining internal and external factors started to
appear, proposing integration of those factors at dif-
ferent levels of the action selection process (Maes,
1991; Tyrrell, 1993; Blumberg, 1994; Spier and Mc-
Farland, 1997). In motivation-based architectures
(Can˜amero, 1997), motivations constitute tendencies
to maintain homeostasis as a consequence of internal
and external factors.
In previous studies, we compared different
motivation-based action selection architectures
(Avila-Garcı´a and Can˜amero, 2002), and we sug-
gested that the cyclic fashion in which motivations
are satisfied greatly influences the performance
of the agent (Avila-Garcı´a et al., 2003). In this
paper, we show that the same action selection
architecture, appropriate in certain static environ-
ments, does not perform viable activity cycles in
environments with added dynamic complexities. We
propose “hormone-like” mechanisms to adapt action
selection architectures to changing and dynamic
environmental circumstances. Such mechanisms
modulate the sensory input of motivation-based
architectures in order to adapt its decisions to
the changing environmental circumstances. Our
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modulatory mechanisms are based on the functional
properties of hormones (Levitan and Kaczmarek,
1997).
Section 2 describes the architectural elements of
our action selection architectures. Section 3 shows
how hormonal modulation of the perception of ex-
ternal stimuli (exteroceptors) adapt the action selec-
tion architecture to a competitive scenario. Sec-
tion 4 shows hormonal modulation of the percep-
tion of one internal essential variable (interoceptor)
to adapt the architecture to a dynamic prey-predator
scenario. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 Action Selection Architectures
Our motivation-based architectures consist of two
layers—motivational and behavioral—linked through
a synthetic physiology, leading to a two-step compu-
tation of intensity. This computation is parallel within
each layer, but motivational intensity must be com-
puted prior to the calculation of behavioral intensity,
since the latter depends on the former. The moti-
vational layer is made of motivational states that set
the goals of the system—the tendency to satisfy bod-
ily (physiological) or internal needs. The behavioral
layer implements different ways in which those bod-
ily needs can be satisfied. This distinction between
motivations and behaviors is essential when imple-
menting more than one behavior satisfying the same
motivation (Toates, 1986).
The Physiology consists of a number of survival-
related, homeostatically controlled essential vari-
ables—abstractions representing the level of internal
resources that the agent needs in order to survive.
They must be kept within a range of values for the
robot to stay “alive,” thus defining a physiological
space (Sibly and McFarland, 1974) or viability zone
(Ashby, 1952; Meyer, 1995) within which survival
(continued existence) is guaranteed, whereas trans-
gression of these boundaries leads to “death.”
Motivations are abstractions representing tenden-
cies to behave in particular ways as a consequence of
internal and external factors (Toates, 1986). Internal
factors are mainly (but not only) bodily or physiolog-
ical deficits or needs (0 ≤ di ≤ 1), also traditionally
known as “drives,” that set urges to action to main-
tain the state of the controlled physiological variables
within the viability zone. External factors are envi-
ronmental stimuli or incentive cues (0 ≤ ci ≤ 1)
that allow to execute (consummatory) behaviors and
hence to satisfy bodily needs. In our implementation,
each motivation performs homeostatic control of one
physiological variable. We have used the equation
Motivation-
Based
Action
Selection
Environment
Internal and External
Hormonal
Modulation
Figure 1: Model of hormonal modulation of a
motivation-based action selection architecture.
proposed in (Avila-Garcı´a et al., 2003) to combine
cue and physiological deficit when computing moti-
vations’ intensities:
mi = di + (di × αci) (1)
In addition to physiological deficits (di) and the
presence of environmental cues (ci), we have intro-
duced a weighting factor (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) to change the
relevance given to the external cue. Note that with
α = 0 the intensity of the cue does not have any ef-
fect on the motivation’s intensity.
Behaviors are coarse-grained subsystems (embed-
ding simpler actions) that implement different com-
petencies, similarly to those proposed in (Maes,
1991; Can˜amero, 1997). Following the classical dis-
tinction in ethology (McFarland, 1999) and more re-
cent advances in neuroscience (Robbins and Everitt,
1999), motivated behaviors can be consummatory
(goal-achieving and needing the presence of an in-
centive stimulus to be executed) or appetitive (goal-
directed search for a particular incentive stimulus). In
addition to modifying the external environment, the
execution of a behavior has an impact on (increases
or decreases) the level of specific physiological vari-
ables. Therefore they are a mechanism to maintain
the state of the physiological variables within the vi-
ability zone.
2.1 Hormonal Control Layer
Our architectures contain a second order control layer
in the form of hormone-like mechanisms (Figure 1).
We take inspiration from models of hormonal con-
trol in neuroscience (Kravitz, 1988; Harris-Warrick
et al., 1992) to modulate the sensory channels of
motivation-based action selection architectures:
(a) Sensory inputs enhance the release of hormones
that act at different levels of the nervous system:
e.g. sensory elements.
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Table 1: Motivations used. Physiological drive repre-
sents the tendency of the motivation to decrement the
physiological deficit until the correspondent variable
reaches a set point of 100.
Motivation Drive Limit Set point Ext. Stim.
mcold ↓ dtemperature 0 100 cheat
mfatigue ↓ denergy 0 100 cfood
Table 2: Behaviors used by the WTA architecture.
Behavior Type Stimulus Effects on physiology
bavoid Reflex. sobstacle + 0.2 dtemp, + 0.2 denergy
bwarmup Consum. cheat – 1.0 dtemp, + 0.3 denergy
bfeed Consum. cfood + 0.3 dtemp, – 1.0 denergy
bsearch Appet. None + 0.2 dtemp, + 0.2 denergy
(b) They act as gain-setting sensitization process
that biases the output of the organism in particu-
lar directions.
(c) The organism now responds to particular sen-
sory stimuli with an altered output appropriate
to the new situation.
3 Modulation of Exteroceptors
In previous studies we analyzed different motivation-
based action selection architectures within a static
Two-Resource Problem (TRP) (Avila-Garcı´a et al.,
2003), where a single robot must maintain optimum
temperature and energy levels consuming two re-
sources available in the environment—heat and food
respectively. Resources were static, i.e., their loca-
tion did not change and they were always equally ac-
cessible. In that study we used a Lego Mindstorms
robot, performing in a 1m× 1m arena surrounded by
a wall, with bright and black gradients representing
heat and food sources respectively (see Figure 2). Ta-
bles 1 and 2 detail our particular implementation of
the TRP. We used two environmental resources (in-
centive cues) that allow to satisfy two physiological
needs, the deficits of which give rise to two motiva-
tional states. Motivations are satisfied by the execu-
tion of a consummatory behavior. The execution of
each behavior reduces the deficit of one physiologi-
cal variable, increasing the deficit of the other one.
Our extension of this problem, the Competitive
Two-Resource Problem (CTRP) consists in the in-
troduction of two robots in the same environment
simultaneously performing their own TRP. The fact
that they have to use the same resources to sat-
Figure 2: Our robotic Two-Resource Problem (TRP)
scenario. The environment is a 1m×1m arena inhab-
ited by one robot, two heat resources and two food
resources. Heat and food resources are represented
as brightness and darkness gradients on the floor of
the arena.
isfy their needs introduces competition for those re-
sources, as both robots might need access to the same
resource at the same time. Thus, new forms of envi-
ronmental complexity—availability and accessibility
of resources—appear due to the interaction between
robots. These forms of complexity effectively affect
the stability and viability of activity cycles performed
by the robots (Avila-Garcı´a and Can˜amero, 2004b).
Using activity cycles analysis (Avila-Garcı´a et al.,
2003) we can see that the action selection mechanism
used within the TRP presents incoherences within
the CTRP, performing pathological cycles of activ-
ities. Firstly, the robot can fall in a pathological
sequence of opportunistic activities—consuming the
same resource—that eventually can drive the robot to
death (over-opportunism). Secondly, when one robot
is located on top of a resource—i.e., consuming it—
the other robot might bump into it and push it out of
the resource. This will result in the interruption of the
ongoing consummatory activity.
3.1 Hormonal Mechanism
Neurohormones interact with the nervous system to
modulate behavioral output, acting at different levels
and evoking a spectrum of different responses on dif-
ferent target neurons, in what has been called “neu-
romodulation” (Kravitz, 1988). In this section we
are inspired by the ability of neuromodulators to ex-
tract different functionalities from the same anatomi-
cal neural circuit (Harris-Warrick et al., 1992; Levitan
and Kaczmarek, 1997).
We propose a single “hormone-like” mechanism to
solve the problems described above. Firstly, it re-
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Figure 3: Proposed hormone-like modulatory mech-
anism for the action selection architecture. A gland
(g) secretes the hormone, whose concentration (cg)
is a function of the stimulus competitor (sc) and the
Risk of Death (RoD) from physiological deficits.
duces opportunistic activities when there is any risk
of death. By acting on the parameter α of equa-
tion 1—i.e., biasing the relevance given to external
cues—the hormone reduces the perception of both
incentive cues. Secondly, the hormone potentiates
the competition skills of the robot by enhancing its
capacity to push the other robot out the resources
and not to be interrupted when consuming resources.
This is obtained by cancelling the perception of ob-
stacles (sobstacle)—and hence the avoidance reflex
behavior—when the robot is facing the competitor.
To achieve this twofold functionality, the concen-
tration of hormone will be the function of the risk of
death and the perception of the competitor. We de-
fine Risk of Death (RoD) as the inverse of the dis-
tance between physiological state (dtemper, denergy)
and lethal boundaries. The perception of the competi-
tor is given by a new stimulus 0 ≤ scompetitor ≤ 1.
Hormone concentration will be computed as:
cg = RoD + scompetitor (2)
Finally, we have to define the relation between hor-
mone concentration and the cancellation of the per-
ception of incentive cues and obstacles. In order to
achieve the first functionality, the cancellation of α is
directly proportional to the increment in the hormone
concentration. Therefore, when RoD rises α drops.
α = min(1− cg, 0) (3)
The second functionality is obtained by cancelling
the perception of sobstacle—i.e., bumpers—when the
competitor is in front of the robot. There are two con-
ditions that must be fulfilled to make a coherent push-
ing of the other robot. First, the robot must avoid get-
ting engaged in fights when it has high RoD. Second,
it must only bump blindly into the other robot, not
against the walls of the arena. To produce that effect
the cancellation of the bumpers must be at hormonal
levels cg  1 and cg  2.
Note that the motivation-based action selection ar-
chitecture has suffered no modification, apart from
the fact that now one of its parameters (α, equation 1)
at sensory level is modulated by the hormonal feed-
back mechanism.
3.2 Experiments
We have tested the robots in a total of 16 runs of 1200
steps each. Each step represents a loop of the action
selection mechanism, taking 260ms1. This means
that each run lasts about 5 minutes.
The robot with hormone-like mechanism recov-
ers the stability and viability of activity cycles. In
this paper we focus on the interesting functionali-
ties that emerge from the modulation of the percep-
tion of the robot’s external stimuli; for a quantita-
tive analysis in terms of viability indicators and activ-
ity cycles see (Avila-Garcı´a and Can˜amero, 2004b).
The first functionality is stopping of consuming re-
sources when the robot detects its competitor ap-
proaching. This could be interpreted by an external
observer as abandonment of a situation (waiting for
the other robot at the resource) that is disadvanta-
geous to compete. Instead, the robot will leave the
resource and go straightforward towards the competi-
tor until it reaches it; at that moment, if there is some
level of RoD, the bumpers of the robot will not be
cancelled and it will avoid the competitor—showing
a behavior that an observer could interpret as “fear”
after evaluating the competitor. On the contrary, if
there is not RoD, the hormonal system will cancel
the bumpers and the robot will push the competitor
unconditionally—as if it showed some sort of “ag-
gression” against it. If we study the whole picture as
external observers, the previous behavioral phenom-
ena could well be interpreted as some sort of “protec-
tion of resources”.
4 Modulation of Interoceptors
In this second part of the paper we extend the previ-
ous study by introducing a third physiological vari-
1Lego Mindstorms robots use a 16MHz microcontroller
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Table 3: Extra motivation used in the H3RP.
Motivation Drive Limit Set point Ext. Stim.
mdamage ↓ dintegrity 0 100 cnest
Table 4: Extra behavior used in the H3RP.
Behavior Type Stimulus Effects on physiology
brecover Consum. cnest + 0.4 dt, + 0.4 de, – 1.0 di
able, integrity, which is unpredictably reduced by the
environment (see Table 3). We call our new test bed
the Hazardous 3-Resource Problem (H3RP). This ex-
tra variable will work as a metaphor of the essential
need any organism has to keep its tissue—the bound-
ary between the organism and its environment—
without damage. The environment reduces the
robot’s integrity level in a semi-unpredictable way
through the action of an extra robot, the predator.
The predator simply chases the prey robot and bumps
into it, touching a wire ring that surrounds the prey’s
structure. The prey robot is able to recover the level
of energy going to a specific place in the environment,
the nest (see Table 4). Figure 4 shows both prey and
predator within the arena.
In preliminary experiments we can observe that
a motivation-based action selection mechanism does
not perform well within the new framework (Avila-
Garcı´a and Can˜amero, 2004a). Using activity cycles
analysis we show that the behavior of the robot in the
new environment is incoherent. The problem arises
when the action selection mechanism pays low atten-
tion to the new motivation to recover integrity even
when the predator is at sight. The probability to lose
integrity rises when the predator is around, therefore
the prey robot should predict that loss and anticipate
the recovering of integrity.
A simple solution consists in using one of the ex-
isting sensors of the prey robot to detect the preda-
tor. This sensor must be the same one used to lo-
cate the nest. The problem of using that sensor is
that it is fixed pointing forwards. Since the predator
seldom passes in front of the prey, this extra stim-
ulus (spredator) will be too low to make any differ-
ence. However, our hormone makes the system more
sensitive to integrity deficit after the detection of the
predator. Hormonal secretion follows the detection
of the stimulus spredator and increases the perceived
integrity deficit. Using the hormone’s temporal dy-
namics, the modulation will be acting in the system
long time after the predator has disappeared from sen-
sory inputs. The concentration of hormone thus mod-
Figure 4: The prey robot recovering the level of
integrity, facing the corner that represents the nest,
about to be attacked by the predator.
ifies one of the inputs of the architecture and, as we
will see in the next section, biases action selection.
We thus make use of the temporal dynamics of an
artificial hormone to maintain the stimulus spredator
increasing the motivation to recover long after the
predator is out of sight. Like in the previous case,
we propose a “hormones-like” mechanism that acts
again as a second order modulator of the motivation-
based action selection architecture.
4.1 Hormonal Mechanism
In this section we model another functionality as-
cribed also to hormones: long-term changes in be-
havior (Levitan and Kaczmarek, 1997). We have
modeled hormonal temporal dynamics—release and
dissipation—using the artificial endocrine system
proposed by Neal and Timmis (2003)—equations 4
and 5. The first element is a gland (g) that releases the
hormone as a function of the intensity of the external
stimulus predator (spredator) and a constant releasing
rate βg:
rg = βg · spredator (4)
The concentration of hormone suffers two opposite
forces over time: it increases with the release of hor-
mone by the gland, and dissipates or decays over time
at a constant rate γg:
c(t + 1)g = max[(c(t)g · γg) + rg, 100] (5)
Note that we constrain the hormonal concentration
to a maximum of cg = 100. In this first implementa-
tion, we have decided to do so in order to keep more
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Figure 5: Hormonal level during a total of 600
steps. The dotted line represents the stimulus preda-
tor spredator (scaled between 0 and 100 to be shown
in comparison with the hormonal level). When the
predator is detected (spredator > 0) there is hormone
release proportional to the intensity of the stimulus.
After any release the hormone concentration decays
with time.
control on the hormone’s dynamics and thus facilitate
the analysis of results. Figure 5 shows the hormone’s
dynamics given a release rate of βg = 0.25, and a de-
cay rate of γg = 0.98. Those values were set by trial
and error prior the experiments. We can observe how
the hormone is released when the predator is detected
(spredator > 0) and how it decays with time.
In this implementation, the hormone increases the
perception of the integrity deficit (dintegrity): the
higher the hormone concentration the higher the read-
ing of the dintegrity interoceptor:
dnewintegrity = max(dintegrity + δg · cg, 1) (6)
Factor δg determines how susceptible to hormonal
modulation the dintegrity interoceptor is. We use
δg = 0.005, which implies that the level of per-
ceived dintegrity is increased by 0.5 when the hor-
monal concentration is maximum (cg = 100). In
other words, although the level of integrity is at its
ideal value (dintegrity = 0), the interoceptor will per-
ceive a level of 0.5 if the hormone concentration is
maximum. Note that there is a constraint to avoid the
level of integrity deficit to be perceived beyond the
maximum possible value (dintegrity = 1).
Figure 6 shows the architecture with the new hor-
monal mechanism, that increases the perceived in-
tegrity deficit when the predator is nearby.
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Figure 6: Proposed hormone-like modulatory mech-
anism for the action selection architecture. The hor-
mone is secrete as a function of the stimulus predator
(spredator); its concentration decays over time, and
modifies the perception of integrity deficit by the ac-
tion selection architecture.
4.2 Experiments
We tested the robot during 16 runs of 1600 steps each.
This means that each architecture was tested for al-
most two hours in our H3RP.
The prey robot presented higher stability and vi-
ability levels when equipped with the hormone-
like mechanism. Please refer to (Avila-Garcı´a and
Can˜amero, 2004a) for a more detailed quantitative
analysis in terms of viability indicators and activ-
ity cycles. In this paper we focus on the difference
in outer behavior between the prey with and with-
out hormone. With hormonal mechanism, the incre-
ment in the execution time of recover-related (ap-
petitive and consummatory) activities is statistically
highly significant, i.e., the robot spends more time
looking for the nest and recovering integrity in it.
Other important phenomenon is the interruption of
ongoing consummatory feeding or warming-up ac-
tivities. When the robot is under the effect of the
hormone it will abandon the resource and come back
to the nest before the motivation has been satiated.
The prey robot, when equipped with hormonal mech-
anism, presents statistically higher levels of interrup-
tion of ongoing feeding or warming-up activities.
Prey animals use unconditioned and conditioned
predator cues to assess risk of predation. Curio
(1993) suggests that a less studied but equally im-
portant feature is their ability to perceive risks in
the absence of such cues. One example is the risk
of permanence, or maintained levels of vigilance af-
ter predator’s disappearance. Our long-term hor-
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monal modulation of action selection may be seen
as predation risk assessment in the absence of preda-
tor cues. Risk of predation strongly influences an-
imal decision-making, for example, when to feed,
where to feed, vigilance, or the use of nest (Lima
and Dill, 1990). Risk of predation has been proposed
to increase the animal’s level of “apprehension,” that
is the reduction in attention to other activities—e.g.
foraging—as a result of increasing the time executing
defense-related activities—e.g. vigilance or refuge
use— (Kavaliers and Choleris, 2001). Our hormone-
like mechanism may be seen as increasing the level of
apprehension of the prey robot after short-term preda-
tor exposure. This is reflected in an increment of the
recover execution time at the cost of the other two
activities—feed and warmup.
5 Conclusion
It is widely accepted that exposure to certain stim-
uli results in secretion of neurohormones–hormones
and neurotransmitters—that have a long-term effect
on antipredator and conspecific defensive/aggressive
behavior in animals (Blanchard et al., 1998, 2001).
In this paper we first show how hormonal modu-
lation of the perception of external stimuli (extero-
ceptors) can adapt the same architecture to new envi-
ronmental circumstances, where the robot instead of
being alone in an environment must compete with an-
other “conspecific” for the same resources. The robot
with hormonal modulation performs better than the
one without it; moreover, it shows some emergent be-
havioral phenomena that could be interpreted by an
external observer as agressive/defensive behavior.
In the second part of the paper we show how the
temporal dynamics of hormones helps the same ac-
tion selection architecture to adapt to a new dynamic
environment. The hormonal modulation acts this
time on the interoceptor of one of the physiological
variables, making the action selection process more
sensitive to its level. With the hormonal modulator
the robot performs better, and some new behavioral
phenomena emerge that could be interrelated as “flee-
ing” behavior and “apprehension” in a standard prey-
predator scenario.
We suggest that such a modulatory hormonal sys-
tems improves the structural coupling between an an-
imat and its environment in a way that is different
from other mechanism such as learning or evolution,
for which “past solutions” are “overwritten” by new
ones. Hormonal modulation can change the function-
ing of the same action selection architectures, by sim-
ply acting at its sensory input, to produce adaptive be-
havior to any of the environmental conditions of the
animat’s niche.
Neuromodulation has already been related to emo-
tions. (Fellous, 2004) proposes emotions as neuro-
modulatory patterns of a neural substrate, and con-
text dependent computation as one of their possible
functions in robotics. It is interesting to note that
our two instances of hormonal modulation effectively
produces a context dependent action selection, where
the context is the risk of death due to, in the first place,
the presence of a competitor and, in the second case,
the presence of a predator.
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Abstract 
 
The present paper is aimed to study the influence of different personality factors, implemented via complex 
software architecture, in the exploration of environment by mobile robots like RWI-B21. We adopted the social 
cognition framework (e.g. Rotter, 1960; Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972; Bandura, 1977) that considers the 
individuals’ motivated and emotionally oriented behaviours as the result of their cognitive evaluations of the 
environment demands and of their own capabilities to cope it. In this framework, we present two robots provided 
with an internal vs. external locus of control. Our robot architecture, that integrates motivations, emotions and 
symbolic knowledge representation by means of a rich and expressive conceptual area where affective 
computing takes place, is based on a constant matching between the expected results of a goal-oriented action 
and its real outcomes. The psychological evaluation of the success/failure of the goal-oriented behaviour is 
modulated by the robot locus of control that regulates the expectancy updating values and the mood state used 
by robots in exploring the environment. We present some experiments of the proposed architecture, performed 
on RWI-B21 robot assigned with a navigation task. 
 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
The present paper is aimed to study the influence of 
different personality factors, implemented via 
complex software architecture, in environmental 
tasks executing by mobile robots like RWI-B21. 
To this aim, we adopted the social cognition 
framework that considers the individuals’ motivated 
and emotionally oriented behaviours as the result of 
their cognitive evaluations of the environment 
demands and of their own capabilities to cope it.  
According to the social learning theory (Rotter, 
1960; Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972; Bandura, 
1977) the individuals’ motivated behaviours arise 
17
  
from the relatively consistent and characteristic ways 
in which a person represents, decides and expects to 
reach his/her goals evaluating the events according 
his/her success/failure perceptions. Therefore, the 
human behaviour is goal-oriented and the chance 
that a given behaviour occurs is a function of two 
combined factors: the first is the expectation that a 
particular behaviour will obtain a reward; the second 
is the perceived value of this reward by the 
individual. The perception of reward is modulated 
by the individuals’ locus of control (e.g. Rotter, 
1966; 1975; Strickland, 1978; Cardaci, 1988; 
Marshall, Collins, & Crooks, 1990; Lefcourt, 1991; 
McLaughlin, & Saccuzzo, 1997). People with an 
internal locus of control expect to be personally 
responsible of their outcomes (in terms of 
success/failure); internality is associated both with 
high motivational levels and high expectations of 
obtaining the reward. People with an external locus 
of control attribute their outcomes to a variety of 
external causes as luck, fate, others, and so on; 
externality is associated both with low motivational 
levels and low expectations of obtaining the reward. 
In this perspective, when a “junctures of plans” 
occurs (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), or in other 
words, when people feel a smoothing or strong 
mismatching between the expected result of a 
planned behaviour and the real outcome, their locus 
of control modulates the emotive appraisals of the 
event and the following generation of coping 
strategies (Lazarus, 1966; Frijda, 1986). Rotter 
(1966; 1975) found strong support for the 
hypothesis that the locus of control influences the 
emotionally oriented behaviours, inducing internal 
people to believe that they can control their own 
destinies by personal efforts and resources (e.g. 
Rotter, 1966; McLaughlin, & Saccuzzo, 1997) and, 
conversely, external people to believe that results 
are not under their control.  
 
2   The Architecture 
 
In this framework, we developed a robotic 
architecture that integrates motivations, emotions 
and symbolic knowledge representation in 
performing different environmental tasks (see Figure 
1). It allows two robots, which differ each other 
about their “personality” and in particular in their 
locus of control, to represent and to explore the 
environment by means of a rich and expressive 
conceptual area, based on the theory of conceptual 
spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000). Conceptual spaces 
provide a principled way for relating high level, 
linguistic formalisms, with low level, unstructured 
representation of data. A conceptual space (CS) is a 
metric space whose dimensions are related to the 
quantities processed by the robot sensors. Some 
dimensions are related to object’s shape, while other 
dimensions are related to the displacement in space 
of the moving 3D shape. We adopt the term knoxel 
to denote a point in the conceptual space. In order to 
account for the perception of dynamic scenes, we 
choose to adopt an intrinsically dynamic conceptual 
space (Chella, Frixione & Gaglio, 2000). The robot 
CS is generalized to represent moving and 
interacting entities: the generic motion of an object 
is represented in its wholeness, rather than as a 
sequence of static frames (Marr &Vaina, 1982). 
The dynamic conceptual space lets the agent to 
imagine possible future interactions with its 
environment. The evolution of the scene is 
represented as a sequence of sets of knoxel that is 
imagined and simulated in the conceptual space 
before the interaction really happens in the real 
world expectations. The link between the conceptual 
space representation of the robot and the robot 
behaviour system is described in details in (Chella, 
Gaglio & Pirrone, 2001). 
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CONTROL 
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Figure 1: The robot architecture 
 
Both robots, indeed, are provided with a similar 
initial expectancy used for choosing a goal; in the 
following plan generation phase, they generate a 
plan of actions in order to produce the expected 
situations. This level of representation can be 
considered as the robot mental imagery and, as 
previously stated, is represented in the conceptual 
space as a sequence of sets of knoxel. During plan 
execution, the robot perceives the environment and 
it is able to compare the expected results of its 
actions, as they were simulated during plan 
generation, and the real results according to its 
current perceptions.  
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The differences between the two robots’ 
personalities arise in the expectancy updating phase 
that is modulated by the robots’ Locus of Controls. 
The updating of the expectancy value, that depends 
on the result of the matching, simulates the 
internality of the robot; the updating of the 
expectancy value in a random way simulates the 
externality of the robot. The expectancy updated 
value is used by both robots to increment/decrement 
their mood states: the internal robot experiments a 
range of mood states from a positive one in the case 
of total matching to a particularly “depressed” one in 
the case of mismatching. In the first case, the robot 
will behave more persistently in the achievement of 
goals of increased difficulty level; in the second 
case, the robot experiences a sort of “learned 
helplessness” (Seligman, 1972) that bring it to 
choose goals of decreased difficulty level. On the 
contrary, the external robot experiments its mood 
states in a random way both in the case of matching 
and mismatching, independently of the behavioural 
outcomes. The mood states affects both the 
execution speed of the following behaviours and, as 
shows in Figure 2, the region surrounding the set of 
knoxels representing the perceived and expected 
situations. The changes in the conceptual space 
influences the new plan generation and/or the 
choosing of new goals. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A pictorial representation of the 
conceptual space of an internal robot: in case of 
partial matching the robot experiments a “grey” 
mood state.  
 
3   Experimental Results 
 
The proposed architecture was tested on an RWI-
B21 robot assigned with a navigation task in a 
known environment. In order to measure the 
expectancy updating value, we simulated various 
success/failure situations experienced by the internal 
and external robots living in the same environment 
(we fixed to 0.5 the initial expectancy value for both 
robots). In Table 1, we reported the expectancy 
updating values associated with various matching 
sequences.  
 
Table 1: Expectancy updating values corresponding 
to various matching sequences. 
 
Matching 
Sequences Expectancy updating value 
 
Internal 
Robot 
External 
Robot 
Difference 
I-E 
1; 1 12.5 4.0 8.5 
0.8; 1 11.3 1.7 9.6 
0.5; 1 9.5 -0.3 9.8 
0.5; -1 -2.5 -3.7 1.2 
1; -1 0.5 2.6 -2.1 
1; -0.1 6.5 -0.9 7.4 
-1; 1; 0.5 1.2 -0.7 
-1; -1 -11.5 -2.1 -9.4 
[-1; 1] ≡[Total Mismatching ; Total Matching] 
 
As hypothesized, the expectancy updating value is 
quite different for the internal/external robots. For 
example, in Table 1, the first row represents the 
result of success/success situations (six iteration): 
the internal robot reaches an expectancy updating 
value of 12.5, while, the external robot reaches an 
expectancy updating value of 4. Such values affect 
the robots’ mood in a sensible different way. In the 
third column is possible to observe that, depending 
on each success/failure sequence (e.g. 1,1; 0.5, 1; -1, 
-1), the difference between the I-E robots is more or 
less amplified.  
 
4   Conclusion  
 
These results indicate that, as observed in human 
beings (e.g. Rotter, 1966; 1975), the internal robot is 
more persistent and motivated in reaching its goals 
in highly predictable environments, but his 
internality becomes a “depressing” factor in more 
dynamic and unpredictable ones. On the contrary, 
the external robot doesn’t vary its expectancy value 
depending on the environmental context; this feature 
allows him to be less emotionally vulnerable than 
the internal robot in dynamic and unpredictable 
environments and less persistent and motivated in 
predictable ones.  
The obtained results demonstrate the utility of 
multidisciplinary research in the field of Affective 
Computing. In particular, the implementation of 
psychological theories in robotics agents may both 
validate the specific models of personality used and 
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provide human-like personalities to traditionally 
rational artificial agents. 
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Abstract 
 
To survive in a complex environment, agents must be able to encode information about the utility value of the 
objects they meet. We propose a neuroscience-based model aiming to explain how a new memory is associated 
to an emotional response. The same theoretical framework also explains the effects of emotion on memory re-
call. The originality of our approach is to postulate the presence of two central processing units (CPUs): one 
computing only emotional information, and the other mainly concerned with cognitive processing. The emo-
tional CPU, which is phylogenetically older, is assumed to modulate the cognitive CPU, which is more recent. 
The article first deals with the cognitive part of the model by highlighting the set of processes underlying mem-
ory recognition and storage. Then, building on this theoretical background, the emotional part highlights how 
the emotional response is computed and stored.  The last section describes the interplay between the cognitive 
and emotional systems. 
 
1   Introduction 
Intensive research in neuroscience has established a 
close link between emotion, cognition, and action. 
In recent years, researchers in artificial intelligence 
and robotics have attempted to build artificial sys-
tems where emotional and motivational mechanisms 
modulate cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Pfeifer & 
Scheier, 1999). However, these attempts have so far 
been directed at modelling animal behaviour and/or 
relatively simple tasks, and did not use current 
knowledge of the human brain. We suggest that, in 
order to understand how emotion, motivation, cog-
nition and action interact in complex systems it is 
necessary to use the information provided by current 
research in neuroscience.  
 
The aim of this paper is to propose a model linking 
emotion and cognition that is based on recent devel-
opments in neuroscience. In particular, we want to 
identify the learning and memory mechanisms that 
enable memories to be influenced by emotions. We 
also discuss how the proposed mechanisms relate to 
chunking, a mechanism that has been shown to be 
central to cognition from simple animals to human 
experts. While we do not present a computer or ro-
botic implementation of these mechanisms, we be-
lieve that they will be of interest to researchers 
building such implementations and others attending 
this symposium. In particular, we hope that the ideas 
presented in this theoretical paper will entice col-
leagues to build computer or robotic systems that 
will allow testing them empirically.  
 
The first section presents a model of memory proc-
essing. The model describes the mechanisms behind 
object recognition and storage, and spells out the 
role of the cognitive central processing unit (CPU). 
In the second section, we present a model of emo-
tional processing. The objective is to show how an 
affect is generated from recognised objects and to 
make clear the relation between the retrieval of 
stored information and that of emotional response. 
In this section, we also introduce the concept of an 
emotional CPU, which computes the emotional re-
sponse. Finally, we present an integrative model that 
consists of the two previous components. Thus, a 
direct link is made between memory storage and 
emotional processing. The interaction between the 
two CPUs is crucial, as it is the means by which the 
emotional responses are actually influencing cogni-
tive processing.  
 
2   The cognitive system 
2.1   Bottom-up processing 
The recognition of an object is done when a particu-
lar configuration of neurons coding for the object 
and its properties is activated. Such distributed neu-
ral networks, which activate a small number of 
modules concerned with different types of informa-
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tion (spatial, auditory, etc…), are known as cell as-
semblies (Sakurai, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A cell assembly (CA). Cells possibly lo-
cated in distinct parts of the brain are activated 
jointly.  
 
A cell assembly is distributed in distinct brain areas. 
The cells forming a cell assembly are closely inter-
connected (bold links in the Figure 1): the activation 
of a neuron belonging to the assembly is likely to 
activate the other neurons of the assembly. This 
propagation law makes the CA act as a unit: when a 
subpart of the CA is activated (e.g., the property of 
an object is recognised), the spreading activation is 
very likely to activate all the CA, so that the object 
is recognised even if some of the information is 
missing (e.g., when an object is partially hidden).  
 
As soon as an object is recognised, the neural coor-
dinates serve as a pointer for short-term memory 
(STM) storage. It is likely that top-down inhibitory 
control processes are carried out at this stage, speci-
fying whether or not the recognised object is of in-
terest and should accordingly be stored in STM. 
 
2.2   The functions of the cognitive CPU 
When a CA is activated (i.e., an object is recog-
nised), a pointer that codes for this CA is stored in 
STM. As each recognised object activates a CA, the 
role of the cognitive CPU is to compute an overall 
representation of the external milieu by connecting 
the active CAs. This computation is likely to have 
two main consequences: 
 
(i) To activate new pathways between the cell as-
semblies. 
(ii) To modify the dynamics within each cell assem-
bly. The spreading activation of any cell assembly is 
now an input for all others.  
 
The result of this computation is the emergence of a 
new dynamic neural network (DNN) that represents 
the external milieu. The DNN is maintained active 
by CPU processing. Unlike CAs, the DNN needs an 
active control to remain active. 
 
2.3   Consolidation: Long-term memory 
The question now arises as to how the DNN may be 
encoded more permanently. In line with this theo-
retical framework, long-term memory (LTM) storage 
refers to the processes that change the neural net-
work activity computed by the cognitive CPU into 
one consolidated memory trace. Neuroscience is 
bringing converging evidence supporting the view 
that the medial temporal lobe mediates information 
storage in the sensory cortices by generating struc-
tural changes via mechanisms like long-term poten-
tiation (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000). We 
suggest that, following the computation of a new 
DNN (see previous section), the CPU supervises its 
consolidation into durable memory traces. Such 
consolidation is done through the synthesis of new 
synapses consolidating the new connections (Kandel 
et al., 2000). As a result of the consolidation of 
memory traces, a new durable CA emerges, and thus 
a new object can be recognised. We note that the 
new CA encompasses the previous CAs coding for 
the individual objects. This process of building new 
patterns by accretion of previous ones is known as 
chunking (Gobet et al., 2001). 
 
Chronologically, the chain of reactions leading to 
the emergence of a new CA is initiated by bottom-
up processing which generates the recognition of 
objects. As soon as recognition is done, the CPU 
computes a dynamical network that represents the 
situation in STM. Thanks to the consolidation proc-
ess, the dynamical network evolves into a structural 
network. This leads to the emergence of a new cell 
assembly that could be activated by discrimination 
of entrant stimuli. 
 
So far, we have presented a theoretical framework 
for memory recognition and storage. The key com-
ponent is the cognitive CPU, the function of which 
is twofold: first, to compute the representation of the 
external milieu based on the recognised objects and, 
second, to consolidate the new computed representa-
tion in memory. In the next section, we turn our 
attention to emotional processing. 
 
3   The emotional system 
3.1   The functions of emotions 
The information processed by the cognitive system, 
although useful for survival, lacks any utility value. 
However, a living system needs to know the utility 
of the objects in the environment in relation to a 
given task. Emotions, which play this role, have 
been defined by Rolls (2003) as “states elicited by 
rewards and punishers” (p. 552). A reward is what a 
living system is ready to work for, and a punisher is 
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what it tries to avoid. Emotions are thus goal-
directed, and values depend on the goal (the motiva-
tor). For example, when one is cooking, the goal is 
to prepare good food (motivator). Each element tak-
ing part in the action of cooking has its own utility  
(emotional value: reward or punisher). In general, 
emotions structure the environment by tagging ob-
jects with an emotional value relative to a goal (the 
motivator). The emotional physiological response 
consists in preparing the body for action (Frijda, 
1993). What remains to be spelled out is how the 
emotional system tags information from the envi-
ronment, and how this influences high-level cogni-
tive processes. 
 
 
3.2   Emotional processing 
A key issue in emotion research is how a neutral 
stimulus comes to generate emotional responses 
with experience. A good example from this field of 
research is LeDoux’s (2002) model of fear condi-
tioning, which links emotion and cognition in the 
simplest way: a stimulus, previously neutral to the 
animal, is paired to an emotional response.  This 
model of fear learning illustrates that emotional re-
sponses are stored, and that they can be linked to 
stored objects. As soon as the object is recognised, 
the emotional response is retrieved. Fear is an 
unlearned punisher, thus likely to be genetically 
coded (Rolls, 2003). But some emotions are experi-
ence-dependent and thus ontologically built. There-
fore, we need to provide an explanation of how new 
emotions are computed from previous emotional 
responses. This necessary flexibility suggests the 
existence of a system regulating emotional re-
sponses.   
 
A living system has thus to be able to process emo-
tions that do not induce automatic responses. In ad-
dition, different objects are likely to induce different 
emotions, giving rise to internal conflicts. To deal 
with these issues, we propose a model where three 
steps of information processing are postulated. In 
the first step, any recognised object in a scene acti-
vates its associated emotional response. In the sec-
ond step, the emotional CPU computes an overall 
emotional response in the same way as the cognitive 
CPU computes an overall representation. That is, the 
emotional responses are physiological levels that 
encode objects utility values; in order to integrate 
the emotional responses, the CPU sums the utilities 
of all objects. In the third and final step, the com-
puted emotion is felt by the individual as related to 
the representation of the external milieu.  
 
This model, which spells out how recognised ob-
jects can retrieve different emotions, explains how 
the living system generates new emotions based on 
the emotional responses of the recognised objects. 
But the living system also needs a way to combine 
the overall emotional response with the representa-
tion computed by the cognitive CPU. This issue is 
addressed in the next section. 
 
4   Cognition and emotion 
 
4.1   Empirical evidence on the influence 
of emotion 
There is substantial empirical evidence supporting a 
close relationship between the cognitive and emo-
tional systems, and two examples will suffice here. 
Erk et al. (2003) demonstrated that non-emotional 
objects are better encoded in memory when they 
have been associated to a strong enough emotional 
clue. That is, the emotional context modulates the 
encoding of memories with no prior emotional 
value. Kilpatrick and Cahill (2003) showed emo-
tionally loaded film clips to their participants, and, 
using neuroimaging techniques, showed that the 
amygdala, a brain structure related to emotional 
processing, influences the hippocampus, a brain 
structure related to memory consolidation.  
 
4.2   Emotion and memory storage and 
retrieval 
The emotional and cognitive processes are both par-
allel and serial (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. The information flow: a summary 
 
In order to clarify them we divide the chain of ac-
tions in two steps. The first step is the computation 
of both the representation of the external milieu by 
the cognitive CPU, and the computation of the emo-
tional response by the emotional CPU. The second 
step, explains how the two CPUs cooperate in order 
to link and consolidate the dynamic neural network 
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representing the external milieu to the computed 
emotional response. 
Figure 2 also describes the two processes that are 
running in parallel: one cognitive, the other emo-
tional. The cognitive process was explained in the 
first section of the paper. The emotional process is 
divided in two steps. Firstly, each active CA induces 
the retrieval of its associated emotional response 
(ER1, ER2, ER3). Secondly, the emotional CPU 
computes an overall emotional response (OER) by 
combining the retrieved emotional responses. The 
OER is the emotional utility value of the representa-
tion coded by the DNN. The OER is at the origin of 
the emotional influence of memory as it modulates 
the speed of the DNN consolidation: The more in-
tense the OER, the more facilitated the consolida-
tion of the DNN will be. In addition to this, the cog-
nitive CPU consolidates the link between the DNN 
and the EOR. As a result of this process, the DNN is 
associated to the computed emotional response. 
 
In summary, by means of the consolidation process, 
the cognitive CPU has created a new representation 
and has linked it to a new emotional response. When 
the representation is activated again in the future, 
the corresponding emotional response is retrieved. 
 
5   Conclusions 
The model provides an explanation of how recog-
nised objects generate a representation of the exter-
nal milieu and how this representation is turned into 
a structural feature of the system. In doing so, we 
put forward a biologically valid explanation for the 
influential concept of chunking (Gobet et al., 2001). 
The model also explains how emotional information 
is linked to objects stored in memory. Tagging al-
lows the system to retrieve the value of an object 
upon its recognition. The computations that follow 
ensure the necessary flexibility of high-level cogni-
tion. Both for memory and cognition, we have pos-
tulated that a CPU played a key role in controlling 
how cell assemblies are combined together so that 
they can be recognised as a unit in the future. 
 
Testing this theory will require a combination of 
empirical and theoretical research. That is, it will be 
necessary to develop computer programs or autono-
mous robots whose parameters will be set by both 
biological and psychological data. Then, experi-
ments should be run to test whether agents would 
perform better in complex and dynamic environ-
ments with the presence of the emotional mecha-
nisms described in this paper. If supported empiri-
cally, our theory would provide a powerful concep-
tual framework for computer science and robotics, 
as it would offer an explanation of how emotions 
help humans to structure their perceptual space. 
 
There is no doubt that understanding—and, in a 
computational model or robot, controlling—the dy-
namics of cell assembly raises serious theoretical 
and practical problems.  But then, the implicit mes-
sage of this paper is perhaps that complex process-
ing is necessary when emotions enter the scene and, 
in corollary, that there are limits in what simple 
autonomous agents can do without emotions modu-
lating the way they perceive and process informa-
tion. 
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Abstract 
 
New theories on emotion emphasize the tight boundaries among emotion, motivation and 
cognition: according to them people are motivated to respond to events differently depending on 
how they have been appraised. The present study tries to examine what kind of emotional 
responses the subject is motivated to express while interacting with an artificial agent if he/she 
believes that this agent is able to understand his/her emotional states. For this purpose different 
kind of computer games were projected to elicit specific emotional appraisals and two different 
conditions were used: in one condition the avatar provided a simulated intelligent feedback, while 
in the second only guided the subject across the different tasks. Multimodal synchronized data 
were captured. All video tapes were codified frame by frame using The Observer 5.0 and THEME 
Software. This is an in-progress study and data are still under elaboration. This paper includes 
initial results of the analysis of non-verbal communicative signals. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
New theories of mind try to gather the 
continuity between cognition and action and their 
tight boundaries with motivation and emotion: their 
goal is the elaboration of unified models where 
these functions are merged to explain human 
behaviour. In this perspective, those theories 
suggest that mind is «embodied» and situated as it 
originates in the interaction with the environment 
(Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
Humans are then considered as biological agents 
able of acting on the environment to change it and 
of functionally adapting in relation to their own 
needs. Procedural actions always involve emotion 
and motivation: agents organize action sequences 
to achieve goals relying on the emotional and 
cognitive evaluation of events. Motivation, 
cognition and emotion are no longer considered as 
separated functions and all support executing 
actions effectively.  
Theoretical knowledge suggests that for human 
beings emotions reflect an adaptive system and 
represent a crucial functional aspect to maintain a 
satisfactory relationship with the environment 
(Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1993). As a matter of fact, 
emotions correspond to different forms of action 
tendency (e.g. avoid, approach, interrupt, change 
strategy, attempt, reject, etc.) and involve states of 
action readiness (Frijda, 1986) elicited by 
circumstances appraised as relevant to the subject’s 
goals. In this perspective, they can constitute very 
powerful motivational factors: people are goal-
driven, task-solving agents motivated to action by a 
complex system of emotions.  
These issues open interesting questions when 
applied to the context of the interaction between 
biological and artificial agents. The increasing use 
of computers and machines that support the human 
user in any kind of task has nowadays transformed 
them into important and constitutive members of 
the physical and social environment with which 
people interact. For this reason, researchers from 
several disciplines have turned their attention to 
emotion and its place in the interaction between 
human and artificial agents, trying to understand 
and re-create emotion in the user interface (Picard, 
1997; Picard, Vyzas, Healey, 2001; Lisetti, 2002; 
Lisetti, et al., 2003; Norman, 2003).  
Emotional models have been proposed as a 
critical component of more effective human 
computer interaction: explicit attention to the 
emotional aspects aims at increasing the system 
performance in terms of usability and acceptance. 
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In this sense, emotions play an important role in the 
design of interfaces: they should not be considered 
a simple optional providing pleasantness but they 
represent crucial cues as they are involved in the 
selection, regulation and motivation to action. 
 
1.1. Emotion and cognitive appraisal 
 
During the last twenty years, appraisal theories 
have suggested that emotions are elicited and 
differentiated on the basis of a person's subjective 
cognitive evaluation of the significance of a 
situation (Weiner, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 
1991; Scherer; 1993). In particular, they postulate a 
fixed sequence of stimulus evaluation checks: 
novelty and expectancy, valence, relevance and 
goal conduciveness, agency and responsibility, 
perceived control (Scherer, 2000; 2001; Van 
Reekum, et al., 2004).  
People are then motivated to respond to events 
differently depending on how they have been 
appraised (Lazarus, Smith, 1988; Wehrle, Scherer, 
1995; Gratch, Marsella, 2004).These theories 
suggest that emotion episodes require the 
individual to adapt and actively respond to the 
situation.  
For this reason, during emotion all major 
functioning subsystems of organism are recruited to 
interact: cognition, physiological regulation, 
motivation, motor expression and monitoring/ 
feeling (Scherer, 1993; Frijda, 2001; Mesquita, 
Frijda, Scherer, 1997; Anolli, Ciceri, 1997; 
Roseman, et al, 2001; Ciceri 2002). Emotion is 
then described as a process, that is, as the dynamic 
time course of constantly changing affective tuning 
of organisms as based on continuous evaluative 
monitoring of their environment. 
Cognitive criteria of evaluation influence each 
of the response components. In particular, great 
interest has focused on physiological arousal and 
expressive behaviour. For example, through the 
systematic manipulation of types of events in a 
computer game (Kappas, Pecchinenda, 1999; 2000; 
Van Reekum, et al., 2004) it has been possible to 
prove the influence of appraisal dimensions on 
physiological reactions and vocal behaviours. 
Appraisal criteria influenced behaviour in different 
ways. For example, the manipulation of intrinsic 
pleasantness had little impact on physiological 
responses while goal conduciveness was associated 
with relevant autonomic effects. Results show the 
utility of trying to manipulate emotion appraisals to 
measure emotional reactions and suggest that 
computer games offer a useful area of research to 
control other appraisal checks such as coping. 
 
1.2. Emotional agents: capturing signals 
or communicative agreement?    
 
In «The Media Equation» Reeves and Nass 
(1996) argue that human-machine interaction is 
inherently natural and social, so that the rules of 
human-human interaction apply to human-machine 
interaction: in many ways people seem to respond 
psychologically to interactive computers as they 
were human actors and not tools (Picard, Klein, 
2002; Gratch, Marsella, 2004). Agents that show to 
understand emotion and behave like humans in the 
environment where they interact with users (such 
as computer games or tutoring environments) are 
more enjoyable and engaging.  
Different computational models of the user’s 
emotion have been developed to support the 
complexity of human emotion and the multi-modal 
richness of face-to-face communication (Bianchi-
Berthouse and Lisetti, 2002; Kort, Reilly, Picard, 
2001; Cowie et al., 2001). On one side theoretical 
knowledge on emotion has been applied to 
implement artificial emotional agents and design 
human-like autonomous agents that interact face-
to-face with the user and simulate human emotional 
expressions (Gratch, Marsella, 2001; Braezel, 
2002; Bartneck, 2001; Lisetti et al., 2004). 
On the other side, a particular interest has 
concerned the implementing and design of 
interfaces able to recognize the user’s emotional 
state from real-time capturing and processing of 
sensory modalities input via various media: 
physiological, facial and vocal signals (Lisetti, et 
al., 2003). This may allow the machine to adapt 
intelligently the running task to the recognized 
emotional state of the user in order to support his 
actions and motivation to the task itself.  
The idea of a computer «sensing» the user’s 
autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity is 
becoming increasingly popular, due to the recent 
progress in analyzing user’s physiological states 
(Prendiger, Mayer, Mori, Ishizuka, 2003). Our 
work attempts to move beyond this idea of an 
emotional interface that attempts to interact with 
the user capturing and processing involuntary 
signals. 
On one hand, the previously presented theories 
tell us that humans are active agents and emotion 
plays an important role of in the evaluation and 
motivation to act.  In this perspective, we suggest 
that emotion can not be reduced to the 
physiological arousal: the agent relies on 
communicative signals that he  intentionally directs 
to express his state and to act on the situation. 
On a second hand, within the framework of the 
latest models that present a two-ways vision of 
communication (Bratman, 1990; O’Keefe, 
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Lambert, 1995; Greene, 1997; Searle, 1998; Ciceri, 
2001), we assume that a crucial factor for the 
interaction with an emotional artificial agent and its 
effectiveness is the presence of a «communicative 
agreement». If the user is aware of the artificial 
agent’s ability to understand his emotional signals, 
he can decide to participate in the interaction 
exhibiting proper communicative signals. 
 
Research problem and hypotheses 
 
Combining human-machine interaction with a 
psychological view of emotion as a multiple 
component process (Scherer, 2000; Frijda, 1986; 
2001; Roseman, 2001), this study focuses on the 
complex relationships existing among emotion, 
motivation and cognition in human-computer 
interaction, in particular: 
 
1.  Considering emotion as a process and its 
cognitive components (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 
2001), we expect that: 
▫ tasks involving different cognitive appraisals 
will excite active responses on the 
environment that have an expressive 
component; 
▫ these responses consist of actions rather than 
reactions and are aimed at adapting to the 
environment and changing it (e.g. the subject 
puffs to signal the need to change the task); 
▫ during the task the subject will exhibit 
dynamic and flexible responses based on a 
continuous evaluative monitoring of stimuli 
rather than fixed expressive patterns 
corresponding to an emotional label; 
▫ each task will elicit congruent emotional 
expressive responses (e.g. boredom for the 
repetitive task). 
2. A second research problem concerns the 
emotional interaction between the user and the 
machine. According to the Media Equation 
(Reeves, Nass, 1998)  we suppose that during the 
interaction with the computer subjects will exhibit 
communicative signals (verbal and non verbal) to 
express their emotional state;  
3. Finally, we’ll try to answer to the following 
question: if the subject is aware of interacting with 
an understanding agent, is he encouraged to make 
use of emotional communicative signals? 
According to Fridlund (1991), we suppose that in 
the experimental condition  (when the  computer 
tells the subject that it is able to understand his/her 
emotional states) subjects will  exhibit significantly 
more communicative signals than subjects in the 
control condition. 
 
Method 
 
Participants: 
 
A total of 30 university students (20-23 years 
old) were recruited  from two different kinds of 
faculties (humanistic vs. scientific).  
 
Stimuli Construction:  
 
Three different kinds of computer games were 
projected to modify the subject’s attention level 
and to elicit specific emotional reactions. 
Systematic manipulation of appraisal dimensions 
was used through the selection of types of game 
events that were assumed to produce specific 
appraisals.  
Specifically, game events were supposed to 
support four emotional evaluation checks: 1. 
novelty (a change in the situation that captures the 
subject’s attention); 2. hedonic value (intrinsic 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of the stimulus); 3. 
goal conduciveness (events that help or damage the 
subject to reach a goal); 4. coping, (increasing 
levels of difficulty of tasks that change the 
estimated ability to deal with them). All games 
were previously tested on 10 subjects to assess their 
efficacy. 
1. Quiz game: 15 questions are presented to the 
subject who has to select the right answer among 
four alternatives. The subject wins money for every 
correct answer and loses money when answering 
wrongly. Questions are divided into two series: a 
very easy one is followed by a very difficult one 
that makes the subject lose almost all the prize 
won.  Selected events: correct/wrong answer; series 
of questions. 
2. Boring game: the subject moves a rabbit on 
the screen and has to collect a great number of 
carrots (50). Carrots appear always in the same 
positions (repetitive task). A message appears 
every 10 carrots collected.  
3. Enemy game: the subject moves a rabbit that 
has to collect carrots while avoiding an enemy. The 
game presents four different levels of difficulty. 
The subject wins points for every carrot collected 
and every level successfully completed. In each 
level positive or negative bonus appear randomly 
independently from the subject action. Selected 
events: losing life, passing to the next game level, 
positive/negative bonus. 
 
Tools:  
 
An enabling system was set up at the 
Psychology Communication Lab of the Catholic 
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University of Milan for implementing experimental 
sessions. Different kinds of devices were used to 
record the subject’s behaviours (see figure1). All 
instruments were synchronized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental situation. 
 
1. Two high resolution web cameras: one web-
cam was placed in front of the subject to 
record facial movements, gaze direction and 
posture changes. A second camera was placed 
behind the subject so that it was possible for 
the external experimenter to follow the 
subject’s action on the screen.  
2. Physiological recordings  were taken using the 
BIOPAC System (BIOPAC System, Inc.; 
Goleta, CA).  
3. A high quality microphone to record vocal 
reports.  
 
Procedure:  
 
Subjects were asked to use the computer where 
an avatar (Baldi, CSLU Toolkit) guided them 
across the three different kinds of computer games. 
All sessions started with 2 minutes of free 
exploration of a web site for the baseline measure 
of physiological signals. Total duration was of 
about 20 minutes. 
They were divided into two different groups, 
according to the kind of information received by 
the avatar. In particular, this experimental research 
will make use of the Wizard of Oz approach 
(Lisetti, 2001; Picard, Kort, Reilly, 2002), that is it 
employs an initially simulated prototype of 
emotional intelligent interface: the subjects are told 
they are interacting with an emotional intelligent 
computer, though in fact they are not.  
In the experimental condition, the subjects 
were exposed to a simulated emotional-intelligent 
computer, where the avatar provided a simulated 
intelligent feedback to the user to decode his 
emotional state and to adapt the tasks accordingly. 
For example, the avatar used sentences like: «You 
seem to be bored, so here it is a new game» «You 
are in difficulties: I repeat the instructions for you». 
The simulated emotional-intelligent computer 
appeared to be automatic to the subjects, but it was 
actually controlled by an out of sight experimenter.  
In the control condition the avatar guided the 
subjects in the same activities but did not simulate 
to decode emotion. All subjects were alone in the 
room with the computer.  
At the end of the computer session, subjects 
were asked to answer to questionnaire and the 
Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (Endler, 
Parker, 1990; Pedrabissi, Santinello, 1994). In the 
questionnaire subjects were asked: to assess their 
own abilities at using a computer; to judge on a 7 
points rating scale the computer games according 
to emotional dimensions (surprising/ boring; 
pleasant/unpleasant; frustrating/enjoying); to judge 
the efficacy of the interaction with the computer. In 
particular they were asked to judge to which extent 
the computer had been able to understand their 
emotional states. In this way it was possible to test 
the efficacy of the simulated prototype, as 13/15 
subjects in the experimental condition said they 
believed in the pc’s ability to understand. 
 
Data Analysis: 
 
Different kinds of synchronized data were 
recorded: 
 
Physiological signals: ECG;     Respiration; 
 Galvanic Skin Response; 
 Skin   Temperature 
Non verbal signals:  Posture; gaze direction 
 facial movements 
Non verbal vocal signals supra-segmental cues 
Verbal signals speech 
 
This is an in-progress study and data are still 
under elaboration. In this study we’ll start to 
present the analysis of non-verbal communicative 
signals.  
This choice is due to different reasons: 1. our 
hypothesis questions about the intentionality of non 
verbal signals; 2. non verbal signals are more 
continuous than verbal ones; 3. this analysis 
enables us to investigate the possibility of applying 
a second methodological level referring to 
dimensional axes.  
Two different levels of analysis are going to be 
conducted. At a first level of analysis all video 
tapes are codified frame by frame (25 fps) using 
The Observer 5.0 NOLDUS Software and THEME 
Software for the recurrent pattern analysis. This 
analysis has previously required the elaboration of 
a coding grid and thus the selection of behavioural 
units to be extracted. Four macro-categories were 
then considered: 
Facial movements:  the fundamental muscle 
movements that comprise Facial Action 
Coding System (Ekman, Friesen, 1978; 2002) 
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were selected. We considered action units 
relating to upper face and lower face (20 AU 
and 10 AD). For each unit intensity was rated 
(Low, Medium, High). 
Gaze direction: we consider if the subject 
looks at the screen, at the keyboard,  around, 
etc. 
Posture: behavioural units of moving near to 
/far from the screen were considered. 
Vocal behaviours: in the video coding it was 
recorded when the subject speaks (verbal) or 
uses other kind of vocalizations (grumbling, 
no-words, etc). All vocal reports were even 
analysed through the Computerized Speech 
Laboratory KAY (CSL) Software for supra-
segmental characteristics (pitch, volume, 
amplitude, time) analysis.  
All behaviours (dependent variables) are 
analysed in relation to the following independent 
variables: 2 (experimental group) (between 
subjects) X 3 (kind of computer task) (within). 
Within  each task the computer events are then 
considered.  
At a second level of analysis, starting from the 
analysis of patterns of multimodal signals the 
mentioned dimensional axes (attention, hedonic 
value, coping) are scored on a 5 point rating scale 
from -2 to +2 by a group of judges trying to 
describe the user emotional state. Inter-judge 
agreement will be calculated (k Cohen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Dimensional axes. 
 
Results: 
 
This paper includes only initial results 
(corresponding to the analysis of one subject, 22 
minutes and 27 seconds for a total of 26948 
frames) which are indicative of the methodology 
that has been applied.   
1. Analysis of non verbal communicative 
signals. Table 1 shows a first statistical output. 
Results show that during the interaction with 
the computer, the subject exhibits communicative 
non verbal behaviour. In particular, facial 
behavioural units are used more frequently than 
vocal ones and within these facial movements there 
is a higher exhibition of lower face units (lips).   
Table 1:  (n) number of total occurrences; (tD)  
total duration (sec); (mD)  mean duration (sec). 
 
 n tD  mD  
Facial movements    
Inner brow raiser 67 20.04 0.30 
Outer brow raiser 66 17.92 0.27 
Brow lowerer 28 19.52 0.70 
Upper lid raiser 26 13.16 0.51 
Lid tightener 18 17.04 0.95 
Chin raise 71 23.00 0.32 
Cheek raise 36 61.32 1.70 
Lip corner puller 63 102.16 1.62 
Lip corner depressor 43 10.32 0.24 
Lips part 99 523.68 5.29 
Lip pucker 60 35.28 0.59 
Lip pressure 78 52.64 0.67 
Lips suck 14 6.68 0.48 
Gaze direction    
Look at the screen 29 1296.32 44.70 
Look at keyboard 17 10.28 0.60 
Look around 8 21.44 2.68 
Posture    
forward 22 1245.00 56.59 
Head backward 15 87.92 5.86 
Head forward 7 27.56 3.94 
Initial position 5 41.24 8.25 
backward 5 44.12 8.82 
Vocal behaviors    
speech 29 31.88 1.10 
laugh 7 5.96 0.85 
Non words (oh, huh) 5 2.32 0.46 
puff 2 2.00 1.00 
 
 
The analysis of the most recurrent 
configurations of the emotional expressions show 
(Theme analysis: number of occurrences: 10; 
p<.001) the presence of patterns of different levels 
of complexity that involve facial movements, 
posture, etc.  (figure 3 ).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: T-patterns of expressive behaviours.  
 
 
Another interesting variable to examine 
concerns the time position of the emotional 
behavioural response in relation the antecedent 
action of the computer and the performance.
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(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4:  Frame by frame sequences and time structure. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows an example of  two frame by 
frame sequences (6.89 sec; 5.32 sec) where the 
subject is dealing with the quiz game (a) and the 
enemy game (b). Each sequence starts with the 
computer event (difficult question; enemy): it is 
followed by its evaluation and a frustration 
behavioural response which precedes the subject’s 
performance (wrong answer; rabbit dead). Finally 
the emotional response to the mistake (smile). 
2. Questionnaire data. Finally Table 2 shows 
the answers of subjects about the interaction they 
experienced with the computer. Subjects in the 
experimental condition assign higher scores to the 
ability of the computer to understand emotion (a), 
to adapt the task according to them (b) and to 
answer to their reactions (c) while in the control 
condition subjects assigned high scores to the 
ability to give information (3). 
 
Table 2. Mean values of the scores rated by 
subjects about the computer ability to understand.  
 
Mean values experimental control 
a 3,93 2,35 
b 3,87 2,41 
c 3,73 4,29 
d 3,53 2,76 
 
Discussion 
 
As previously mentioned, this is a study in 
progress and data till now available does not allow 
us to discuss or support our hypotheses, in 
particular concerning the expected differences in 
the exhibition of communicative signals between 
the two conditions. Unfortunately this remains an 
open question to which we hope to answer in the 
following months. In any case, the results presented 
above enable some interesting considerations. 
First of all, non verbal behavioural units are 
exhibited with different frequencies and durations, 
hence they seem to have different functions and  
relevance. It is possible that in the interaction with 
a machine subjects mostly rely on facial responses, 
even if  vocal behaviour is present. Moreover, 
behavioural units are linked one to another in more 
complex pattern and expressive configurations. 
Hence the subject exhibits dynamical facial 
responses based on the continuous monitoring of 
the task and performance rather than fixed patterns 
corresponding to an emotional label. Secondly, 
patterns show a correlation between computer 
events and behavioural units: in this sense it has 
been possible to focus on sequences of events 
characterized by a specific timing and organization 
(antecedent, evaluation, performance, emotional 
response). In particular, the emotional response 
seems to have tight boundaries with the evaluation 
of the antecedent and the performance in the task 
suggesting its role in the motivation to act. 
These considerations may have interesting 
applications when considering artificial agents and 
the implementing of computer interfaces as 
autonomous intelligences. In this perspective, 
knowing about what kind of emotional behaviours 
the human user is encouraged to show and direct to 
a supposed emotional-intelligent machine is a 
central issue to understand the kind of information 
that a computer can accurately obtain.  
Secondly, the study presents an attempt to 
define some significant features that can be 
extracted from the user’s expressive behaviour and 
a model able to describe  the dynamic changing of 
the user’s emotions during the computer 
interaction. This model can be seen as a possible 
formalization of an emotional semantics that could 
be used by a machine aimed at discerning the 
user’s emotional state. As a matter of fact, within a 
multi-disciplinary attempt to implement an 
emotional intelligent interface (Andreoni, Apolloni, 
Balzarotti, Beverina, Ciceri, Colombo, Fumagalli, 
Palmas, Piccini,  2004) we suggest that such a 
machine should present not only physical devices 
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for capturing the user’s multimodal signals, but 
also a specific component for features extraction 
and their semantic encoding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Theoretical model for an emotional 
intelligent interface 
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Abstract
Survival in the animal realm often depends on the ability to elucidate the potentialities for action
offered by every situation. This paper argues that affordance learning is a powerful ability for adaptive,
embodied, situated agents, and presents a motivation-driven method for their learning. The method
proposed considers the agent and its environment as a single unit, thus intrinsically relating agent’s
interactions to fluctuations of the agent’s internal motivation. Being that the motivational state is
an expression of the agent’s physiology, the existing causality of interactions and their effect on the
motivational state is exploited as a principle to learn object affordances. The hypothesis is tested in a
Webots 4.0 simulator with a Khepera robot.
1 Introduction
One of the most vital abilities for situated, embedded,
autonomous agents in a dynamic scenario is making
the right decisions when interacting with their envi-
ronment. This is the so-called behaviour or action
selection problem, deciding “what to do next” (what
behaviour to execute in a particular situation) to in-
crease the likelihood of maintaining life. Being able
to make the right decisions partly depends on the
knowledge of the effect of an action to compensate
internal needs. Furthermore, it depends on the abil-
ity to discriminate objects to befit every interaction.
This was confirmed experimentally by Guazzelli et al.
(1998), who proposed a behaviour selection model to
simulate the behaviour of rats navigating a T-maze,
integrating drives and affordances. No perception-
related learning was however involved, being that this
was solely aimed at interpreting the possibility of
moving in one or another direction.
The use of motivational states to make decisions
has been proposed in several architectures (Avila-
Garcı´a and Can˜amero, 2002; Can˜amero, 1997),
which mention the necessity not only of maintaining
life, but also of meeting the criterion of internal phys-
iological stability (Ashby, 1965). Nevertheless, these
architectures neglect the apprehension of the appro-
priate functionalities of objects. Information about
the objects’ potential for action has therefore usually
been hard-wired. It is argued that knowing the func-
tionality of an object is also part of the adaptation
problem.
Related to this, Gibson introduced the notion of
affordance (Gibson, 1966), defined as the function-
ality an object offers to an agent. Hence, a set of
affordances is only defined in the context of a par-
ticular agent-environment pair. Furthermore, affor-
dances are held to be directly available from the envi-
ronment, without the integration of perceived features
into object representations (Cooper and Glasspool,
2002). Based on this, Cooper and Glasspool (2002)
introduced a symbolic model of affordance learning
by relating object features to action schemas. In their
approach, object features are symbolically integrated
into objects to bias one action or another.
Conversely, the architecture introduced in this pa-
per aims at endowing the agent with the capability
of building its own functional perception via an ap-
propriate neural representation of the objects in its
environment, related to the agent’s behaviour reper-
toire1. This aims at bypassing the feature-based step,
and should therefore be a more faithful implementa-
tion of gibsonian affordances. Importantly, to per-
form an action the perception of certain regularities
of each object is fundamental to decide the right be-
1Unlike Gibson’s studies of the optical flow, we have to deal
with other perceptual modalities (the agent’s senses).
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haviour. However, this does not relate to physical re-
semblance only (among different objects of the same
sort), but also to a functional similarity (being able to
perform the same actions).
The next section introduces the affordance learn-
ing and behaviour selection model, and precedes the
experimental section. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of results and of future research issues.
2 Motivational Model for Learn-
ing Affordances
The model comprises three parts: a neural structure, a
behaviour arbitration mechanism and a learning mod-
ule.
2.1 Neural Structure
The first challenge is to build a neural representation
of the objects of the environment. To this end, the use
of a Growing When Required (GWR) network (Mars-
land et al., 2002) has been selected. This is a topolog-
ical network that adapts to the level of entropy of the
environment according to a set of parameters, unlike
Kohonen (1982). The growing process is described
in the following steps:
1. The network is trained with 64-D image patterns
representing objects in the scenario. The algo-
rithm chooses the first and second most similar
nodes.
2. If the Euclidean distance between the closest
node and the current interaction pattern is larger
than the pre-set accuracy, a new node is inserted
between the two closest nodes, which are then
connected by new synapses. Conversely, the
closest and its adjacent nodes are dragged to-
wards the input pattern.
3. Nodes rarely close to the patterns are deleted.
4. The growing process is hindered when the eu-
clidean distance between the sensory-patterns
and their closest node is smaller than the pre-set
level of accuracy.
In a very simple manner, the GWR provides a simple
representation of similar objects. The next subsection
explains how to relate these patterns to the behaviour
repertoire.
2.2 Motivations for Behaviour Selection
The combination of extenal and internal stimuli gives
rise to the motivational state. This section describes
the necessary elements to build an internal physiol-
ogy.
The controlled homeostatic variables are abstrac-
tions representing an agents’ resources. Nutrition,
stamina and restlessness are the chosen variables.
Their values must be kept within the viability zone
for the agent to remain alive; if their values over-
flow/underflow the upper/lower boundaries that de-
fine the variable’s viability, the robot dies.
The drives are also abstractions denoting urges for
action. The drives monitor the levels of the homeo-
static variables and initiate a process of compensation
whenever they are in a deficit state. In our case, the
mechanism of compensation is the selection and ex-
ecution of a behaviour, which requires an appropri-
ate object nearby for successful execution. We have
used three different drives: hunger (which controls
nutrition), fatigue (controlling stamina), and curios-
ity (controlling restlessness). At each time step, each
drive is assigned an intensity proportional to the mag-
nitude of the error of its controlled variable.
The behaviours are to grasp, to shelter and to in-
teract. The execution of a behaviour results in an in-
teraction with an object in the environment that may
cause a compensation of the deficit for the most crit-
ical internal variable, contributing therefore to com-
pensate the drives. In the general case, different be-
haviours can contribute to compensate a drive, but in
our simplified model each drive can be satisfied by
one behaviour only, “eat” (grasping an object) satis-
fies hunger, “shelter” satisfies fatigue, and “interact”
satisfies curiosity.
The arbitration mechanism for behaviour selection
follows a winner-take-all policy, using the drive that
exhibits the highest urgency (the one with the highest
level) to choose the behaviour to execute next. In our
simplified model this is very straighforward because
there is a single behaviour that can satisfy each drive.
The model also has two Hormones: Frustration and
Satisfaction, which are respectively triggered when
the outcome of an interaction succeeds or fails. The
values of the hormones are 1, if they are active, and 0
otherwise.
2.3 The Learning Mechanism
The learning process adds a novel dimension to the
topological network, by growing functional synapses
between every node in the aforementioned neural
structure and each behaviour of the agent. The pro-
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cedure for growing these synapses is driven by the
agent’s drives in a hebbian manner. The process is as
follows:
• Every time the agent detects an object, the clos-
est node in the state space is identified. Figure
1 shows the 2D projections of topologies rep-
resenting the objects contained in the Khepera
world used for simulation.
• The interaction succeeds, the hormone Satisfac-
tion is released, otherwise, the hormone Frustra-
tion is released.
• Satisfaction and Frustration, strengthen or
weaken, respectively, the synapse relating the
active node and the behaviour executed (∆ωij =
αbj). Weights are normalised between -1.0 and
1.0.
The final values quantify the affordances relating
those particular objects, encoded by the neural struc-
ture, to the agent’s behaviours.
3 Experiments and Results
The goal of these experiments is to test this learning
hypothesis with an artificial agent in an engineered
scenario. The affordances of the objects in that sce-
nario are such that little objects afford grasping, large
objects afford shelter, and all objects afford interact-
ing. Relative sizes vary between 0.08 and 0.01, the
size of the Kephera’s gripper is 0.04 and the arena
measures 0.5× 0.5 units.
3.1 Experimental Procedure
The robot wanders in the aforementioned environ-
ment, interacting with objects encountered at random.
Everytime an object is encountered, the object is cen-
tred, and a snapshot of the object is taken always at
the same distance. The single top horizontal line of
the object is selected, and reduced to a 64-D illumina-
tion vector. This vector is used for building the neural
structure2. Two 2D-PCA of final structures with 16
and 42 nodes each are shown in figure 1.
Concurrently, the agent’s homeostatic variables are
initialised to their optimal value, and decay accord-
ing to equation ∆hvi = τ , with τ = 10−5. Their
optimal values are 0.8 for nutrition and stamina, and
0.2 for restlessness. Their related drives measure the
2With parameters energy = 0.5, epsilonb = 0.5,
epsilonn = 0.006, amax=50, as described in Marsland et al.
(2002).
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Figure 1: 2D-PCA with GWR overlapping with 16
and 42 nodes, left and right, respectively.
difference from those optimal values, and define the
agent’s motivational state. Whenever an object is
encountered, the behaviour whose attached drive ex-
hibits the highest value is selected and executed. The
affordance learning method, as introduced in section
2.3, is then executed.
3.2 Results
Four series of five simulations each have been run
with networks of sizes between 4 and 42 nodes for
testing the aformentined learning algorithm. Results
for topological networks of 4, 8, 16 and 42 nodes are
presented in histograms 2 and 3. The three individ-
ual histograms, address the affordance values for each
behaviour: grasp, shelter and interact. Values in the
X-axis represent the node id in the topological struc-
ture, and values in the Y-axis the affordance values
learnt (ranged between -1.0 and 1.0), averaged over
five simulations.
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Figure 2: Learnt affordance values for behaviours
grasp, shelter and touch (top-down) for GWR with
4 and 8 nodes, left and right, respectively.
It can be observed that affordance values in topolo-
gies with a low number of nodes exhibit a large stan-
dard deviation. This is due to the low accuracy of
those topologies, and is confirmed by observing the
difference with affordance values in topologies with
a larger number of nodes (16 and 42), which are de-
fined more precisely. In the former case, the low
level of accuracy provokes an incorrect selection of
the node closest to the visual pattern. In other words,
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Figure 3: Learnt affordance values for behaviours
grasp, shelter and touch (top-down) for GWR with
16 and 32 nodes, left and right, respectively.
nodes in topologies with a low level of accuracy rep-
resent a range of objects whose features cannot be
causally related to the same effect. This also high-
lights that for representations of high accuracy, the
growing algorithm could be improved via pruning
nodes exhibiting affordance values with a high vari-
ance. This would not diminish the overall perfor-
mance, since the resting nodes already represent the
sensory-space accurately enough. This would im-
prove the overall performance, since the selection of
one node or another would be more accurate, thus its
affordance values would be better defined.
Lastly, it is important to highlight that there are
implementation and execution issues, e.g., inaccurate
object manipulation, which means the execution of
some behaviours fail despite the object affording that
behaviour to be executed.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
The learning method is based on internal observation
of causal fluctuations in the motivational state due to
behaviour execution. This provokes a hormonal re-
sponse, which reinforces the functional synapses re-
lating the behaviour executed to the node in the GWR
closest to the perceived sensory pattern. The results
suggest that affordances can be learnt according to
the experimental procedure proposed.
It is fundamental to stress that affordances are
context-related. Hence, to be able to learn and use
affordances, it is necessary to dene a context: the
agent’s morphology, its set of internal goals and be-
haviours, the environment. However, sensory percep-
tion is independent from the motivational state.
The principles of the model highlight that motiva-
tion and learning are two inter-related processes. If
there is motivation to drive the agent to perform an
action, the effect of the performance biases learning.
Conversely, learning has a reinforcing role on the mo-
tivational (physiological) system. This is grounded
in neuroscience by Bindra’s suggestion: The effects
on behaviour produced by reinforcement and motiva-
tion arise from a common set of neuro-psychological
mechanisms, and the principle of reinforcement is a
special case of the more fundamental principle of mo-
tivation (Bindra, 1969).
Finally, it is relevant to stress that learning affor-
dances is related to building a representation of the
environment; however, a functional representation.
In fact, as the model shows, neural encoding and re-
inforcement are processes affecting one another.
Future endeavours will perform ethological analy-
sis of behaviour (in terms of physiological stability
and cycles of behaviour execution), to assess the ef-
fect and reach of this learning process in a variety of
environments.
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Abstract 
 
The present study aims to investigate how figurative language was used by the participants of an 
online learning environment in order to express their emotion, feelings and motivation in their 
new learning experience. According to our results, figurative language mainly served as an 
original and specific linguistic feature through which people project themselves (their identity, 
emotions and feelings) in the online context. The research was conducted on a ten-week course, 
delivered at a distance via a computer conferencing system, addressed to 57 student teachers. 
 
1   Introduction 
The study was conducted on the premises that 
cognitive processes are closely related to the 
affective, emotional and motivational ones. This 
kind of strict relationship is borne out within the 
context of neurosciences (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 
1996), Artificial Intelligence (Picard, 1997; 
Dautenhahn, Bond, Cañamero and Edmonds, 2002), 
cognitive psychology (Hamilton, Bower and Frijda, 
1988; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996; Frijda, Manstead 
and Bem, 2000) and social sciences (Elster, 1999; 
MacMullen, 2004), with positive effects on the 
educational context (Gardner, 1983; Volet and 
Järvelä, 2001) and on the context of web-based 
learning as well. 
In the latter, the socio-affective dimension of 
learning acquires specific features as it is expressed 
and biased by written discourse. While some early 
approaches in the study of CMC emphasize the lack 
of non-verbal cues as a limit (Short, Williams and 
Christie, 1976), in more recent times, a number of 
studies have shown that written communication is 
able to actively stimulate and effectively enhance 
social and affective presence (Garrison, Anderson 
and Archer, 2000). 
In contrast with the view according to which 
students adopt verbal immediacy behaviours to 
make up for the lack of non verbal and vocal cues 
communicated online, we reckon that the expression 
of emotions and affectivity must not be seen as a 
substitute or a surrogate way to express the same 
emotional needs that may emerge in a face-to-face 
setting, but rather as a different and independent 
means to become aware of and to share emotional 
states. In this view, written communication is 
supposed to convey specific and unique social and 
emotional affordances (Kreijns, Kirschner and 
Jochems, 2002). 
Following this line of thought, we investigated 
the uses of figurative language as one of the possible 
dimensions adopted to express emotions in online 
communication, quite often achieved by using 
language in original and creative ways. Hence our 
analysis covered not only metaphors and other 
figures of speech in their proper meaning, but any 
use of language aiming at expressing a non literal 
meaning, i.e. a meaning beyond the standard 
denotation of the used utterances. 
 
2   Theoretical background 
The study of emotions in online learning has been 
carried out through a number of indicators: the main 
emotions involved in the experience of starting a 
distance education course (Conrad, 2002; O’Regan, 
2003), and student distress in a web-based course 
(Hara and Kling, 2000). McFadden, Herie, Maiter 
and Dumbrill (in press) propose a model of web-
based education based on the assumption that 
emotional emphasis may facilitate constructivist 
learning goals. 
The role of students’ online emotional appraisal 
of social conditions of learning has been studied in 
connection with research on motivation as well: 
emotion arousal influences the cognitive, 
metacognitive and motivational aspects of the 
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learning process, especially when they are socially 
oriented (Wosnitza and Volet, in press). 
The affective and emotional functions of 
metaphors have been closely investigated in a 
number of studies as well. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson’s theory of metaphor (2003), emotion 
concepts emerge as conceptual structures largely 
constituted by metaphor: emotion concepts are 
claimed to be social-cognitive constructions 
(Kövecses, 2002). Ortony and Fainsilber (1989) 
underlined concrete vividness as the main 
characteristic of metaphor and figurative language 
in the expression of emotions.  
More generally, some authors (Gibbs, Leggitt 
and Turner, 2002) stated that figurative language is 
so special as it concerns emotional communication, 
which tightly reflects something about people’s 
ordinary conceptualizations of their complex 
emotional experience. In addition, it is considered a 
special communicative tool because it might create 
that sense of closeness and intimacy between 
speaker and listener that literal language cannot 
achieve (Fussell and Moss, 1998). 
 
3   The method 
The research context was a ten-week course 
delivered at a distance via a computer conferencing 
system, held during the academic year 2002/2003 by 
our institute, on the topic of educational technology. 
The course was addressed to 57 student teachers of 
the local Post-graduate School for Secondary 
School-teachers and was managed by 7 tutors. 
After the course conclusion we noticed the great 
amount of figurative language produced by tutors 
and students that occurred in their written discourse 
as a spontaneous phenomenon. 
Next to the instructional activities, the use of 
some familiarization and meta-reflection facilities 
was especially encouraged for socialization and 
reflection purposes. Focusing the analysis on 
expressions of self-disclosure, two communication 
areas (socialization and meta-reflection) were object 
of investigation, being the most concerned with the 
expression of emotions. 
Following the most used approach in the 
literature about computer-mediated discourse 
analysis (i.e. Rourke, Anderson, Garrison and 
Archer, 2001; Herring, 2004), the single message 
(posting) was chosen as macro-unit of analysis, 
since it was recognized as the smallest meaningful, 
independent and exhaustive datum. Postings were 
analyzed to find the cases in which figurative 
language served to express the participants’ feelings. 
As a single posting could include more than a single 
figurative language instance (occurrence), segments 
of postings were considered for both quantitative 
and qualitative micro-analysis. The research was 
guided by the following questions: 
- which images did the participants choose to 
introduce themselves to others? 
- which images did they use to represent their 
learning experience? 
- what kind of emotions were shared using 
figurative language? 
 
4   Qualitative outcomes 
The number of postings with figurative language 
was equivalent to 86 of 843 examined (10.2%), and 
the number of occurrences was 103, postings 
containing on average 1.19 occurrences. 
During the analysis it was noticed that all the 
occurrences could belong to two alternative 
categories: some were related to the expression of 
participants’ Identity, some others to the expression 
of feelings and ideas towards the Context of the 
course (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Categories chosen in order to analyze 
figurative language occurrences 
 
Categories Category’s typology Iconic image
I feel like… 
We feel like… 
I see you as… 
I see them as… 
disguise Identity 
I move as… orientation 
CMC environment is… 
Written communication 
is… 
The course is… 
The course subject is… 
give body Context 
The computer is… give soul 
 
Participants used figurative language both to 
give shape and body to themselves and to other 
participants, disguising their corporeity and making 
it move in different settings, and giving a body and a 
soul to objects. In other words, they recurred to 
figurative language with the effect of changing the 
shared ontological status of people and objects. 
Thinking of the reasons why participants chose 
to use figurative language, emerged quite clearly 
that by acting as other people, or dressing up as 
animals, literature characters, cars and so on, they 
could explain their inner emotions, such as fear, 
frustration, anger, happiness, moderating, at the 
same time, their epistemic commitment towards the 
propositional content of their statement. For 
instance, for some participants it might have been 
difficult to explicitly acknowledge that they were 
very anxious because they could not understand 
what was going on in the online course, but they had 
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no problem to state that they were in need of a 
lifeboat, since they felt quite shipwrecked (see 
below the full excerpt). Such disclosure was 
possible only with the reduced degree of epistemic 
commitment granted by figurative language. 
 
4.1   Figurative language occurrences of 
Identity and Context 
Especially during the first weeks of the course, 
participants recurred to the semantic field of 
navigation in order to express feelings related to the 
new learning environment. 
In this way a little boat became, to all purposes, 
a vehicle useful both to represent a route and to 
explain feelings towards the learning experience: 
“Until now my little boat passed off, without too 
many hitches…” - (II week) 
This figurative idea was further developed by 
another student: 
“Picking up the metaphor used by Irene, during 
this online activity I feel as I am in a paradoxical 
condition, on one side I’m navigating on the paper-
boat of my “empiric” and improvised ICT 
competences, on the other, however, it seems to me 
that I’m sailing safe in this environment” - (II week) 
Unfortunately, not all the seas sailed by the 
participants are so calm: 
“Yesterday I’d like to use a virtual lifeboat; I felt 
as a shipwrecked” - (II week) 
But not all the settings of figurative occurrences 
are placed in the sea. In order to explain the feelings 
towards their rhythm of participation to the 
activities, somebody wrote: 
“In this brand-new activity, I feel somehow as I 
was a little turtle going slowly, slowly, slowly…” - 
(IV week) 
and another participant echoed: 
“I’m going slowly, uphill, but as an old 5001 I’m 
proceeding determined, one step at a time, always 
trying to learn something new and astonishing” - 
(VII week) 
The computer is the communication medium in 
the CMC environment and however transparent it 
may be, some participants felt its presence. In a 
posting, a student is invited to make a propitiatory 
gesture by ignoring the computer presence: 
“You are MAD! Don’t you know that these 
devices have eyes, ears and tongue? Don’t you know 
that they love teasing and feel at the centre of 
attention? Of course I’m joking: PC infected me!”  - 
(II week) 
The course subject, as well as some postings and 
the reflection around synchronous and asynchronous 
                                                 
1 A FIAT 500 is a popular Italian car from the 60’s, whose most 
distinguishing features are the compact dimensions combined 
with toughness and reliability. 
communication, are objects of simile or comparison. 
A single posting might be a symbol of hope: 
“I’m very grateful to the latter posting written by 
Giovanna. In this world, full of anxieties, a 
reassuring posting is like a dewdrop in the desert. 
Thank you” - (II week) 
And again: 
I’d like to thank dear and nice Irene for her 
appraisal to my posting: you don’t know how much I 
appreciate that you sense a smell of “life” in my 
message - (IX week). 
 
5   Conclusions and future 
directions 
Self-disclosure has been an effective mean through 
which people reciprocally invite to open the door to 
motivation through the expression of emotions and 
feelings. All the examples reported a set of emotions 
of self-, other- and technology-directed type, 
expressed by means of figurative language. This 
latter has been a powerful detector of emotions and 
feelings involved in the learning experience (for a 
detailed analysis, Delfino and Manca, u.c.). 
Figurative language has been a resource, among 
others, to create the new learning and social reality 
in which the participants were involved. For most of 
them it was their first online learning experience and 
they had to face several new problems including 
learning to communicate by written discourse in an 
asynchronous manner, familiarizing with 
communication technologies, and even practicing 
with learning and collaborating in group. Metaphors 
and figurative language helped them to understand a 
new domain of experience in terms of what was 
already familiar to them (e.g., images of movement 
to explain learning rhythms). 
In the future, figurative language could also be 
adopted in the design and conduction phases of an 
online learning course, as a stimulus and a 
motivation to manifest and share those personal 
emotions and feelings always deeply involved in 
any new learning experience, by providing a 
framework for role assignment, identity, 
responsibility and intrinsic motivation.  
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Abstract 
 
The aim of the present research was first to identify the manifestations of emotion during a problem-
solving activity and then to integrate, in a foreseeable future, the emotional component of the cognitive 
activity into the Constraints Model, a problem-solving model developed by Richard (Richard, Poitrenaud 
& Tijus, 1993; Richard & Zamani, 2003). Nineteen female participants were asked to solve the well-
known five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Two classical measures of emotion were 
recorded during the problem-solving activity: facial expressions and spontaneous skin conductance 
activity. The analysis of data shows that both facial and physiological manifestations do not randomly 
appear in the course of the problem-solving but in some cognitive significant events like the impasse 
situations in which the subject have to cope with actions sequence that are not relevant in sub-goal 
achievement. Those results suggest that emotion plays a crucial role in decision-making mechanism and 
that one of its functional aspects is to regulate the system.  
 
1 Introduction 
Since four decades, some cognitive investigators 
contribute to a highly important aspect of emotion 
theory by integrating it into a cognitive science 
framework. For instance, as far back as 1967, Simon 
claimed the necessity to develop a general theory of 
thinking and problem-solving that incorporates 
motivation and emotion. Simon (1967) and Oatley 
and Johnson-Laird (1987) considered that the 
function of emotion is to regulate the system by 
allowing to abandon the current goal and to 
substitute a new goal more suitable for the 
constraints of the environment. 
Recently, there have been some attempts to 
model emotion within cognitive science framework 
(e.g. Gadanho & Hallam, 2002; Sander & Koenig, 
2002; Gratch & Marsella, 2004). 
For instance, Belavkin proposed a model based 
on the ACT-R architecture (Anderson & Lebière, 
1998) that takes emotion into account (Belavkin, 
Ritter & Elliman, 1999; Belavkin, 2001) in a 
problem-solving activity. The author concludes that 
emotions make a positive influence on problem-
solving by 1) increasing of the motivation and 
confidence when positive emotions are experienced 
on successes during problem-solving, 2) 
overcoming possible problems and allowing to 
change the direction of the search when negative 
emotions are experienced on failures during 
problem-solving. 
Following Belavkin, we think that even in a 
situation carried out in a laboratory, problem-
solving situations generate emotions that are 
experienced on successes or on failures to achieve 
the goal. According to the appraisal theories (e.g. 
Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Ellsworth, 1991; Lazarus, 
1991; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 
2001), in which the cognitive appraisal of the 
situation is an initial step in the triggering of 
emotion, achieving sub-goals should produce 
positive emotions, whereas leading to an impasse 
should produce negative emotions.  
The aim of the present research was first to 
identify the manifestations of emotion during a 
problem-solving activity and then to integrate, in a 
foreseeable future, the emotional component of the 
cognitive activity into the Constraints Model, a 
Problem-Solving Model developed by Richard 
(Richard, Poitrenaud & Tijus, 1993; Richard & 
Zamani, 2003). This experimental step is a crucial 
one to integrate emotion in a cognitive model. In the 
Constraints Model, solving a problem consists to 
elaborate the adequate representation of the problem 
by dropping misconceptions (inappropriate 
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interpretations and irrelevant goals generated by 
these misconceptions) and building more and more 
sophisticated goal-structures (Richard, 1999). 
On the one hand, this model is able to describe 
the solver behaviour into the two phases depicted by 
Kotovsky and Fallside (1989) in the course of 
problem-solving: the exploratory phase during 
which the relevant interpretation of the operator is 
elaborated, and the final phase in which planning 
takes place. On the other hand, the model contains a 
decision mechanism, which states that, in impasse 
situations, the representation temporally changes in 
order to make an action (principle of constraints-
relaxation). In this approach, the impasse and the 
achievement of a sub-goal are supposed to be the 
occasion to change the representation (when the first 
representation lead to impasse) and the goal (both 
when the first representation lead to impasse, and 
when a sub-goal is achieved). 
Our first hypothesis is that if the task is 
emotionally relevant to the subject, emotional 
manifestations may be more frequent during the 
exploratory phase than in the final phase. Our 
second hypothesis is that if the function of emotion 
is to regulate the system, so emotion may play a 
crucial role in decision-making mechanism and 
emotional manifestations may be observed during 
the significant events that are the impasses. 
 
2 Method 
Nineteen female participants were asked to solve the 
five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi problem. 
Two classical measures of emotion were 
recorded without interruption during the problem-
solving activity: facial expressions and spontaneous 
skin conductance activity (Biopac’s finger 
electrodes). Participants were tested individually 
and videotaped. As an indirect measure of emotion, 
facial expressions were chosen because participants 
had to solve the problem in the presence of the 
experimenter. Indeed facial expressiveness is 
generally considered as a component of emotion, of 
which the function is to communicate to someone 
his/her own internal states (e.g. Scherer, 1984; 
Frijda, 1986; Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001). In other 
respects, it seems important to measure the 
emotional manifestations as well through their 
physiological response since this response is not 
under the subject’s control (Bauer, 1998). The 
analysis of the physiological data was based on two 
criteria: the average level of skin conductance, as 
reflecting the resources mobilisation (Dawson, 
Schell & Filion, 1990) and the maximum skin 
conductance amplitude (pic-to-pic), as reflecting the 
mobilisation’s stability that is supposed to change in 
response to emotionally relevant events (Frijda, 
1986). In order to identify for each subject in the 
course of the problem 1) the two phases described 
below and, 2) the impasses, we conducted a subject-
by-subject analysis in the framework of the 
Constraint Model (Richard et al., 1993). This 
analysis allowed us to match the emotional 
manifestations to the significant events of the 
problem-solving activity. 
 
3 Results 
The three measures of emotion are compared 
according to the solving phases (exploratory versus 
planning), and within the exploratory phase, they are 
compared between impasse situations and the 
remaining exploratory phase. 
 
3.1 Exploratory phase versus planning 
phase 
The average number of facial expressions per 
minute (table 1) is more frequent in exploratory 
phase than in planning phase (respectively 2 and 
0,62). The inferential analysis shows that this 
difference is significant: T(18) = 5,31; p=0,0001. 
 
Table 1: Emotional manifestations according to the 
solving phases (average and standard deviation) 
 
 Exploratory phase 
Planning 
phase 
Number of FE1 per 
minute 2,00 (1,00) 0,62 (1,18) 
Average level of SC2 1,24 (0,19) 1,38 (0,24) 
Maximum SC 
amplitude (pic-to-pic) 0,35 (0,16) 0,15 (0,76) 
 
The average level of skin conductance (table 1) 
is lower during the exploratory phase than during 
the planning phase (respectively 1,24 µMho and 
1,38 µMho). The inferential analysis shows that this 
difference is significant: T(18) = 5,6; p=0,0001. 
In return, the maximum skin conductance 
amplitude (table 1) is higher during the exploratory 
phase than during the planning phase (respectively 
0,35 µMho and 0,15 µMho). The inferential analysis 
shows that this difference is significant: T(18) = 6,26; 
p=0,0001. 
 
3.2 Exploratory phase: Impasse 
situations versus remaining exploratory 
phase 
The average number of expression facial per minute 
(table 2) is more frequent during impasses than 
during the remaining phase (respectively 2,34 and 
                                            
1 FE is used for “facial expressions” 
2 SC is used for “skin conductance” 
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1,43). The inferential analysis shows that this 
difference is significant: T(17) = 3,68; p=0,0009. 
 
Table 2: Emotional manifestations within the 
exploratory phase (average and standard deviation) 
 
 Impasses 
Remaining 
exploratory 
phase 
Number of FE1 per 
minute 2,34 (1,24) 1,43 (0,90) 
Average level of SC2 1,21 (0,18) 1,27 (0,19) 
Maximum SC amplitude 
(pic-to-pic) 0,20 (0,14) 0,15 (0,07 
 
The average level of skin conductance (table 2) is 
lower in the impasses than in the remaining phase 
(respectively 1,21 µMho and 1,27 µMho). The 
inferential analysis shows that this difference is 
significant: T(17) = 3,61; p=0,0011. 
On the other hand, the maximum skin 
conductance amplitude (table 2) is higher in the 
impasses than in the remaining phase (0,2 µMho 
and 0,15 µMho). The inferential analysis shows that 
this difference is significant: T(17) = 2,56; p=0,01. 
 
As predicted, facial expressions of emotion are 
more frequent in the exploratory phase than in the 
final phase, and within the exploratory phase they 
are more frequent in the impasses. Concerning the 
physiological manifestations of emotion, two 
apparently paradoxical results were observed. On 
the one hand, the maximum activity amplitude (pic-
to-pic) is higher in the exploratory phase, and within 
this phase it is higher in the impasses. On the other 
hand, the average level of skin conductance is lower 
in the exploratory phase than in the final path, and is 
lower in the impasses than in the remaining 
exploratory phase. As a matter of fact, those results 
are consistent with the hypothesized meanings of the 
two physiological measures. The higher average 
level of skin conductance observed in the final 
phase suggests that it reflects resources mobilisation 
related to goal achievement proximity, whereas the 
higher maximum activity amplitude (pic-to-pic) 
observed in the exploratory phase and in the 
impasse situations suggests that it reflects the 
response to emotionally relevant events. 
 
4 Discussion 
Those results suggest that the problem-solving 
situation is emotionally relevant to the solver. 
Indeed, both facial expressions and the maximum 
activity amplitude (pic-to-pic) are higher in the 
exploratory phase, which is actually a problem-
solving situation. The subject gets involved in the 
construction of the relevant interpretation, and must 
cope with actions sequences that are not relevant in 
sub-goal achievement. These two criteria are lower 
in the final phase that is closer to an execution-task. 
So, it can be argued that it is the problem-solving 
situation itself that triggers emotional 
manifestations. In addition, those results suggest 
that emotion can play a regulatory role in decision-
making mechanism. Indeed, both facial expressions 
and the maximum activity amplitude do not 
randomly appear in the course of the problem-
solving, but in some cognitive significant events like 
the impasse situations. These two criteria are lower 
in the remaining exploratory phase and in the final 
phase, in which actions sequences carried out by the 
subject are efficient in goal achievement. 
On the other hand, the average level of skin 
conductance is lower in the exploratory phase and, 
within exploratory phase, is lower when subjects are 
in impasse situations. This result is consistent with 
those reported by Pecchinenda and Smith (1993): 
the difficulty encountered in the exploratory phase 
temporally leads the subject in a disengagement of 
the task. 
Our results show that the emotional measures 
used in this research do not reflect the same 
theoretical constructs. Facial expressions are related 
to the communication with others, whereas 
physiological activity reflects the physical 
preparation for an adequate coping with the situation 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1986; Smith, 1989). 
This preliminary research is a first step to 
integrate the emotional components into the 
decision-making mechanism described in the 
Constraints Model (Richard et al., 1993). Our 
findings show that these components do not 
randomly appear during the problem-solving, and 
that their manifestations are linked to specific events 
of the problem-solving. It shows the necessity to 
study the emotional manifestations within a 
cognitive model that allows to describe and to 
simulate the solver behaviour. In such a model, 
successes and failures can be identified, and then 
matched to the emotional manifestations. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research points out the interest to 
study in a problem-solving situation the emotion as 
a crucial component in the decision-making 
mechanism. In this way, we have used a theoretical 
model that allowed us to identify some cognitive 
significant events in problem-solving as the 
successes and failures.  
The attempts to experimentally study the 
emotional manifestations during a problem-solving 
situation make valuable contributions to our 
understanding of the general question of the links 
between emotion and cognition.  
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Abstract 
 
We should distinguish between two kinds of psychological states which are often not properly dis-
tinguished: desires and evaluations. Emotions necessarily involve evaluations but don’t necessarily 
involve any immediate or direct connection with desires. This distinction throws light on the ways 
in which human emotional experiences can play diverse and complex explanatory roles. If an artifi-
cial agent is to be constructed to be emotionally anything like a human biological agent, then there 
must be no immediate or direct connection between emotion and motivation understood as desire. 
An implication of our approach is that an artificial or non-human biological agent with the relevant 
desires is not yet an agent with emotion. Moreover, with the above distinction in place it becomes 
less easy to see how to construct an agent capable of emotion—that is, an agent capable of emo-
tional evaluation without any immediate or direct connection to desire.   
 
1   Introduction 
We should distinguish between two kinds of psy-
chological states which are often not properly dis-
tinguished. First, there are those motivating states 
that are standardly taken to be necessary to explain 
action. These states we will call desires. Secondly, 
there are those states that are necessarily involved in 
emotion, but which have no direct role in explaining 
action and which have no immediate or direct con-
nection to desire or to motivation in general. These 
states we will call evaluations. Emotions necessarily 
involve evaluations but don’t necessarily involve 
any immediate or direct connection with desires. 
This distinction throws light on the ways in which 
human emotional experiences can play diverse and 
complex explanatory roles. If an artificial agent is to 
be constructed to be emotionally anything like a 
human biological agent (using the terms suggested 
by the organisers of the symposium), then there 
must be no immediate or direct connection between 
emotion and motivation understood as desire. One 
might think that the mark of a successful construc-
tion of emotion in an artificial or non-human bio-
logical agent would be that the agent has the rele-
vant desires. But an implication of our approach is 
that an artificial or non-human biological agent with 
the relevant desires is not yet an agent with emotion. 
Moreover, with the distinction between emotional 
evaluation and desire in place, it becomes (as it 
clearly should become) less easy to see how to con-
struct an agent capable of emotion—that is, an agent 
capable of emotional evaluation without any imme-
diate or direct connection to desire. 
2   Human action and motivation 
Let’s begin with human action. Actions, as such, 
aren’t just bodily movements, for bodily movement 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for action: it’s not 
necessary because I can do something without my 
body moving (such as signalling to someone by sit-
ting dead still); and it’s not sufficient because my 
body might move without my doing any action 
(such as my trembling with cold, or my knee mov-
ing when it’s hit by a doctor’s mallet).  
Although there are many instances which are 
clearly and uncontroversially either actions or just 
bodily movements, there are controversial instances 
where it is not clear where action ends, and where 
other kinds of ‘behaviour’ begin: for example, many 
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of our expressions of emotion—facial expressions 
(grimacing with anger), and expressive behaviour 
(such as kicking the chair in anger). But to make 
progress, let’s begin with human actions which are 
most uncontroversially actions, where an action is 
understood, roughly, as something done by someone 
intentionally1.  This would include actions not done 
out of emotion (such as going to meet someone be-
cause you promised), and actions done out of emo-
tion (such as, in anger, hitting the person you are 
angry with). 
What kind of motivation is necessary for action, 
so to speak lying behind the intention? One might 
say it is desire, so that whatever I do or try to do 
intentionally, I do because I desire or want the thing 
that I think my action will bring about2.  But if this 
is to be accepted, then the notion of desire will have 
to be very protean. One reason for this is that it is 
often possible for us to do things that, just in terms 
of the phenomenology of desire (that is, desires 
which have a certain ‘feel’), we have no desire to 
do. Even in respect of actions out of emotion, moti-
vation often lacks this phenomenology—a phe-
nomenology which is ‘traditionally distinguished 
from “cold” cognition’ in the words of the sympo-
sium organisers. For example, the Mafia advise us 
that, if one is angry with someone and wants re-
venge, then this revenge is a dish best tasted cold. In 
respect of some actions, the person acting might not 
just deny that he has a desire with this phenomenol-
ogy; he might even deny that he has any desire at all 
to do what he does. For example, one evening you 
go to meet someone whom you earlier promised to 
meet, and you might sincerely say that you went 
because you promised to go, and not because you 
wanted to; all you really wanted to do, you say, was 
to stay in and watch the football on TV. So, if we 
are to find room for examples like these, we must 
have a more protean notion of motivation than de-
sire in the phenomenological ‘feel’ sense, and more 
protean than desire of the kind which the person 
acting is conscious of3. 
                                                 
                                                
1 To be a bit less rough, an action is something done 
by someone which is intentional under a description. 
So someone might intentionally be hammering in a 
nail but unintentionally waking the neighbours. This 
idea of action and intention is discussed in the semi-
nal work of Anscombe (1957), and in Davidson 
(1963). 
2 As Anscombe puts it (1957: 67), with animals in 
mind, ‘[T]he primitive sign of wanting is trying to 
get’. 
3 The role of desire in action explanation is dis-
cussed in Nagel (1979), Smith (1987; 1994), and 
Schueler (1995). 
2   Pro-attitudes and means-end 
reasoning 
At this point, the notion of a ‘pro-attitude’ is often 
introduced to stand duty for the notion of desire, 
with the thought that pro-attitudes should include 
states that are, in respects to be discussed below, 
like desires, but are not necessarily desire-like in 
their phenomenology or in their being states of 
which one is necessarily conscious. The philosopher 
Donald Davidson, for example, has characterised 
pro-attitudes as including ‘desires, wantings, urges, 
promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aes-
thetic principles, economic prejudices, social con-
ventions, and public and private goals and values 
…’ (1963:4).4
So far, then, we have the theory that a pro-
attitude is a supposedly necessary motivation for 
action.  But it is not a sufficient motivation for ac-
tion. First, one might have a pro-attitude towards an 
action, but this pro-attitude is ‘outweighed’ by some 
other pro-attitude towards some other action, where 
both actions cannot be performed (you could have a 
pro-attitude this evening towards watching the foot-
ball on TV and a stronger pro-attitude towards keep-
ing your promises, in which case, presumably, you 
will not watch the football on TV). Secondly, and 
more interestingly for our purposes, a pro-attitude is 
not sufficient for action because there also needs to 
be some other kind of psychological state—
paradigmatically some kind of belief or percep-
tion—that represents the way the world is and that 
represents your action as the ‘means’ to bringing 
about your ‘end’—to bringing about whatever it is 
you have a pro-attitude towards. This is what lies 
behind the familiar idea of means-end reasoning. 
For example, your having a pro-attitude towards 
drinking some beer isn’t sufficient to explain your 
drinking from this glass; you also need to see that 
what’s in this glass is beer, and to believe that your 
moving the glass in this way is the suitable means to 
your end of drinking some beer. 
So we now have developed our theory to this: 
actions—all actions—can be explained by, and are 
brought about by, two distinct kinds of psychologi-
cal state, distinguished by their characteristically 
different roles in explaining and bringing about ac-
tion: pro-attitudes, which roughly represent the way 
the world would be if the pro-attitude is satisfied; 
and beliefs, which roughly represent the way the 
world is, and the means of changing the world so 
that the pro-attitude is satisfied. 
 
4 Davidson himself would seem to think that all pro-
attitudes ‘can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent 
directed toward actions of a certain kind’; as will 
emerge, it is this connection that we dispute. 
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This may seem like a complex bit of theorising, 
but the idea—at heart just means-end reasoning—
really isn’t too far from our common sense way of 
explaining action. Of course in explaining everyday 
action, we sometimes just refer to the pro-attitude, 
and sometimes just to the belief, but this will typi-
cally be for pragmatic reasons. If you ask me why I 
crossed the road, I might reply ‘To get a sandwich’, 
which reply presupposes that you believe, as I do, 
that there is a sandwich shop across the road, so all I 
need to refer to is my pro-attitude. But if I reply 
‘Because I think there is a sandwich shop across the 
road’, this presupposes that you know that I want a 
sandwich, but that the presence of the sandwich 
shop is for some reason in doubt, so I need to refer 
to this belief to explain my action, but not to the 
pro-attitude. 
Let’s assume for the purposes of this paper that 
this theory is correct, and that all actions are brought 
about, and are explicable, by a pro-attitude and a 
belief5.  It would follow that action out of emotion 
must be explicable in this way. Thus, according to 
this picture, my action of hitting you out of anger 
must be explicable by reference to a pro-attitude, 
such as my pro-attitude towards getting my revenge 
for the wrong you have done me, and to a belief, 
such as my belief that hitting you is a suitable and 
available means of getting my revenge. 
3   Pro-attitudes: desires and 
evaluations 
The problem now is that the notion of pro-attitude 
that we have before us would seem to be too pro-
tean, for many pro-attitudes are such as never to 
lead to action of any kind, even with the relevant 
belief in place. Why not? Because (we are assum-
ing) all action needs a desire in place, and not all 
pro-attitudes are desires. For example, I might have 
a negative attitude (a ‘con-attitude’) towards the 
presence of chewing gum on the pavements of Lon-
don, and yet do nothing about it, because I have no 
desire to do anything about it. Or I might have a 
negative attitude towards you, but never do anything 
to harm you in any way, again because I have no 
desire to. 
What we need, it seems, is the kind of distinction 
that the notion of pro-attitude has blurred: a distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, those kinds of pro-
                                                 
5 The  theory is in fact highly contentious; see, for 
example Döring and Peacocke (2001) and Döring 
(2003), who bring it into question. Explaining action 
might be one thing, and bringing action about or 
causing action something else. But for the purposes 
of this paper, it is best to leave these issues to one 
side. 
attitude which are desires, and which do imply a 
necessary and direct motivation towards action (but 
which do not necessarily have a phenomenology or 
involve any conscious awareness); and, on the other 
hand, those kinds of pro-attitudes which we will call 
evaluations, and which imply no immediate or direct 
motivation towards action.  
Armed with this distinction, we can readily see 
that there can be evaluation without desire. Putting 
the point roughly, there are all sorts of things that 
we humans care for or value, sometimes for a whole 
lifetime, but which we never do anything to bring 
about or to promote. One would have to be in the 
grip of a theory to insist that the fact that you do 
nothing to bring something about or to promote it 
shows that you don’t care about that thing or value it 
in any way.  
Another way to think of the point might be this. 
There might be a necessary connection from (1) 
acting to bring something about, to (2) desiring to 
bring that thing about, to (3) valuing (at least in 
some etiolated sense) the thing that you want to 
bring about. But there is no necessary connection 
from (3) valuing something or having a pro-attitude 
towards its coming about, to (2) desiring to bring 
that thing about, and thus to (1) acting to bring that 
thing about. There is a fundamental distinction be-
tween ‘ought to be’, as an expression of evaluation, 
and ‘ought to do’, as an expression of desire. 
4   Emotions: desires and evalua-
tions 
How does all this bear on emotion and motivation? 
Well, we can now begin to see good reasons for 
thinking that emotions necessarily involve evalua-
tions, but do not necessarily involve desires: and my 
anger at the chewing gum on the pavements is an 
example where evaluation and desire come apart. 
Then what this thought does—and this is the advan-
tage as we see it of our approach—is to shift our 
focus from the very intractable and oblique question 
of what the connection is between emotion and ‘mo-
tivation’, understood as desire. Part of the problem 
here, which makes the question so intractable and 
oblique, is that emotion and desire are doubly disso-
ciable: one can have emotion without desire; and 
one can have desire without emotion. Instead, we 
can move to the more tractable questions of what the 
connection is between, on the one hand, emotion 
and evaluation and, on the other hand, between 
emotional evaluation and desire. 
Why should we think that there is a necessary 
connection between emotion and evaluation? This is 
too big a question for us to address in this short pa-
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per, but the underlying idea is really very simple6.  
Emotions—all emotions—are concerned with what 
we care about or what we value. Let’s consider, for 
example, some historical fact, such as the fact that 
the treatment of slaves in eighteenth century Europe 
was unjust, or some future possibility, such as the 
possibility that there will be no whales remaining on 
the planet in two hundred years’ time. Now I might 
just believe these facts without caring about them: I 
believe that slaves were treated badly in those days, 
and I believe that it’s possible that fairly soon there 
will be no whales on the planet. But what if I feel 
angry about the unjust treatment of slaves, and what 
if I fear the extinction of the whale? Now I care 
about these facts, rather than just believing them to 
be true. 
But will I do anything about these things? Will I 
desire to do anything about these things? Our an-
swers to these questions is ‘Maybe, maybe not’. Of 
course, in respect of many emotions, there is evalua-
tion and desire and action, as would be the case with 
my immediate fear of the wild bull’s charge: when I 
run away from it out of fear, I both evaluate the bull 
as fearful, and I desire to get away from it as the 
immediate object of my fear. But it is a mistake to 
think of all human emotion as being just like this 
kind of example: not all emotions are ‘affect pro-
gram responses’—short-term, visceral responses 
such as fear of the wild bull’s charge.7
Indeed, a little thought will reveal that many of 
our emotions are evaluative concerns of the kind 
which do not involve any immediate or direct con-
nection with action or with desire. We have emo-
tions about the past and about the future, where we 
have no related desires—recall the earlier examples 
of anger at the slavery, fear for the whales. We feel 
emotions about things we remember doing, such as 
shame at that needlessly cruel thing we did last year, 
but we don’t desire to do anything about it—it’s too 
late for that.8  We get emotionally involved with 
fictional characters, caring whether or not the heroes 
of the Western we are watching will triumph over 
the corrupt Marshall; and yet we do not try to inter-
vene on their behalf.9  We value artworks highly, are 
moved by them emotionally, thinking them as ob-
jects of great beauty perhaps, but we don’t necessar-
ily have any desires for them: to think that we do 
would be to turn all aesthetic appreciation of art-
                                                 
                                                6 For detailed discussion, see Nussbaum (2003) and 
Solomon (2003). 
7 For discussion of affect program responses, see, 
for example Griffiths (1997), and Ekman (1992). 
8 For discussion of our emotional responses to re-
membered events, see Goldie (2003). 
9 This is an example of the so-called paradox of fic-
tion, much discussed by philosophers. See for ex-
ample Currie (1990) and Walton (1990). 
works into a desire to collect them or to own them.10  
We feel awe at the stars in the heavens or at the 
storm waves crashing against the sea wall, but we 
have no relevant desires; yet this feeling, known by 
Kant and Burke in the eighteenth century as a feel-
ing of the sublime, is surely a kind of emotion 
(Kant: 1790/1987; Burke 1757). We put ourselves in 
someone else’s shoes and imagine how they would 
feel (such as imagining being attacked in a dark 
alleyway); empathetically we can come to feel real 
emotions, but we do not desire to act on those emo-
tions—we feel real fear at what we imagine, but we 
don’t desire to run away from what we imagine.11  
All emotions are evaluations, but by no means do all 
emotions involve any immediate or direct connec-
tion with desire. So we claim. 
5   How one might try to refute our 
claim 
It is always open to our opponent to insist that emo-
tions always involve desire. We will first consider 
an example, and then we will suggest some ways 
that our opponent might resist our claim. 
Let’s go back to our example of my anger at the 
presence of chewing gum on pavements of London. 
This is a real emotion. But I do nothing about it. Our 
claim is that it is possible that the reason why I do 
nothing about it is that I have no desire to do any-
thing about it: I might have the thought ‘Something 
ought to be done about this’, or ‘The pavements 
ought not to look like this and feel so sticky under-
foot’, but I needn’t also have the thought ‘I ought to 
do something about this’. Our opponent denies this: 
she claims that emotion implies evaluation (as we 
do), and that emotional evaluation implies an imme-
diate and direct necessary link to desire (as we 
deny). Then our opponent goes on to list a wide 
range of reasons why we don’t act in this case, 
which maintain an immediate and direct link be-
tween emotional evaluation and desire. Here are 
some: 
 
• She might accept that I care, and insist 
that I do desire to do something; but the 
reason I don’t act is that my desire to do 
something is outweighed by a stronger 
contrary desire (perhaps a prudential 
 
10 As John McDowell says, in criticising J. L. 
Mackie’s notion of objective prescriptivity, such a 
notion ‘suggests a specific response involving 
value’s appeal to the will, and this is at best ques-
tionably appropriate for ethical value in general, and 
surely inappropriate for aesthetic value’ (1998: 117). 
11 For discussion of the role of emotion in simula-
tion, see Goldie (2002). 
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one to conserve my energy and re-
sources). 
• She might insist that there is always 
some kind of action, such as verbal ac-
tion (‘Something ought to be done’), or 
expressive action, including expressive 
verbal behaviour (such as a sigh of de-
spair) and expressive gestures. So the 
fact that there is always action shows 
that, after all, desire of some kind or 
other is always present. 
• She might insist that the kind of desire 
that is present could be a dispositional 
desire for later action, rather than a de-
sire for immediate action; in this exam-
ple, I might desire to vote for the politi-
cian who pledges to remove chewing 
gum from the pavements.  
• She might say that the connection be-
tween evaluation and desire is a norma-
tive one, so that a failure to form a de-
sire is a failure of rationality of some 
kind; in this example, I might fail to de-
sire to do anything, in spite of my emo-
tion, because of sloth, or what the an-
cient scholastics called accidie. 
 
How should we respond to this battery of possi-
bilities, each of which has a venerable philosophical 
history? First, we should accept that each of these 
possibilities is at least possible in individual cases. 
Secondly, we should accept that we don’t have a 
knock-down argument to show that desire of some 
kind or other needn’t always be present. But thirdly, 
we should, like in judo, use our opponent’s claims 
against her: by putting forward this battery of possi-
bilities, she has shown just how deferred and indi-
rect the connection between emotional evaluation 
and emotional desire can be in us humans. One can 
be beguiled by simple examples, such as the wild 
bull, and brought to think that evaluation (of the bull 
as fearful) and desire (to get away from what is fear-
ful) are always immediately and directly linked, or 
even that evaluation and desire are really just two 
sides of the same coin. Fundamentally, these are the 
thoughts that we want to undermine. Emotional 
evaluation and emotional desire must be seen as 
distinct. 
6   Implications 
What are the implications of this for the topic of the 
symposium and for those who are concerned with 
the construction of ‘agents’ with emotions? 
Imagine that one built an artificial agent that was 
capable of recognising warm spots on the floor; on 
recognising a warm spot, it would move towards it, 
overcoming obstacles on the way, and then settle 
there until the spot cooled down. Then it would rec-
ognise other warm spots in the vicinity, and repeat 
its behaviour. Could we say that one had built an 
agent which was capable of emotion? Surely not. 
Surely all that one has is an agent whose movements 
might be characterised as explicable, and brought 
about by, means-end reasoning—by a combination 
of desire and belief or perception: it desires to be on 
a warm spot; it recognises that there is a warm spot 
in some direction or other, and it believes that the 
best means of getting to the warm spot is to move in 
such-and-such a direction and in such-and-such a 
manner. (We should really have scare quotes around 
‘desire’ and ‘belief’, but leave that to one side.) We 
have no reason to assume that there is, in the agent, 
any kind of emotional evaluation of warm spots, 
and, moreover, the principle of Occam’s Razor (that 
one should not multiply entities beyond necessity) 
suggests that we would be wrong to do so. 
So how could one build an artificial agent with 
emotion? The connection between emotional 
evaluation and desire should not be too direct and 
immediate. All emotions are not like hunger or thirst 
or itches or fear of the wild bull. Rather, the agent 
should be constructed to be capable of manifesting a 
wide range of connections between emotional 
evaluation and emotional desire in individual cases, 
leaving a significant place for the battery of possi-
bilities put forward by our opponent earlier. In short, 
it seems a relatively easy task to build an artificial 
agent with ‘desire’, but it seems (as it should seem) 
like no easy matter to build an artificial agent with 
‘emotional evaluation’, where this is clearly distinct 
from desire in the way that we have been insisting 
on: in effect one has to build an agent that is capable 
of the thought ‘ought to be’ as distinct from the 
thought ‘ought to do’. 
Now let’s turn to ‘biological agents’. Our re-
marks about evaluation and desire reveal how great 
is the gap between non-human biological agents 
(dogs, octopi, rats) and human biological agents. 
Maybe, in such creatures, one can make do with a 
more immediate and direct connection between 
emotional evaluation and desire, as if all emotions 
are like hunger, thirst and so on; in other words 
these creatures more readily fit the paradigm of the 
example of fear of the wild bull, where the link be-
tween evaluation and desire is of that kind. But hu-
mans are not like that: with us, evaluation and desire 
need have no such link. 
Finally, we should mention the considerable 
ethical implications of our view. If humans really 
are that different emotionally from other biological 
and artificial agents, and the connection between 
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emotional evaluation and desire is that much more 
tenuous and oblique, then methods of measuring 
emotion as an indicator of motivation, understood as 
desire, that might be appropriate for other agents 
may well not be appropriate for humans. I could be 
very angry with you, but have no desire to do any-
thing about it. 
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Abstract
For many years there have been lay people, philosophers and scientists who have made the distinction
between affect and ’cold’ cognition. This paper examines the potential value of this dichotomy in
relation to understanding ventromedial lesion (VMF) patients behaviour in general and on the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT). We use a combination of dual-process and somatic-marker theories and infer-
ences based on simulations of normal controls and VMF patients on the IGT.
1 Introduction
Two closely related dichotomies. In recent years
some researchers in the field of thinking and reason-
ing have been proposing dual-process accounts for
the ‘non-rational’ results of human performance on
normative logical tasks. The main evidence comes
from deductive reasoning paradigms, particularly the
Wason selection task, both abstract and deontic ver-
sions, the belief bias found in syllogistic reasoning
(Sloman, 1996) and neuropsychological data (Goel
and Dolan, 2003). These dual-processes are said
to emanate from two quite separate cognitive sys-
tems that have distinct evolutionary histories. “Sys-
tem 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with
other animals: it comprises a set of autonomous sub-
systems that include both innate input modules and
domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-
general learning mechanism. System 2 is evolu-
tionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits
abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is
constrained by working memory capacity and corre-
lated with measures of general intelligence.” (Evans,
2003). This dual-process split is similar to another
often mentioned dichotomy of affect and ‘cold’ cog-
nition, where traditionally, motivation and emotions
are considered to be part of affect.
Such dichotomies have long been a staple for
philosophers and psychologists alike, stemming from
Plato and Aristotle to James (1890) and to current
work in journals like Cognition and Emotion. By
placing affect and ‘cold’ cognition within the context
a seemingly similar theory, like dual-process theory,
it becomes possible to further constrain our models
and move towards an elucidation of what emotions
are, how emotions might help in reasoning by see-
ing when they occur and what causal effect they may
have. These are particularly important issues since
currently we have no clear accepted definition of what
phenomena emotions include (Evans, 2002; Sloman,
2004).
Bringing the two dichotomies together. These two
dichotomies seemingly represent the same functional
split, but are not currently considered together within
the literature. A key question concerning the sys-
tems in these dichotomies is how each system inter-
acts with one another. Do they have different mem-
ory systems? What might be the method of internal
communication between them? Can they interact in-
dividually with the external world? Does one system
become more dominant than the other in certain types
of situation and/or context? A useful starting point in
such research can be to look at a theory that seems to
represent the affect/‘cold’ cognition dichotomy and
see what happens when the systems become some-
what disconnected, i.e. when they work with limited
support from the other type of processing. We will
argue that such a separation arises in VMF patients.
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2 Somatic-Marker Theory and
the Iowa Gambling Task
One theory we can examine is the idea of somatic-
markers. It proposes that body states act as a valence
that can be associated with potential choices based on
prior outcomes, and thus aid decision-making, both
by limiting the search space and allowing an affective
evaluation of choices. The main supporting evidence
for this theory arose from clinical interviews of sub-
jects with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMF) le-
sions and their performance on the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) (Bechara et al., 1999), compared to nor-
mal controls and those with lesions in other brain ar-
eas. The gambling task consists of four decks that
subjects can pick from; two decks, A and B, which
yield high wins but higher losses (Disadvantageous)
and the other two, C and D, that yield low wins with
lower losses (Advantageous). Normal subjects start
by picking from the disadvantageous decks but learn
to pick from the advantageous decks, unlike the VMF
patients who, as in their real social and personal lives,
continue to pick non-advantageously.
Going back to the potential dichotomy of affect and
‘cold’ cognition, it has been suggested by Damasio
(1994) that patients with VMF lesions are no longer
able to automatically produce somatic-markers when
making social decisions. Unlike laboratory experi-
ments, such decisions often have large numbers of
choices and unlimited consequences. Some somatic-
markers can be considered synonymously with ‘feel-
ings’ as the conscious component of emotions. VMF
patients possess most of their ‘cold’ cognitive facul-
ties, as shown by normal verbal test, tower of hanoi
and IQ scores, but seem to have blunted emotions
when describing situations, even when they are in-
timately involved. Parts of the affect system are still
intact in VMF patients, as they can be classically con-
ditioned and they get SCR responses when they are
rewarded and punished in the IGT (Bechara et al.,
1999). This could suggest that the VMF region is
where social event knowledge is held (Wood et al.,
2003), and is an important link between the ‘cold’
cognitive system (explicit memory) and the affect
(emotional memory) system. Alternatively, is it just
an important part of a single overall system? There
are often many interpretations to data concerning the
brain, mind and behaviour. However, one way for-
ward is to propose hypotheses and then see how they
stand-up to current experimental results and to new
direct hypotheses tests, i.e. following the Popperian
view of scientific discovery (Popper, 1959).
Figure 1: Diagram of Neural Network used for the
Iowa Gambling Task. It shows the repetition of the
basic architecture for each choice in the problem
space.
3 Neural Network Model of the
IGT
A dual system account for VMF behaviour arose from
the current literature and neural network simulations
examining the different behaviours of normal con-
trols and VMF patients on the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT), at a level of abstraction above and, in this case,
inclusive of both the ‘cold’ cognitive and affect sys-
tems (Kalidindi et al., 2005). An explanation that ac-
counts for the difference in behaviour between nor-
mal controls and VMF patients on the IGT is ‘my-
opia’ for future consequences, in that they are driven
by immediate reward and are less interested in uncer-
tain future loss or gain (Bechara et al., 2000b). This
simulation investigates the implications of this ‘my-
opia’. The current literature lacks a model that both
accurately reproduces these experimental results, and
is abstracted from specific anatomical details, which
underlie other models (Wagar and Thagard, 2004). A
diagram of the neural network can be found in Figure
1. It shows the Memory Layer where the affinity for
each choice in the choice space is represented by a
positive and negative pair of units.
The simulation begins by using a random num-
ber generator to pick one of the four decks, this
choice/result is represented by an activation value of
1 in the relevant Result Layer unit. Then a card is
picked from the chosen deck and the result is fed
into the Value Input Layer, where the positive neu-
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ron is activated by money won and the negative unit
by money lost. The activation is simply the amount
divided by $2000 (the amount of money the player
starts with) or the largest card result seen so far, if
that is larger. Through gating neurons (McClelland
and Rumelhart, 1986) this activation is passed onto
the relevant Memory Layer pair (See Figure 1) by
multiplying the activation in the Result Layer units
with that from the Value Input Layer; as only one Re-
sult Layer unit is active, only the units associated with
that choice will recieve new activation. Next, the Re-
sponse Layer units will recieve excitatory input from
the linked positive Memory Layer unit and inhibitory
input from the linked negative unit. Then a normally
distributed random activation is added to each Re-
sponse Layer unit to encourage exploration. This
is followed by a winner-takes-all competition, where
the winning unit in the Response Layer becomes the
deck choice for the next trial, by activating the rele-
vant Result Layer unit and returning its’ own actia-
tion to zero. This process continues through the trials
of the task, with a build-up of knowledge about each
deck being held in the Memory Layer units. (Note,
all the units, except those in the Memory Layer and
the active unit in the Result Layer (representing the
next choice), are set to zero after each trial.)
To explore the difference between normal controls
and VMF patients, a time-averaging equation (See
Figure 2) was used to describe the decay of infor-
mation, and how new and old information influences
Memory Layer units. This relationship between old
and new information can be altered by changing the
parameter τ , which is a real number between 0-1.
Thus, if τ is close to 1 then previous activation (i.e.
information) is almost completely preserved while
current activation (i.e. information) has little impact
on the representation of the valence of a choice. It
is felt that VMF patients might be less able to inte-
grate past information into current decision-making
than normals. We suggest that this might be the cause
of VMF patients’ ’myopia’ for future consequences.
An exploration of the state space of τ was performed
to confirm which values of τ best matched the normal
control and VMF patient behaviour on the IGT.
The results showed that a constant value for τ ,
across cycles, equal to 0.52, gave the closest deck
choice profile to that of the VMF patients (a 2% dif-
ference between the simulated and the human data
across the 5 data points, that occur every 20 selected
cards, (Bechara et al., 2000b)), whereas increasing τ
over trials was required to reproduce the normal con-
trols deck choice profile. Various increasing func-
tions over cycles gave almost exact replicas of the
act(t) = τ · act(t− 1) + (1− τ) · yβ
Figure 2: Time-Averaging Equation - act(t) is the
activation in the unit at time t, τ is the time-
averaging parameter and yβ is the gated input
from the Value Input Layer.
normal human subjects profiles (a 6% difference be-
tween simulated and real data). Therefore, it seemed
that an increase over trials was the key point. Overall,
this could suggest that VMF patients always treat any
new trial information as they would treat the first trial
in the task, suggestive of their inability to progress
from disadvantageous decks to advantageous decks in
the IGT. However, in normal subjects, as experience
over trials increases, less value is put on current-input
(information/activation) and more value is placed on
holding onto past experience. The next question for
investigation could be what are the underlying causes
of this?
4 Conclusions
Implications of the model. Our modelling work sug-
gests that (normal) humans have an effective mech-
anism by which the weighting applied to past vs
present information changes during an “exploration”
task, such as the IGT. Furthermore, it may in fact be
the case that such strategic adjustments are central
to optimum decision-making, especially decision-
making in non-initial phases of such “exploration”
tasks. The results further suggest that VMF patients
have lost this capacity to strategically adjust this past
vs present weighting as an “exploration task” pro-
ceeds. Our finding here is largely consistent with the
‘myopia’ for future consequences theory of VMF pa-
tient behaviour (Bechara et al., 2000a).
It is well accepted that the ventromedial prefrontal
region is implicated with emotion and body-state in-
fluences on decision-making. Somatic-markers are
one theory of such affective influences on decision-
making. If we accept the somatic-marker theory, our
modelling results suggest that somatic-markers play
a particularly significant role in encoding, maintain-
ing and utilising (in future decisions) past information
and further, that such somatically-driven memory and
retrieval is particularly important in post initial stages
of an “exploration task”. Indeed, such mechanisms
may become progressively more important through-
53
out the time course of such a task. Such strategic
adjustment of past vs. present weighting during ex-
ploration also has relevance for the construction of
artificial agents, especially those that seek to take in-
spiration from somatic-marker theories of human de-
cision making.
General Implications and Proposals. More gener-
ally and speculatively, it could be proposed that dual
process theory’s System 1 and the affect system can
be considered as largely synonymous. We propose
that the goals, and therefore System 1 alone, are mo-
tivated by fairly basic needs, such as quenching thirst,
satiety of hunger, obtaining what is envied and sexual
encounters. This is in-line with the proposal that Sys-
tem 1 is shared most closely with animals.
If we suggest that a main cause of VMF behaviour
is due to a weakening of the connection between Sys-
tem 1 and System 2 and that System 1 normally has
greater influence during social and personal situa-
tions, then, as System 2 has even less influence over
System 1 in VMFs than in normal subjects, we would
expect VMF patients to become almost whimsical in
social, personal or uncertain situations, and that Sys-
tem 2 responses might even be ignored. This lack
of influence by System 2 is shown in the IGT when,
normals (70%) and some VMF patients (50%) gain
conceptual (conscious) knowledge (Bechara et al.,
2000a), by around the eightieth cycle/card, of which
decks are advantageous. But unlike normal con-
trols the VMF patients fail to use this knowledge and
do not improve their deck choices/strategy. A fur-
ther cause for VMF behaviour is, during the build-
up of knowledge about the IGT, normal subjects de-
velop representations or access to representations of
explicit events and their associated affect content
through the VMF. This claim is supported by the
VMF’s known reciprocal connections with the amyg-
dala (important in affect) memory and the hippocam-
pus (important in episodic memory). VMF patients
do not gain a build-up of this knowledge and there-
fore, have a constant τ . Our simulations would also
suggest that VMF regions in normals reduce the im-
pact of new information about a situation as the asso-
ciated information/experience increases. This com-
bination of explicit (System 2) and affect (System 1)
memory is used to ‘hypothesis’ test against the ex-
pected outcomes of a choice. Access to this combi-
nation of System 1 and System 2 information can be
considered equivalent to the effective use of somatic-
markers. Therefore, the VMF regions provide a rep-
resentation link between System 1 and System 2, al-
lowing for an ’affect’ assessment of the combination
of potential reward and punishment outcomes for an
explicit choice, without the need for explicit rules.
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Abstract 
 
Referring to a recent controversy in psychological literature on facial displays and the expression of 
emotion it is argued that concerning the implementation of communication abilities in e.g. 
embodied agents, researchers should stress motivation instead of emotion. Based on a social 
communicative view it seems feasible to focus on motivation and social intentions when planning 
the behavior of embodied conversational agents. An architecture implementing emotions and one 
focussing on motivation (in terms of intentions to affect the user in a certain way) are contrasted. An 
example of a system based on the latter concept is presented and empirical evidence that this can 
successfully affect the user is given.  
 
1   Introduction 
Embodied conversational agents are expected to 
on the one hand yield human computer interaction 
more natural and intuitive and on the other hand to 
“manipulate” (in a positive sense) the users´ moods 
and emotions - e.g. by calming them down, elicit 
positive emotions or alerting the user when 
necessary. In this paper, it is argued that it is not 
compulsory to implement emotions and subsequent 
motivations in order to achieve this ultimate goal to 
affect the users´ emotions. Instead, the direct 
implementation of intentions and social goals is 
proposed as alternative approach. A set of rules 
derived from this approach is presented that links 
intentions to specific (nonverbal) behaviors that are 
known to elicit specific effects in a human observer. 
Thus, although in humans we can assume that 
motivation and emotion are highly intertwined and 
have mutual interaction we propose to not 
implement this within embodied conversational 
agents. For agents that merely interact with a social 
but not with a physical environment the 
implementation of a goal and corresponding 
behavior initiation would be more important than to 
implement evaluation and emotional states. Two 
studies - conducted with agents whose behavior is 
controlled based on this approach - show that the 
direct implementation of social motivations and 
intentions is effective in leaving favourable 
impressions and inducing positive feelings in the 
user.  
 
2   Implementation of emotions 
Many architectures of more sophisticated 
embodied conversational agents incorporate 
emotions. Emotions are seen as necessary since they 
yield human-like emotional behaviour that may 
motivate or affect the user and/or eventually permit 
empathic behaviour of agents (Picard & Cosier, 
1997; Breazeal, 1998; Elliott & Brzezinski, 1998; 
Elliott, Rickel und Lester, 1999; Picard, 1999; 
Lester, 2000). Implementations thus are based on 
assumptions and knowledge derived from emotion 
research (e.g. Ortony, Clore und Collins, 1988). 
Internal system states are implemented that relate to 
basic emotions (e.g. “delight” about correct input) 
and subsequently motivate a corresponding behavior 
(e.g. smiling, see e.g. Lester et al., 2000, and their 
emotive-kinesthetic behavior framework). These 
approaches are based on psychological theories that 
presume a direct link between emotion and 
nonverbal behavior (Tomkins, 1962; Rimé, 1983; 
Ekman, 1997). On the other hand, of course, there 
are numerous researchers already focussing on the 
functions and effects of nonverbal communication 
regardless of emotive states (mostly in the realm of 
linguistic or discourse supporting aspects, see 
Bickmore, 2004; Cassell & Bickmore, 2001; Cassell 
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Figure 1: Architecture and necessary knowledge when impl
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Alternative approach focussing on the state/emotion that 
 
et al., 1999). But as depicted above a considerable 
number of other researchers still holds the view that 
implementing emotions and motivation is essential – 
especially when attempting to influence the human 
user´s emotion and motivation as e.g. in e-learning 
scenarios. 
In order to implement this “emotion view” one 
has to possess knowledge about various relations 
(see figure 1). It has to be known (a) what emotions 
emerge given a specific input or situation and (b) 
which nonverbal readouts result given a specific 
emotion. Finally – since the ultimate goal is to affect 
the users´ emotion and behavior – one has to know 
(c) which state should be induced in the user and (d) 
by means of which cues this can be achieved. 
Especially with regard to the first two aspects 
one has to fall back on knowledge derived from 
emotion research. But especially the knowlegde 
concerning the relation of emotions and their 
behavioural readouts or “expressions” is ambiguous. 
The assumption that emotion and expression are 
directly linked and that emotional states 
involuntarily lead to expressions specific for the 
respective emotion (Tomkins, 1962; Ekman, 1997) 
has been challenged in recent years: Researchers of 
the social-communicative view (Chovil, 1991; 
Fridlund, 1991) argue that emotional nonverbal 
behaviors are not determined by emotional states but 
by social intentions. Referring to empirical findings 
and evolutionary psychology Fridlund (1991) argues 
in his behavioral ecology view that it is not 
functional to d
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aspects of the relation between an agent and its 
environment) in order to be able to act 
autonomously (see e.g Dautenhahn & Christaller, 
1997; Cañamero, 2003; for a critical discussion of 
that notion see Sloman, 2004), embodied 
conversational agents “merely” interact within a 
social world. Hence, it is arguable whether they 
need emotions or whether the focus should rather be 
on the ultimate goal: the motivation to satisfy the 
users´ needs – which according to Fridlund (1991) 
should eventually be achievable even for unhedonic 
entities1.  
3   Alternative approach: 
Implementation of motivation in 
terms of social intentions and 
social goals  
With regard to embodied conversational agents 
the more relevant questions thus are: Which state 
should be induced in the user and by means of 
which cues can this be achieved (see figure 2)? It it 
suggested to motivate behavior according to the 
desired effects on the user. In consequence, a 
specific behavior is shown when it – based on the 
knowledge about its effects – promises to be 
effective in manipulating the user in a desired way. 
In case desired state of the user and a nonverbal cue 
to achieve this state are known, the behavior can be 
chosen straightforward without the need to arouse 
an emotion within the agent: The agent e.g. does not 
have to be sad when an error occurred; he just has to 
communicate the error in a way that the user does 
not return the system angrily (e.g. by displaying 
regret). A corresponding set of rules can be 
implemented in a behavior planner.  
Following this approach, no emotions have to be 
implemented. Thus, one would not have to answer 
questions that need to be answered when following  
the “emotion view” (or else the seemingly resolution 
of the debate stating that both emotion and social 
motives are important). These questions would be: 
a) Which emotion emerges given a specific 
situation? and b) Which behaviour is shown given a 
specific emotion? - the latter being not only more 
difficult to tackle but also more controversely 
discussed. Instead, one is able to focus on the 
question that eventually has to be answered in both 
approaches: By means of which nonverbal cues are 
agents able to influence the emotions of the user? 
                                                 
1 Additionally, the implementation of emotions certainly is 
compulsory when trying to verify a model of human emotions 
and thus using the embodied agent as a means for fundamental 
research. 
Hence, merely the motivation and not the emotion 
aspect is important to be implemented. The general 
motivation is to affect the users´ mood. More 
specifically, depending on the situation the intention 
could be to e.g. calm the user down, to cheer him up 
or to alert him. Table 1 shows a list of rules that 
links speech acts (that are chosen according to a 
specific situation) and corresponding intentions (in 
terms of goals what to achieve with regard to the 
users´ feelings) with specific nonverbal behaviors. 
The latter are assigned to the intentions based on 
empirical findings (for an overview on socio-
emotional effects of nonverbal behavior see Krämer, 
2001). It nevertheless has to be mentioned that more 
research is needed to reveal the effects of nonverbal 
cues since especially with regard to subtle dynamics 
the level of knowlegde is rather poor. 
By implementing this kind of “knowledge” on 
the effects of specific cues the agent is enabled to 
choose that kind of behavior that best promises to 
influence the user´s feelings and behavior in a 
desired way. It subsequently has to be implemented 
(and thus first of all discussed) what the desired 
states of a user - given a specific situation - are. 
Should the agent calm the user down when an error 
occurred or should he draw the user´s anger to 
himself? And – most importantly – should the agent 
be one day capable of deciding on this 
autonomously based on an ability to reason about 
emotion? (for a model of agents that reason about 
human emotions see Elliott & Brzezinski, 1998; 
Gratch & Marsella, 2004). In future, not only this 
but also various other topics connected to the 
implementation of motivation and emotion will have 
to be discussed against the background of both 
empirical evidence and ethical considerations. 
4   Empirical evidence 
In order to analyse whether approach and rules 
are effective, we implemented the rules and 
empirically veryfied a selection. We conducted two 
experiments testing whether an embodied 
conversational agent whose facial displays were 
based on the rules would influence the users´ 
feelings more effectively than an agent without 
facial displays. 
The agent was developed by our project partners 
of the Computer Graphics Center (ZDGV, 
Darmstadt) within the project EMBASSI (Electronic 
multimodal service assistance, funded by the 
German Ministry for Education and Research). 
Supported by the dialogue architecture developed 
within the project the agent is able to understand and 
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Table 1: Speech acts, corresponding goals and behavior 
 
Speech act (Searle, 1969) Intention/Goal Agent behavior Time 
message_greeting: agent greets 
user 
User feels 
welcomed in a 
friendly and polite 
way 
Eye brow raise, eyes widen 
smile 
 
head tilt (10 degrees to the 
right) 
start (1 second) 
before addressing user, after 
addressing user 
after addressing user (4 seconds) 
message_inform [status: 
warning] 
User feels urgency Eye brow raise, eyes widen 
Raise hands, palms towards 
user 
During utterance 
Start of utterance, then drop 
slowly 
message_inform [status: busy] User stays patient Tilt head slightly downward 
Look away from user (turn 
stays with agent) 
During utterance 
After utterance 
message_inform [status: error] 
or [status: failed] 
User is calmed 
down/appeased 
Regret/sorrow display 
smile 
head tilt (10 degrees to the 
right) 
During utterance 
After utterance 
After utterance (4 seconds) 
message_inform 
[status: ok] 
Positive feelings 
are induced 
Slight smile After utterance 
message_inform 
[status: offer] 
(proactive offer) 
User is interested Raise index finger  
Slight smile 
First 3 seconds 
During utterance, intensify after 
utterance  
message_ reject:  
(the user´s claim is rejected) 
User does not get 
angry 
Neutral display During utterance 
message_command:  
(proposals or urgent hints) 
User feels urgency Eye brow raise, eyes widen 
Raise hands, palms towards 
user 
During utterance 
Start of utterance, then drop 
slowly 
message_cancel:  
sudden turn-yield after 
interruption by user 
User realizes that 
he is allowed to 
speak 
Look at user Until user starts to speak 
message_acknowledge: 
(declares successful execution)   
Positive feelings 
are induced 
smile 
 
(emblematic gesture) 
During utterance, intensify after 
utterance 
query_input:  
(agent awaits user´s input) 
User feels invited 
to speak 
Look at user 
Slight head tilt (5 degrees to 
the left) 
After utterance 
3 seconds after end of utterance 
(lenght: 5 sec) 
query_selection:  
(list of alternatives) 
Comprehension is 
facilitated 
beat gestures (or deictic 
gesture) 
Look at user 
Slight head tilt (5 degrees to 
the left) 
Alongside every alternative 
 
After utterance 
3 seconds after end of utterance 
(length: 5 sec) 
 
answer the users´ questions and instructions within 
the domain of TV and VCR programming. Although 
the agent allows for free dialogues in the TV/VCR 
domain, the dialogue within the study was pre-
written and only partly interactive with the agents 
presenting alternatives and the user choosing from 
them (answers could be typed in via keyboard). In 
order to meet the criteria of psychological research 
this approach was chosen to guarantee standardised 
conditions. 
Within the first experiment we compared an 
agent without, an agent with facial expression and as 
further control condition a merely audio based 
system. 60 participants in a between subjects design 
were randomly assigned to one of the three groups. 
All participants were asked to complete a task that 
involved the programming of a VCR. As dependent 
variables we assessed both behavioral data and 
subjective self-report data. The participants´ 
readiness to delegate the task to the agent was 
assessed by logging the actual behavior of the 
participants: At one point they were asked whether 
they chose to do the programming by themselves 
supported by the agent or whether they preferred to 
delegate the whole task. The choice was made more 
relevant than in usual laboratory studies by the fact 
that participants were told that they would be given 
an additional incentive when the programming 
proved to be successful. Additionally, by means of a 
post-hoc questionnaire we assessed the feelings 
during interaction (20 items), person perception with 
regard to the agent (33 items) and evaluation of the 
system (19 items). Within analyses we wanted to 
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show whether participants actually are more 
inclined to delegate the task, to give positive 
evaluations and whether they felt better when there 
is an agent (compared to audio). Also, we expected 
that there would be a difference between the agent 
showing facial displays derived from the model 
depicted above and the agent without facial 
expressions – with the former triggering more 
delegation, more positive evaluations and feelings. 
Table 2: Design of first experiment 
Independent 
Variable 
Audio Agent 
without facial 
expressions 
Agent with 
facial 
expressions 
Participants 21 20 19 
Dependent 
Variable 
Decision to delegate; Feelings during 
interaction;  Person perception; Evaluation 
 
Results show that neither the agent with nor the 
agent without facial expressions led to a higher rate 
of participants delegating the task - compared to the 
audio condition. Also, there are no differences 
concerning participants´ feelings during interaction. 
With regard to person perception of the agent, 
though, one out of seven factors that were derived 
from the 33-item scale showed significant 
differences: The agent displaying facial expressions 
was rated as more approachable as the one without 
and as the audio condition (F = 7.24; df = 57; p = 
.002).  
 
Figure 3: Agent used in experiments 
A second study yielded more pronounced 
differences. Here, 60 participants were infomed by 
an agent that the VCR programming of a movie they 
had done previously had failed and the movie had 
not been recorded. After an additional inquiry 
whether he may provide another service, the agent 
says goodbye. Conditions differed with regard to the 
facial expressions of the agent: One agent did not 
show any facial expressions, one showed a 
sorrow/regret display during the first part while 
smiling again during good bye, one showed a 
sorrow/regret display during the whole interaction. 
Here, we wanted to test whether consistent behavior 
of the agent would lead to more positive evaluations 
and feelings than both the agent with inconsistent 
and the agent without facial expressions. Dependent 
variables again focussed on feelings during 
interaction as well as on person perception of the 
agent. 
Table 3: Design of second experiment 
Independent 
Variable 
Agent 
without facial 
expression 
Agent with 
sorrow/regret 
display in 
first part 
Agent with 
sorrow/regret 
display 
during whole 
interaction 
Participants 18 20 22 
Dependent 
Variable 
Feelings during interaction; Person 
perception; Evaluation 
 
Concerning feelings during interaction, the agent 
with inconsistent facial expression receives worst 
ratings: participants describe themselves as less 
awake (F = 3.5; df = 57; p = .037) and curious (F = 
4.35; df = 57; p = .018) than especially compared to 
the agent with sorrow/regret display during the 
whole interaction (see also differences hinting in the 
same direction but only significant on the 10% 
significance level: bored F = 2.47; df = 57; p = .093; 
attentive F = 2.67; df = 57; p = .078; committed F = 
2.98; df = 57; p = .059). Also, this is reflected with 
regard to the factor “naturalness/vitality” (F = 3.09; 
df = 57; p = .053) that is one of four factors derived 
from the person perception items: The agent with 
inconsistent facial displays is rated as least natural. 
More importantly, concerning the factor 
“likeability/pleasantness” the agent with consistent 
sorrow/regret display is evaluated most positive (F = 
4.03; df = 57; p = .053). In sum, the agent with a 
consistent sorrow/regret display leaves a more 
favourable impression and influences the user in a 
more positive way than both agent without facial 
expressions and agent with inconsistent facial 
display (see also results of Isbister and Nass, 2000, 
who show that consistency across different 
communication channels is likewise important). 
These results certainly do not prove that 
implementing merely intentions and a corresponding 
behaviour planner based on knowledge on the 
effects of nonverbal cues is a better way to tackle 
the task of building believable and effective agents. 
It shows, though, that especially in situations when 
mood management with regard to the user is needed 
(e.g. when the user is prone to be disappointed or 
angry, see above), facial expressions as derived 
from the rule based behaviour planner can be 
effective. Thus, the approach is at least worthwhile 
pursueing. 
59
5   Conclusion 
In conclusion we ask: Why not try and build 
embodied conversational agents that merely want – 
in terms of being motivated to elicit specific states 
in the user - without implementing emotions (that 
they would not “feel” anyhow). Not in all cases it 
seems to be inevitable or necessary to implement 
human-like attributes. When focussing on the 
emotions of the user, research efforts would be 
drawn to the question by which nonverbal cues the 
users´ emotions can be manipulated most 
effectively. This could prove to make research more 
straightforward and some applications easier to 
realise. 
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Abstract
A synthetic research approach to investigating the real time dynamic development of emotive pro-
cesses is presented, revealing disassociable evaluative component systems leading to “wanting” and
“liking” during the emotive episode. A distributed network of motor primitives and forward models
is presented, which allows a robot to anticipate the outcome of its actions and to initiate and direct
its movement according to self-generated expectancies. The operation of the network is organised
according to the signalling properties of the dopaminergic neuromodulatory system, which signals
reward according to a prediction error. The prediction error allows to determine the on- and offset
of the anticipatory phase, revealing internally encoded expectancies during the emotive process. The
computational architecture is tested in four experimental trials, each being comprised of a complete
perception-action cycle with internally generated evaluative feedback, allowing the robot to associate
the hedonic experience with the action leading to it and to adapt its expectations to changing reward
values.
1 Introduction
A rich body of research has focused on the
functional role of emotion and motivation in social
interaction and communication (Breazeal, 2003;
Staller and Petta, 2001), and the role emotion and
motivation play in designing action selection and
decision-making policies (Avila-Garcia et al., 2003;
Bryson, 2003; Canamero, 2003; Cos-Aguilera et al.,
2003; Sawada et al., 2004). Work in progress,
presented here, takes a synthetic research approach
(Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999) using robot-based exper-
iments and focuses on the dynamics of the emotive
process itself.
This approach is related to research into value sys-
tems in the area of developmental robotics. A number
of value systems have been realised in robotic sys-
tems, where they are employed to modulate learning
and to realize value-dependent modifications for
motor activation (Almassy et al., 1998; Krichmar
et al., 2000; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1997; Sporns and
Aleksander, 2002). The contribution presented here
is different, since it emphasizes the developmental
nature of the emotive process itself and concentrates
on investigating internally encoded expectancies
in cognitive and movement dimensions. These
expectancies are encoded as associatively learned
knowledge about a rewarding stimulus and the move-
ment leading to the rewarding event and are pivotal
for initiating and executing goal-directed movements.
Focussing on the real time dynamic development
of the emotive episode allows to research the com-
positional and systemic nature of the process and the
reciprocal interaction between different component
systems. The three organismic component systems
of the emotive episode investigated in this paper are:
1) the cognitive system (predictions, evaluations),
2) the motor system (motor programs), and 3) the
sensory monitoring system (feelings), with feelings
being the parallel reflection of all ongoing changes in
the different component systems during the emotive
episode. This approach allows not only to model
the phenomenological distinctiveness of the emotive
episode during the anticipatory and reactive phase,
but also to investigate temporally distinct evaluative
components leading to “wanting” and “liking”, two
seperable systems linking motivation and emotion.
Reward information processing involves the ascend-
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ing dopaminergic neuromodulatory system of the
brain, which is involved in sensorimotor processes
that are important for “wanting”, i.e. for movement
activation and responsiveness to conditioned reward-
ing stimuli.
This paper proposes that the emotive process
is comprised of an anticipatory and a reactive
phase, based on qualitatively and quantitatively
different and temporally distinct evaluative feed-
back components on sensory, cognitive and motor
levels. The development of the emotive episode is
proposed to be multi-factorial and modelled as a
function of expected reward value and the actual
value of the hedonic experience, with its subsequent
decay. A distributed network of motor primitives
and forward models is presented, which allows a
robot to anticipate the outcome of its actions and
to initiate and direct its movement according to
self-generated expectancies. Network operation is
organised according to the signalling properties of
the dopaminergic neuromodulatory system, which
processes reward information according to prediction
errors (Schulz, 2004, 2002, 2000; Schulz and Dick-
inson, 2000). The timing of these prediction errors
determine the onset and offset of the anticipatory
process and reveals internally encoded expectancies.
Drawing upon the neuroscience, psychology, and
epigenetic robotics literature, a biologically inspired
perspective is taken to investigate the coding of value
during the anticipatory phase of the emotive process,
aiming to illustrate the dynamical and reciprocal link
between motor behaviour, expectancies and goals in
general. In particular, the research addresses the
suggestion made by Holland and Gallagher (2004)
that ‘estimates of expected value of the consequences
of actions might be frequently intertwined with ex-
pectancy’. Results substantiate this suggestion and
propose this process to be based on the circular self-
organising interaction between expectancies and mo-
tor programs, and to be reliant primarily on com-
petition, mutual inhibition and quality-of-prediction-
based selection of a winner. This proposed mecha-
nism may be used to inform neurobiological research
into orbitofrontal-amygdala interaction.
2 Architecture
A distributed network of motor primitives and
forward models (Demiris and Johnson, 2003) is
implemented, which allows a robot to anticipate the
outcome of its actions and to initiate and direct its
movement according to self-generated expectancies.
The core feature of this active anticipatory system
is the pairing of multiple inverse models operating
in parallel with corresponding forward models to
create a perception-expectancy-execution sequence.
Network operation is organised according to the
dopamine prediction errors, which determine the
onset and offset of the expectancy process. Eval-
uative feedback generated by the prediction errors
provides the system with particular expectancies that
guide perception and limit action, consistent with
cognitive accounts of the role of anticipation in the
perception-action cycle.
The computational architecture solves the problem
of initiating goal-directed, intentional movement by
using motor primitive programs in a dual and par-
allel control loop. Forward models provide a) the
predicted potential outcome of each simulated mo-
tor primitive (motor primitive expectancies) towards
achieving the goal, as well as b) the predicted results
of those actions. The architecture chooses the action
with the highest expectancy by internally generating
it and a winner-take-all approach is used to deter-
mine which motor primitive is used at each time step
towards achieving the goal (Demiris and Johnson,
2003). This prediction-comparison process achieves
the matching between cognitive and motor informa-
tion. Simultaneously, the system performs the execu-
tion of these motor behaviours.
2.1 State representation and generation
The system’s state space is represented as a
vector of values, comprising interoceptive, i.e.
proprioceptive and hedonic states, and exteroceptive
states, i.e. quantities derived from the relation of the
system to objects in its environment, such as distance.
The dopamine prediction error at a particular time
is computed as the difference between the reward
value experienced at that time and the reward value
predicted for that time:
Dopamine Responset = (1)
Actual Reward V aluet −
Predicted Reward V aluet−1
Learning involves minimising the prediction
errors and modifies both performance and prediction
according to the prediction error (Pagnoni et al.,
2002; Schulz, 2004; Schulz and Dickinson, 2000;
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Figure 1: A top view of the computational architecture
Schulz, 1998; Schulz et al., 1997). After learning,
the reward value is fully predicted and the error
term is zero. By signalling rewards according to
a prediction error, dopamine responses provide a
teaching signal for model learning, show adaptive
responses during associative learning episodes,
and transfer from the actual rewarding event to the
earliest reward-predicting event, the latter evoking
an expectation of the reward value, marking the
evaluation leading to “wanting” and initiating the
approach behaviour. Accordingly, visual detection of
a reward-predicting object results in the generation of
a dopamine prediction error, which marks the onset
of the anticipatory phase. The expectation to receive
a reward and the motor primitive expectancies are
generated from the time of object detection and spec-
ified in value by the forward model predictions. The
hedonic experience of reward marks the offset of the
anticipatory phase and only leads to the generation
of a second prediction error if the expected reward
value does not equal the actual one.
The development of the emotive episode is
multi-factorial and modelled here as a function of
expected reward value, motor primitive expectancies
and the actual value of the hedonic experience,
with its subsequent decay. Consistent with this
conceptualisation, the emotive episode is comprised
of an anticipatory and a reactive phase. The onset
and offset of the anticipatory phase is determined
by the dopamine prediction errors, and the reactive
phase starts at the time of the actual rewarding
experience and ends with this hedonic experience
having decayed over time.
The prediction for the expected reward value
during the anticipatory phase determines the positive
valence (hope, optimism, positive expectancy) of the
developing emotive episode. The episode undergoes
a phase change at the time of the actual rewarding
event, when the actual reward value is compared
to the predicted value. This evaluation leads to
feelings of happiness, satisfaction and contentment
if the expected value equals the actual value; leads
to increased intensity of feeling happy if the actual
reward is higher than the predicted reward value; and
to feeling disappointed if the actual reward value is
smaller than the predicted value (Buck, 1999).
Due to the lack of existing biological data, a 1:1
mapping between the magnitude of the reward signal
and the value of the hedonic experience is chosen.
This assumption allows us to focus the investigation
on the effects of the cognitive evaluation of expected
and actual reward value on the subjective experience
- the “liking” component. This sensory component of
the emotive episode is chosen to decay exponentially
according to:
Hedonic Experiencet = (2)
Reward magnitude× e
−kt
,
with the decay rate k =
x
−1
2
Since the decay is dependent upon knowing the
elapsed time after the reward signal, the variable x
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is introduced in order store this information and to
derive the decay value at any given point in time af-
ter the reward signal has been given. This allows the
modelling of the decay of the emotive episode so that
the higher the actual reward value, the slower the de-
cay of the hedonic experience, or alternatively, the
smaller the hedonic experience, the faster the decay.
2.2 Implementation of Forward Models
Forward models can be used to not only simulate
musculoskeletal aspects but also cognitive and
affective system components, thus allowing the
prediction of multiple future system states. Each
forward model receives as inputs the current states,
the motor command generated by the inverse model it
is coupled to, and has access to associative memory.
Forward models are implemented as integrators to
generate one-time-step predictions for guidance of
movements.
During the anticipatory phase, forward models
generate two kinds of predictions: a) motor command
hypotheses, which are generated on the basis of the
current distance, i.e. predictions are made of what
the distance to the object is expected to be if this par-
ticular motor command was to be executed. These
predictions are compared every cycle to evaluate the
motor primitive, which contributes most towards goal
completion. The expectancy of each motor primitive
is calculated according to:
Expectancy = (3)
associated reward value×
normalised
(
1
distance
)
Predictive evaluative feedback generated this way
specifies how to initiate and guide movement. Thus,
this feedback not only encapsulates the motivation to
reduce the distance towards achieving the goal, but
also the means to achieve this. b) In parallel, predic-
tions are generated for interoceptive and exterocep-
tive robot states. These predicted states are fed into
the inverse model and are considered when the con-
trol signals are generated.
2.3 Implementation of Inverse Models
The inverse model is comprised of six motor prim-
itives: rotate left, rotate right, move forward and open
the gripper, move backward, close gripper and stand
still. During the anticipatory phase, the generation of
motor commands by the inverse model is driven by
the motor primitive expectancies. Thus expectancies
produce the goals for the motor primitives, so that
they generate a motor command that will, at the next
time-step, result in a larger expectation to achieve the
rewarding experience. Thus, in a circular and inter-
active manner, do generated motor commands affect
the subsequent expectation level and motor primitive
expectancies control the execution of movement.
3 Experiments
3.1 Experimental setting
The computational architecture was tested in
four experimental trials, each being comprised of
a complete perception-action cycle with internally
generated evaluative feedback, allowing the associa-
tion of the object colour and the experienced reward
value with the action leading to it. Experiments were
performed using a robotics platform with the aim of
a) showing approach and grasping behaviours ac-
cording to self-generated expectancies, b) assessing
how well the system adapted its expectations due
to changing reward values, and c) demonstrating
the effects of changing expectancies on the emotive
episode.
The robot used is an ActivMedia Peoplebot with
an onboard 800 MHz Pentium III. It is equipped with
a Canon VCC4 pan-tilt zoom (PTZ) camera, which
was used as the main tracking and range-finding
sensor. The ActivMedia Colour Tracker (ACTS)
was used for segmentation of the object colour, thus
achieving recognition. The software was written in
C++ and the artificial equivalent of a reward sensor
was implemented to model the functional effect of
reward on the emotive episode. All processing was
done in real time with one full iteration of the main
loop executing in 0.1 seconds.
At the beginning of each experimental trial, the
robot faced the table at about 1 meter distance. A
blue object was then placed on the table initiating the
experiment; and upon grasping the object a single re-
ward signal magnitude was given, with a value cho-
sen by the experimenter. This single signal magnitude
was chosen deliberately in order to emphasize the ef-
fect of reward evaluation on the subjective experience
at this point in time. After the emotive episode had
decayed, the robot was reset and a new experimental
trial started. During the experiment the robot moved
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Figure 2: The graphs illustrate different dopamine signalling properties during the learning period over the four
experimental trials. Dopamine prediction errors (a) indicate the visual detection of the reward-predicting object.
Dopamine prediction errors (b) signal the discrepancy between predicted and actual reward value.
at constant speed.
3.2 Experimental results
The first prediction error in each trial encapsulates
the expected reward value learned associatively and
the second prediction error marks the difference be-
tween the predicted and the actual reward value (fig-
ure 2). This second prediction error is positive if the
actual reward value is better than expected, negative
if it is worse than predicted; and zero if the actual
reward value was experienced as predicted.
Results show that the system correctly adapted its
expectations to the changing reward values according
to the generated prediction error upon receiving
the reward signal in each experimental trial. Thus,
the system was able to adapt its reward prediction
according to changed environmental contingencies
prior to initiating the approach behaviour (figure 3).
During these experiments inverse model learning
was not taken into consideration.
Experimental data plotted in figure 4 demon-
strate the generation of motor primitive expectancies,
which initiate and direct the robot’s movements to-
wards achieving the goal of grasping the object. Re-
Figure 3: The graph on the left shows the reward val-
ues given to the robot in each experimental trial. The
graph on the right plots the development of deltaR
during learning and the offset of the learning period
in experiment 4. The error term deltaR is computed
according to equation (1) and is zero after the actual
reward value is fully predicted.
sults obtained during the experiments allow visual-
isation of the developmental nature of the emotive
episode and the analysis of feedback generated by
sensory, cognitive and motor components during the
process (figure 5). These three feedback compo-
nents were computed according to the equations pre-
sented. The expected reward value is encoded in the
dopamine prediction error (equation 1), motor primi-
tive expectancies are computed according to equation
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3, and the hedonic experience on the sensory level
decays according to equation 2.
Figure 4: The graph shows the predicted potential
outcome of each simulated motor primitive towards
achieving the goal. The motor primitives are compet-
ing and a winner-take-all approach is chosen to de-
termine which motor primitive is used at each time
step.
4 Discussion
The dopamine prediction errors generated during
the four experimental trials correctly showed partic-
ular signalling properties of this neuromodulatory
system. After having learned to associate the he-
donic effect with the object colour and the motor
primitive ’close gripper’, the reward prediction error
transferred to the earlier event, the time of visually
detecting the object. The association triggered the
prediction of the reward value, revealing the internal
expectation, and initiated the approach behaviour.
Results illustrate the two evaluative and functionally
distinct component systems involved in reward
information processing. The “wanting” component,
which puts motion into emotion and necessitates that
the expected rewarding properties of the stimulus
must be evaluated and updated prior to initiating
approach behaviour, can be disassociated from the
“liking” component. The dopaminergic neuromodu-
latory system is involved in integrating sensorimotor
processes that are important for “wanting”, i.e.
responsiveness to conditioned rewarding stimuli
and movement initialisation. Results show that the
hedonic assessment of rewards - “liking” - does not
depend on dopaminergic neurons, but necessitates
the involvement of neural network structures such
as orbitofrontal cortex, prefrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate cortex and striatum. These structures do
not emit a global reward prediction error signal
similar to dopamine neurons, but process reward
information as transient responses and process the
specific nature of the rewarding event. Furthermore,
the hedonic assessment of rewards involves opiod
mechanisms in the brain stem, nucleus accumbens
and pallidum, and manipulation of the opioid system
to increase opioid function modulates hedonia.
The robotic system correctly learned to associate
the object colour with the hedonic experience and
the motor primitive leading to it and adapted its
expectations to the changing reward values given
over the experimental trials. Thus, the architecture
was able to integrate learning and control in a
concurrent rather than separate fashion (Pfeifer and
Scheier, 1997).
Results show the generation of evaluative feedback
on sensory, cognitive and motor levels at different
time steps of the emotive process. Associatively
learned predictive evaluative feedback on the cogni-
tive level was shown to be encoded in the dopamine
prediction errors; to structure the on - and offset of
the anticipatory phase; and to drive the expectancy
process. Furthermore, results show that the operation
of the distributed model of motor primitives and
forward models self-organised according to these
prediction errors. During the anticipatory phase,
this predictive evaluative feedback was continuously
generated for movement execution and control via
the generation of motor primitive hypotheses about
the potential contribution of motor primitives towards
the rewarding experience.
The evolution of motor primitive expectancies
over time towards achieving the goal of grasping
the object clearly demonstrates their development
through online interaction with the environment.
Results show expectancies to be generated by the
close coupling of inverse and forward models,
which supports the suggestion made by Holland
and Gallagher (2004) that guidance of action is
based on expectancies, especially on estimates of
the expected value of the consequences of actions.
Results show that the implemented distributed
network of motor primitives and forward models
provides such a mechanism for initiating and guiding
movements. The computational architecture uses
motor primitive programs in a dual and parallel con-
trol loop, which allows generated motor commands
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Figure 5: The graphs show the different development of each emotive episode, consisting of an anticipatory (blue
and red) and a reactive (green) phase, in each experimental trial. The emotive episode is modelled as function of
expected reward value, motor primitive expectancies and hedonic experience. During the anticipatory phase the
emotive episode is driven by the predicted reward value (blue) and the motor primitive expectancies (red). After
the actual reward signal was given, the hedonic experience and thus the emotive episode decays exponentially. In
episode 1, the comparison between predicted and actual value leads to increased feelings of happiness (4 value
units). In episode 2, the evaluation leads to feelings of disappointment (1 unit). In episode 3, the result of the
cognitive comparison leads to increased feelings of happiness (1 unit). In episode 4, the expected reward value
matches the actual one and induces feelings of happiness, satisfaction and contentment.
to affect the subsequent expectation level and in
parallel motor primitive expectancies to direct the
execution of movement. This circular interaction
between expectancies and movement is proposed as
a mechanism, which relies primarily on competition,
mutual inhibition and quality-of-prediction-based
selection of a winner (Demiris and Johnson, 2003).
The bottom-up synthetic approach allowed the
modelling of the development of the emotive episode,
and reveals that the episode is comprised of an antic-
ipatory and a reactive phase, with evaluations taking
place at different time steps leading to phase changes
of the episode. The anticipatory phase of the emo-
tive episode starts with the visual detection of the ob-
ject, is driven by the expected reward value and mo-
tor primitive expectancies, and ends with the actual
event, at which the expected and the actual hedonic
experience are compared. This evaluation leading to
feelings of happiness if the actual reward experience
is better than predicted or to feelings of disappoint-
ment, if the outcome is worse than predicted. Results
show that the predictive evaluative feedback gener-
ated by the distributed network serves to establish
a perception-expectancy-executionsequence, demon-
strating the integration of sensory, cognitive and mo-
tor feedback and parallel gating of learning during the
emotive episode.
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Abstract
This paper presents a simple extension to the base agent architecture supporting the construction of
believable synthetic characters: an anticipatory module composed by emotivectors that: (1) monitor
the information flowing back and forth between the sensor, effector and processing modules of the
agent; (2) anticipate the information that will be monitored next; (3) confront the sensor information
with the anticipated prediction using a model inspired in Emotion and Attention research that provides
the synthetic agent with an autonomous sensation and attention control mechanism aimed at enhancing
its believability.
1 Introduction
A critical yet subjective concept to account for when
defining the quality of the interaction with a synthetic
character is believability (Bates, 1994).
Disney animators have been dealing with the cre-
ation of believable characters since the dawn of the
last century, and have developed a set of guidelines
to help in the creation of such believable characters
(Thomas and Johnson, 1994). The general princi-
ple is to display the internal state of the character
to the viewer. This simple principle strives to make
the character aware of its surrounding environment
by reacting emotionally to what happens around it in
a consistent way.
The concept of awareness can be further devel-
oped into what we call the behavior loop: agents
should change the focus of their attention and respond
emotionally to stimuli provoked by other agents, and
these reactions should be responded as well. As an
example, if Pluto is laying near the fire when Mickey
enters the room, he should react by looking at him and
clearly expressing an emotion, perceived as caused
by Mickey. In response, Mickey should look back at
Pluto and express an emotion. This loop is a simple
process that increases the believability of intervening
characters.
This work researches which mechanisms are suited
to control both the focus of attention and the emo-
tional reactions of a synthetic character, to increase
its believability through the behavior loop and strives
to make this control as autonomous from the main
processing of the agent as possible.
2 Emotivectors
Our synthetic characters are implemented as software
agents (Russel and Norvig, 1995). To make control
as independent as possible form the agent process-
ing, we extended the architecture with an autonomous
module: the salience module (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Extended Architecture
The salience module performs a semantic-
independent monitoring of the percepts flowing from
the sensors to the processing module as well as the
action-commands flowing from the processing mod-
ule to the agent effectors. This monitoring is possible
since the code of the information flowing throughout
the agent is usually the consistent measurement of
a certain aspect of the environment on a same scale
over time. Each element of the salience module, re-
sponsible to monitor a single piece of information, is
called an emotivector.
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Each emotivector keeps a limited record of its as-
sociated signal history, and uses this information to
compute a prediction for the next signal value to be
read. By confronting the expectation with the actual
sensed value, using the affective model described in
the next section, the emotivector computes the sen-
sor salience, and adds a tag to the signal containing
both attention focus and emotional potential informa-
tion. The management of all emotivectors according
to their salience is performed by the salience module.
3 Affective Model
Rather than striving to implement a detailed affec-
tive model (Picard, 1997), we selected a small set
of principles from the Psychology of Attention and
Emotions. Even these principles fail in providing
with an accurate description of how Humans act, we
argue that they are useful in building simple syn-
thetic models of behavior that perform well in real
time, a critical aspect when considering the creation
of “autonomous believability”. As both Attention
and Emotion cannot be considered separately (Wells
andMatthews, 1994), we merged theses principles to-
gether into one model. The next subsections describe
our approach.
3.1 Attention
Posner (1980) showed that directing attention to a
valid location facilitates processing, which led him
to suggest that “attention can be likened to a spotlight
that enhances the efficiency of the detection of events
within its beam”. Note that attention is not synony-
mous with looking. Even when there is no time to
make voluntary eye movement to the cued location,
facilitation is found. Thus, it seems, attention is ori-
ented to a stimulus.
Posner experimented with central and peripheral
cues and found that the attentional spotlight could be
summoned by either cues, but peripheral cues could
not be ignored whereas central cues could. Pos-
ner proposed two attentional systems: an endoge-
nous system, controlled voluntarily by the subject and
an exogenous system, outside of the subject control,
which automatically shifts attention according to en-
vironmental stimuli and cannot be ignored.
After performing a series of experiments clarify-
ing Posner’s hypothesis, Muller and Rabbit (1989)
verified that exogenous orienting could sometimes
be modified by voluntary control, and suggested that
“reflexive orienting is triggered and proceeds auto-
matically, and if both reflexive and voluntary orient-
ing mechanisms are pulling in the same direction,
they have an additive effect. However, if they are
pulling in different directions, their effects are sub-
tractive”, which is compatible with Posner’s proposal.
Following Posner’s proposal, our model uses two
interacting components: an exogenous component
and an endogenous component. The exogenous com-
ponent is based on the estimation error and reflects
the principle that the least expected is more likely to
attract attention. The endogenous component is com-
puted whenever a search value is given to the emo-
tivector: it is a function of the change in the distance
to the search value. Unlike the exogenous component
that is always positive, the endogenous component is
valenced: an increase in the search distance is nega-
tive while a reduction is positive.
Both added exogenous and endogenous compo-
nents define the salience of the emotivector, following
Muller’s hypothesis. However, an emotivector with a
search value also possesses a certain qualia. This is
described in the next section.
3.2 Emotion
As Harlow and Stagner (1933), we differentiate be-
tween sensation and emotion. Harlow and Stag-
ner proposed that there are basic sensations, innate
and undifferentiated, and that emotions are a condi-
tionned form of these sensations, which we learn to
refer in particular ways: we are born with the capacity
to feel but have to learn the different emotions. Fol-
lowing Harlow’s and Stagner’s proposal, we assume
that emotions are conditioned responses of primary
sensations, and concentrate our model in the genera-
tion of these sensations. Emotions per se are left to
the processing module cognitive or symbolic affec-
tive processing.
As Young (1961), we assume that affective
processes are defined in a continuum, where changes
can occur in either positive or negative direction, giv-
ing form to four basic sensations: positive increase,
positive reduction, negative increase and, negative re-
duction. As Young, we give to the affective processes
a motivational and regulatory role driving, among
other things, the subject toward or away from a stim-
ulus.
Inspired by the behavioural synthesis of Hammond
(1970), we considered the emotion as a central state
of the organism which is generated by stimuli, both
known and unknown. Both stimuli relate to the pres-
ence or absence of a reward or punishment. We use
the emotivector estimation to anticipate the reward or
punishment which, when confronted with the actual
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value, triggers one of Hammond’s four basic sensa-
tions (fear, relief, hope and distress) that we translated
to Young’s sensations.
Inspired by Millenson (1967), we attribute an in-
tensity to each sensation, which value is the emo-
tional salience, allowing a same sensation to vary ac-
cross its dimension, and compute its impact in the
conditioning of current operational tendencies. We
also use Millenson’s designations for our sensations,
as the symbols are not connoted to an exact word
which, by itself, would imply a certain intensity.
In other words, our affective model considers the
following five primary sensations:
Surprise (S) when there is no expectation of a re-
ward or punishment due to the absence of a
search value to the emotivector.
Positive Increase (S+) , that we relate to Harlow
and Stagner’s excitement as well as to Ham-
mond’s hope and Millenson positive uncondi-
tioned stimulus, and associate with a reward
stronger than the expectation. If reward is antic-
ipated and the effective reward is stronger than
the expected, a S+ sensation is thrown.
Positive Reduction ($+) , that we relate to Harlow
and Stagner’s discontentment as well as to Ham-
mond’s distress and Millenson reduction of a
positive unconditioned stimulus provoking rage,
and associate with a reward weaker than ex-
pected. If reward is anticipated but the effective
reward is weaker than the expected, a $+ sensa-
tion is thrown.
Negative Increase (S-) , that we relate to Harlow
and Stagner’s depression as well as to Ham-
mond’s fear and Millenson negative uncondi-
tioned stimulus provoking anxiety, and associate
with a punishment stronger than expected. If
punishment is antecipated and the effective pun-
ishment is stronger than expected, a S- sensation
is thrown.
Negative Reduction ($-) , that we relate to Har-
low and Stagner’s pleasure as well as to Ham-
mond’s relief and Millenson reduction of a neg-
ative stimulus, and associate with a punishment
weaker than expected. If punishment is antic-
ipated but the effective punishment is weaker
than expected, a $- sensation is thrown.
4 Anticipation
The computation of the emotivector salience rely on
the capacity of the emotivector to predict its next
state. As there is no a-priori knowledge of the world,
we followed a simple assumption: that the intensity
of a signal will tend to oscillate around a certain value
for a while, and then suddenly change to a random
totally new value. We used this model to assess the
adequacy of our candidate predictors.
Our chosen predictor is inspired in both the two-
phases recirculation algorithm (Hinton and McClel-
land, 1988), a biologically plausible implementation
of the backpropagation algorithm, and Kalman fil-
tering (Kalman, 1960). A detailed description of
our lightweight predictor can be found in (Martinho,
2004).
5 Experiment
To test our approach and the strategies to manage sev-
eral emotivectors at once, we set up a small experi-
ment based on the computer game Dungeon Master1.
The task is to selected a party of 4 champions to con-
trol during the game. The selection is performed by
going through the possible 40 champions, one by one.
To find a good starting party, a first approach could
be to draw a table of all champions and rate them in
terms of their potential value for the party according
to some weighting scheme based on their attributes
and select the ones with the better scores. However,
players running through the game for the first time do
not spend around two hours annotating all the cham-
pions attributes and computing their potential suit-
ability before entering the game per-se!
Imagine yourself walking through the Halls of
Champions, examining each candidate, one by one.
You would look at a first one, then at a second, and
suddenly you would remark: “This champion has a
very high strength. He could make a good warrior!”.
Later, while observing the statistics of another, you
would remark: “This one has a very low dexterity,
she would never make to be my ranger, and for what
I have seen until now, it will be hard to get a good
one...” Step by step, your attention will be drawn to
one or other attribute, you will react emotionally and,
in a matter of minutes, a party will come together. No
notes needed, only the memory of one or other value,
and that is exactly the human-like behavior we are
aiming for.
1DungeonMaster c©1987 Software Heaven Inc., edited by FTL
Games, one of the first real-time role playing games.
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6 Preliminary Results
We associated an emotivector with each attribute rat-
ing the champions. Each time a new champion was
observed, its attributes were fed to their related emo-
tivectors and they would each produce a salience
value. The salience module would then, using a spe-
cific strategy, decide which emotivectors would be
sent to the agent for processing, based on the indi-
vidual saliences. If a sensation was present, it would
be expressed by the agent.
We evaluated a simple winner-takes-all strategy
and the results were promising. After a few runs with
different permutations of the champion order, the
algorithm found sub-optimum parties which mem-
bers were rated as top-5 in the exhaustive approach:
enough to start the game knowing to have (maybe not
the best) but a good starting party.
However, under certain conditions, an emotivector
could hide another, and we are starting to evaluate
other possible strategies: salience ordering, threshold
salience and meta-estimation.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented an extension to the base agent archi-
tecture aimed at enhancing the believability of syn-
thetic characters built upon it. We introduced the
salience module, that manages emotivectors: inde-
pendent mechanisms that monitor the different di-
mensions of the agent perceptions, estimate their next
state and, based on a model of attention and emotion,
provide with information regarding both the attention
focus as well as the sensation potential of the signal.
An interesting aspect is that the salience is computed
independently from the semantics of the signal and
from the rest of the agent processing. A simple ex-
perience was described that allowed us to verify the
potential of the approach and test a simple manage-
ment strategy. The most important result, however, is
to have shown that it is possible to enhance synthetic
characters with human-like behavior using very sim-
ple strategies.
Some aspects are still under development: the
emotional exogenous control based on Damasio’s so-
matic markers that is being implemented as described
in (Martinho et al., 2003) and; although the model
proved to be adequate in providing with mechanisms
of human-like behavior, the degree of believability
gained using this technique still has to be evaluated
in more detail.
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Abstract 
 
Humans are agents that want and like, and the impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, 
everyday beliefs is well-documented (Gilovich, 1991). The influence of such motivational factors on delu-
sions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevail-
ing models of delusion formation and maintenance (e.g. Ellis and Young, 1990; Stone and Young, 1997; 
Davies & Coltheart, 2000; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen, 2001). This 
paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the moti-
vational and the deficit. Motivational approaches view delusions as extreme instances of self-deception; as 
defensive attempts to relieve pain and distress. Deficit approaches, in contrast, view delusions as the conse-
quence of defects in the normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned by neuroanatomical or neu-
rophysiological abnormalities. It is argued that although there are good reasons to be sceptical of motiva-
tional theories (particularly in their more floridly psychodynamic manifestations), recent experiments con-
firm that motives are important causal forces where delusions are concerned. It is therefore concluded that 
the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both motivational and 
deficit approaches. An attempt is made to develop just such a rapprochement, taking as its point of depar-
ture a current cognitive neuropsychiatric model of delusion formation, the two-deficit model of Coltheart, 
Langdon, Davies and Breen. 
 
1   What are Delusions? 
If illusions involve low-level misperceptions of real-
ity, then delusions involve cases of high-level mis-
belief – instances where the avowed contents of an 
individual’s beliefs run counter to a generally ac-
cepted reality. The prevailing diagnostic view of 
delusions is that they are rationally untenable beliefs 
that are clung to regardless of counter-evidence and 
despite the efforts of family, friends and clinicians 
to dissuade the deluded individual (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1995). 
 
Delusions are observed in an array of psychiatric 
and neurological conditions. They have been re-
ferred to as “the sine qua non of psychosis” (Peters, 
2001, p. 193); together with hallucinations, delu-
sions constitute first-rank symptoms of psychotic 
disorders such as schizophrenia, schizophreniform 
disorder, schizoaffective disorder and delusional 
disorder. Such disorders affect around one percent 
of the population and have devastating conse-
quences in terms of suffering and loss of function-
ing. Delusions also occur in association with demen-
tia, temporal lobe epilepsy, Huntington's disease, 
Parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis and traumatic 
brain injury. 
 
Delusions can vary both thematically and in degree 
of circumscription. Thematically speaking, delu-
sions range from the bizarre and exotic (e.g. the 
delusion that one’s head has been replaced by a 
pumpkin or that one has been raped by the devil) to 
the relatively humdrum (e.g. an unjustified convic-
tion regarding the infidelity of a spouse, or an over-
whelming suspicion of persecution by one’s neigh-
bours). This is a nosologically important distinction, 
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as the presence of bizarre delusions satisfies the 
symptom criteria for a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(even in the absence of other psychotic symptoms), 
while precluding a diagnosis of delusional disorder. 
 
In terms of scope, delusions vary from the circum-
scribed and monothematic to the widespread and 
polythematic (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). A pa-
tient with “Capgras” delusion, for example, may 
believe that a loved one (usually a spouse or close 
relative) has been replaced by a physically identical 
impostor, yet remain quite lucid and grounded on 
other topics. Other individuals evince a more exten-
sive loss of contact with reality. Nobel laureate John 
Nash, for example, believed not only that aliens 
were communicating with him, but also that he was 
the left foot of God and the Emperor of Antarctica 
(David, 1999). 
 
2   Theoretical Approaches: Moti-
vational versus Deficit 
 
There have been many proposed theoretical expla-
nations of delusions (for interesting reviews see 
Winters & Neale, 1983; Blaney, 1999; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). Among the various models that 
have been put forward can be discerned two general 
classes of theoretical explanation, the motivational 
and the deficit (Blaney, 1999; see also Winters & 
Neale, 1983; Hingley, 1992; Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Venneri 
& Shanks, 2004). In brief, theories of the first type 
view delusions as serving a defensive, palliative 
function; as representing an attempt (however mis-
guided) to relieve pain, tension and distress. Such 
theories regard delusions as providing a kind of psy-
chological refuge or spiritual salve, and consider 
delusions explicable in terms of the emotional bene-
fits they confer. This approach to theorizing about 
delusions has been prominently exemplified by the 
psychodynamic tradition with its concept of defense, 
and by the philosophical notion of self-deception. 
From a motivational perspective delusions constitute 
psychologically dexterous “sleights of mind”, deft 
mental manoeuvres executed for the maintenance of 
psychic integrity and the reduction of anxiety.  
 
Motivational accounts of delusions can be generally 
distinguished, as a major explanatory class, from 
theories that involve the notion of deficit or defect. 
Such theories view delusions as the consequence of 
fundamental cognitive or perceptual abnormalities, 
ranging from wholesale failures in certain crucial 
elements of cognitive-perceptual machinery, to 
milder dysfunctions involving the distorted opera-
tion of particular processes. Delusions thus effec-
tively constitute disorders of belief – disruptions or 
alterations in the normal functioning of belief 
mechanisms such that individuals come to hold er-
roneous beliefs with remarkable tenacity.  
 
A deficit approach to theorizing about delusions 
would seem to be implicit in the field of cognitive 
neuropsychiatry (David & Halligan, 1996). Cogni-
tive neuropsychiatry is a branch of cognitive neuro-
psychology, a discipline which investigates disor-
dered cognition in order to learn more about normal 
cognition (Ellis & Young, 1988; Coltheart, 2002). 
Cognitive neuropsychiatry involves applying the 
logic of cognitive neuropsychology to psychiatric 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations 
(Ellis & Young, 1990; Stone & Young, 1997; Lang-
don & Coltheart, 2000). The aim of cognitive neu-
ropsychiatry is thus to develop a model of the proc-
esses underlying the normal functioning of the belief 
formation system, and to explain delusions in terms 
of damage to processes implicated in this model of 
normal functioning. 
 
Perhaps the best way to represent the distinction be-
tween the motivational and deficit approaches is to con-
trast a motivational account of a particular delusion 
with a deficit account of the same delusion. Let us take 
as our example the Frégoli delusion, first described in 
1927 by Courbon and Fail (see Ellis, Whitley & Luaute, 
1994). Patients suffering from the Frégoli delusion be-
lieve that they are being followed around by a familiar 
person (or people) who is in disguise and thus unrecog-
nizable. The delusion was named after an Italian actor 
renowned for his ability to impersonate people (Ellis & 
Young, 1990). A motivational explanation of a particu-
lar case of this delusion was suggested by Collacot and 
Napier (1991; cited in Mojtabai, 1994), who argued that 
a case of Frégoli delusion in which the patient misiden-
tified certain unknown people as her deceased father 
might be explicable in terms of wish fulfillment. The 
development of this woman’s delusional belief is here 
viewed as serving a psychological function, namely 
gratifying her wish that her father still be present. This 
explicitly motivational formulation, with its notion of 
wish fulfillment, is exquisitely Freudian, and consistent 
with a long tradition of psychodynamic theorizing. 
 
Such an account brooks comparison with the deficit 
explanation of Davies and Coltheart (2000). Davies 
and Coltheart integrate a key notion from prevalent 
deficit accounts of the aforementioned Capgras de-
lusion (the belief that a loved one has been replaced 
by an impostor), which implicate a dissociation be-
tween different components of face recognition (e.g. 
Ellis and Young, 1990; Stone & Young, 1997). The 
proposal involves two components of face recogni-
tion, an overt “pattern-matching” component and an 
affective component which provides an experience 
of “familiarity” when we encounter people we 
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know. Whereas prevailing deficit accounts of the 
Capgras delusion suggest that it stems from a dimin-
ished affective response to familiar faces (see be-
low), Davies and Coltheart (2000) propose that the 
Frégoli delusion involves a heightened affective 
response to unfamiliar faces. The ensuing discor-
dance between an experience of the way a stranger 
looks (unfamiliar, unrecognizable) and the way they 
“feel” (familiar) might lead to the adoption of the 
Frégoli belief (cf. Ellis & Young, 1990). 
 
3   The Two Deficit Model 
 
The notion that anomalous perceptual experiences 
may stimulate delusional hypotheses is a key ele-
ment of a current model of delusion formation and 
maintenance known as the “two deficit” or “two 
factor” model (Davies & Coltheart, 2000; Langdon 
& Coltheart, 2000; Davies et al., 2001; Coltheart, 
2002). This model incorporates an empiricist per-
spective on delusion formation (Campbell, 2001), 
taking as its point of departure theoretical work by 
Maher and colleagues (e.g. Maher & Ross, 1984). 
Maher maintained that delusions do not arise via 
defective reasoning, but rather constitute rational 
responses to unusual perceptual experiences, which 
are in turn caused by a spectrum of neuropsy-
chological abnormalities. Coltheart, Davies, Lang-
don and Breen agree that such anomalous experi-
ences may indeed be necessary for the development 
of delusions, and they allocate such experiences the 
status of Deficit-1 in their two-deficit theory. 
 
An experiment conducted by Ellis, Young, Quayle 
and de Pauw (1997; see also Hirstein & 
Ramachandran, 1997) provided support for Maher’s 
contention that delusions are responses to anoma-
lous perceptual experiences. Ellis et al. (1997) re-
corded skin-conductance responses (SCRs – an in-
dex of autonomic activity) while showing Capgras 
patients and control participants a series of pre-
dominantly unfamiliar faces, with occasional famil-
iar faces interspersed. They found that whereas con-
trol participants showed significantly greater SCRs 
to familiar faces than unfamiliar faces, Capgras pa-
tients failed to demonstrate a pattern of autonomic 
discrimination between familiar and unfamiliar 
faces, showing SCRs of equivalent magnitude to 
photographs of both types. 
 
Further support for the claim that anomalous percep-
tual experiences are implicated in the formation of 
delusions comes from the work of Breen, Caine and 
Coltheart (2001). These authors investigated the rare 
delusion of mirrored-self misidentification, whereby 
patients misidentify their own reflected image. 
Breen et al. thoroughly examined two patients with 
this delusion, and found that whereas the first pa-
tient (FE) demonstrated a marked deficit in face 
processing, the second patient (TH, whose face 
processing was intact) appeared to be ‘mirror ag-
nosic’ (Ramachandran, Altschuler & Hillyer, 1997), 
in that he showed an impaired appreciation of mirror 
spatial relations and was unable to interact appropri-
ately with mirrors. These findings implicate two 
potential routes to development of the mirrored-self 
misidentification delusion, underpinned by two 
types of anomalous perceptual experience; on the 
one hand an anomalous experience of faces, and on 
the other an anomalous experience of reflected 
space. 
 
In addition to their suggestions about Frégoli delu-
sion and mirrored-self misidentification delusion, 
Coltheart and colleagues identify perceptual anoma-
lies that may potentially be involved in a series of 
other delusions, including delusions of alien control, 
thought insertion and Cotard delusion (the belief 
that one’s self is dead). These researchers note, 
however, that such first-deficit experiences are not 
sufficient for the development of delusions, as some 
individuals with similar anomalous perceptual expe-
riences do not develop delusory beliefs about those 
experiences (see, for example, Langdon and 
Coltheart’s [2000] discussion of delusional Capgras 
patients versus the non-delusional patients with 
damage to bilateral ventromedial frontal regions of 
the brain tested by Tranel, Damasio and Damasio, 
1995). Coltheart and colleagues thus claim that 
Maher’s account is incomplete, and invoke a second 
explanatory factor – a deficit in the machinery of 
belief revision. Individuals with this second deficit, 
it is hypothesised, are unable to reject implausible 
candidates for belief once they are suggested by 
first-factor perceptual anomalies. 
 
4   Backlash 
 
It would appear that the advent and ascent of rigor-
ous cognitive and neurological models of mental 
disorders has occasioned something of a backlash 
against historically prevalent psychodynamic modes 
of theorizing (Gabbard, 1994). In the field of delu-
sions, recent years have seen psychodynamic ac-
counts usurped by their cognitive neuropsychiatric 
counterparts. Influential cognitive neuropsychiatric 
accounts such as that of Ellis and Young (1990) and 
Stone and Young (1997), which explain delusions as 
the output of a faulty cognitive system, disregard 
psychodynamic influences in favour of more austere 
psychological factors (i.e. “cold cognitive” factors). 
Such authors view psychodynamic approaches as at 
best inadequate (Stone & Young, 1997), and at 
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worst “sterile… tired and outdated” (Ellis, 2003, pp. 
77-78). Likewise, the two deficit theory of Coltheart 
and colleagues, outlined above, which aims “to ex-
plain delusions of all types” (Langdon & Coltheart, 
2000, p. 184, italics in original), contains little pro-
vision at present for motivational factors.  
 
Psychodynamic theorists and practitioners have 
been roundly censured for their notoriously unsound 
methodologies and outrageous theoretical presump-
tion. Cognitive neuropsychiatric accounts (Ellis & 
Young, 1990; Stone & Young, 1997; Davies et al., 
2001), by contrast, are elegant and theoretically rig-
orous, yielding empirically testable predictions. 
Cognitive neuropsychiatric research has shown that 
at least some delusions are neuropsychological in 
origin. One wonders, therefore, whether all delu-
sions might be adequately explained in terms of 
neuropsychological damage, in which case motiva-
tional ideas could be dispensed with altogether. 
 
5   Persecutory Delusions 
 
The motivational explanation of Frégoli delusion 
discussed above strikes one, at least initially, as ra-
ther fanciful and far-fetched. The manufacture of 
Frégoli symptoms seems, after all, a rather convo-
luted route for the psyche to take in order to satisfy a 
wish for the continued presence of a deceased rela-
tive. The fact that this account fails completely as an 
explanation for cases of Frégoli delusion where 
strangers are misidentified as known, but hostile, 
persecutors, poses an additional obstacle to its suc-
cess.1 
 
Claims about motivational causes of delusion are 
more plausible elsewhere, however, and the domain 
of paranoid and persecutory beliefs is an example 
where there are well-worked out motivational inter-
pretations, notably those of Bentall and colleagues 
(e.g. Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1996, 1997). 
 
How might a deficit model such as the two-deficit 
theory of Coltheart and colleagues account for cases 
of persecutory delusions? In line with the model’s 
empiricist perspective on delusion formation 
(Campbell, 2001), the first requirement is that a 
credible candidate for Deficit-1 be proposed. In 
other words, one needs to identify some kind of an-
                                                
1 This, of course, is not to suggest that all cases of Frégoli delu-
sion will have the same explanation. It is virtually an axiom of 
cognitive neuropsychology that for many particular symptoms a 
number of idiosyncratic aetiological pathways are possible (Colt-
heart, 2002). Breen et al. (2001), for example, identified two 
potential cognitive neuropsychological routes to development of 
the mirrored-self misidentification delusion. 
omalous perceptual experience that might plausibly 
suggest a paranoid delusional hypothesis. The sec-
ond requirement is that this candidate deficit be 
present in both deluded and non-deluded individu-
als, i.e. there must exist some individuals with paral-
lel perceptual anomalies who do not develop delu-
sional beliefs grounded in those experiences. 
 
Appropriate candidates for Deficit-1 are not difficult 
to find. For example, claims of an association be-
tween deafness and paranoia have been made for 
many years (e.g. Piker, 1937). The empirical support 
for this connection is admittedly somewhat equivo-
cal, with some studies reporting evidence of the 
association (e.g. Zimbardo, Andersen & Kabat, 
1981) and others finding little support for it (e.g. 
Thomas, 1981). Nevertheless, in terms of the above-
stated theoretical requirements, the gradual onset of 
deafness fits the bill rather well. One can at least 
conceive of how experiences of surrounding voices 
at lower than expected volume might stimulate the 
delusional hypothesis that “people are whispering 
about me”. If coupled with a deficit in belief evalu-
ation abilities (Deficit-2), this dubious hypothesis 
may be uncritically accepted. If Deficit-2 is not 
present, the delusional hypothesis will, instead, be 
rejected and the more plausible belief that one is 
suffering hearing loss will be adopted. 
 
As noted above, the two-deficit explanatory model 
of Coltheart and colleagues is intended to encom-
pass all forms of delusional psychopathology, yet 
makes little provision for motivational causes of 
delusion. In an attempt to examine the scope of this 
theory, we have recently conducted a series of em-
pirical investigations of such putative motivational 
causes, focussing on persecutory delusions. Evi-
dence that motivational factors do play a role in the 
aetiology of persecutory delusions would call for a 
theoretical overhaul of the two-deficit model in 
order to incorporate these factors. 
 
5.1   Investigating discrepancies between 
overt and covert self-esteem 
Bentall and colleagues (e.g. Bentall & Kaney, 1996; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996, 1997) are influential 
advocates of a motivational model of persecutory 
delusions. Consistent with the traditional psychody-
namic emphasis on projection as a mechanism of 
defence against intolerable inner feelings (Freud, 
1895), Bentall and colleagues have claimed that 
persecutory delusions are constructed defensively, 
for the maintenance of self-esteem. A key prediction 
of their model is that persecutory delusions will be 
associated with a discrepancy between relatively 
high measures of overt self-esteem and relatively 
low measures of covert self-esteem. A variety of 
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studies (e.g. Kinderman, 1994; Lyon, Kaney & Ben-
tall, 1994) have attempted to investigate this hy-
pothesis (for reviews see Garety & Freeman, 1999; 
Bentall et al., 2001). The findings of such studies, 
however, are disconcertingly equivocal, with a 
number of studies suffering from methodological 
flaws. 
 
We (McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, submitted) have 
recently examined this hypothesis by utilizing a new 
and highly influential methodology for eliciting co-
vert effects, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Following 
Greenwald and Farnham (2000), our study adapted 
the IAT for the measurement of covert self-esteem 
by assessing automatic associations of the self with 
positive or negative affective valence. Persecutory 
deluded patients were found to have lower covert 
self-esteem than healthy controls and remitted pa-
tients. On two measures of overt self-esteem, how-
ever, the persecutory deluded group did not differ 
significantly from the other groups once the effects 
of co-morbid depression had been taken into ac-
count. These results are thus consistent with Bentall 
and colleagues’ suggestion that persecutory delu-
sions are associated with a discrepancy between 
overt and covert self-esteem, and are consistent with 
psychodynamic accounts of paranoia and persecu-
tory delusions dating back to Freud (1895).  
 
5.2   Need for closure 
A second investigation (McKay, Langdon & Colt-
heart, in preparation) aimed to replicate reported 
connections between persecutory delusions and need 
for closure. Need for closure (Kruglanski, 1989; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) is a motivational con-
struct, associated with a preference for certainty and 
predictability. Colbert and Peters (2002) have sug-
gested that a high need for closure may account for 
the tendency of certain individuals with anomalous 
perceptual experiences to develop delusory beliefs 
about those experiences. Bentall and Swarbrick 
(2003) had found that patients with persecutory de-
lusions (both current and remitted) displayed a 
greater need for closure than healthy control partici-
pants. Our study showed that patients with current 
persecutory delusions scored higher on need for 
closure than the remitted patients and healthy con-
trols, thus confirming the relationship between per-
secutory delusions and need for closure. 
 
 
The above investigations have found compelling 
evidence that motivational factors play a vital role in 
the genesis of persecutory delusions. In particular, 
these studies have shown that persecutory delusions 
are associated with discrepancies between overt and 
covert measures of self-esteem, consistent with the 
defensive theoretical scheme of Bentall and col-
leagues; and that persecutory delusions are associ-
ated with the motivational construct of need for 
closure. The implication of these findings is that 
motivational factors are important, despite their 
almost wilful neglect by certain cognitive neuropsy-
chiatric models. How then are we to best theoreti-
cally integrate such factors into existing cognitive 
neuropsychiatric accounts? 
 
6   A Theoretical Synthesis 
 
We argue that although there are good reasons to be 
sceptical of psychoanalytic theories, empirical stud-
ies such as those reported above demonstrate that 
these theories do contain a notion of key importance 
for models of delusions and belief formation - the 
insight that motives can be important doxastic forces 
(doxastic = of or relating to belief). We propose 
therefore that motives be incorporated into the two-
factor scheme of Coltheart and colleagues as a first-
factor source of unreliable doxastic input – a means 
by which individuals prone to the second factor are 
led astray when forming beliefs, such that resulting 
beliefs track desires rather than reality. In this modi-
fied two-factor account of delusion formation, the 
first factor constitutes whatever sources of informa-
tion suggest a particular delusory belief, be they 
anomalous perceptual experiences or defensive de-
sires. Individuals with the “second factor” would be 
prone to giving undue weight to unreliable sensory 
information, and liable to having their belief-
formation systems derailed and overridden by moti-
vational factors. 
 
How might this motivationally modified two-factor 
account be applied to persecutory delusions? We 
have already touched upon the possibility that deaf-
ness might constitute a perceptually anomalous 
Deficit-1 in such delusions. It may be that in certain 
cases persecutory delusions arise in the context of 
multiple relevant first-factor sources, including both 
aberrant perceptual experiences and defensive de-
sires. A man with encroaching deafness, for exam-
ple, might be highly motivated to avoid any evi-
dence of this infirmity. He might therefore experi-
ence an organically underpinned perceptual anomaly 
– the voices of others at lower than normal volume – 
in a context of wanting to believe that his faculties 
are still intact. These two sources of doxastic input – 
the hearing loss and the desire to deny the hearing 
loss – might jointly suggest the paranoid belief that 
others are whispering about him. Such a belief 
would both account for the perceptual evidence and 
simultaneously satisfy the desire. Given an addi-
tional context of inadequate belief evaluation abili-
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ties (Deficit-2), an implausible paranoid hypothesis 
might be elaborated into a full-blown persecutory 
delusion rather than being rejected. 
 
The evidence that persecutory delusions are associ-
ated with discrepancies between overt and covert 
self-esteem allows the motivational element in the 
above story to be further elucidated. The individual 
described may be motivated to avoid any evidence 
of his hearing impairment at least in part because 
such evidence is a threat to his self-esteem. It may 
be that he has some covert awareness that his an-
omalous perceptual experiences signal encroaching 
hearing loss (equating to lowered covert self-
esteem). Projection would then constitute the pro-
cess whereby the perceptual experience and low 
covert self-esteem suggest the delusional hypoth-
esis: the cause of the perceptual anomaly is pro-
jected onto others (externally attributed – see 
Kinderman & Bentall, 19972), resulting in the belief 
that others are whispering about him.  
 
Alternatively (or perhaps additionally), motives 
might enter the story at the level of the second fac-
tor, playing a role in the evaluation of doxastic input 
by constituting constraints on the processing of be-
lief-related information. Westen (1998) has dis-
cussed the connectionist notion of constraint satis-
faction, noting that “Psychodynamic theory can 
augment a connectionist model in proposing that 
affects and affectively charged motives provide a 
second set of constraints, distinct from strictly cog-
nitive or informational ones, that influence the out-
comes of parallel constraint-satisfaction processes” 
(p. 359). Perhaps incoming doxastic information is 
ordinarily processed so as to satisfy motivational 
constraints as well as constraints of verisimilitude, 
in which case it may be a feature of the second fac-
tor that the belief-formation system becomes unduly 
biased toward satisfaction of the former. Need for 
closure is one such motivational constraint, separate 
from the alethic injunction to approximate reality. 
Our individual who experiences being surrounded 
by low volume voices might be highly motivated to 
achieve some closure, to account for his anomalous 
perceptions. That other people are whispering 
around him might come very readily to mind and, 
rather than exploring alternative hypotheses, the 
paranoid belief that others are whispering may pro-
                                                
2 Although few studies have attempted to characterise persecu-
tory delusions or persecutory attributions in terms of neuroimag-
ing (Blackwood, Howard, Bentall & Murray, 2001), Blackwood 
et al. (2000) have found that depressive attributions (which, in 
contrast to persecutory attributions, involve internalising negative 
events and externalising positive events; see Seligman, Abram-
son, Semmel & von Baeyer, 1979) require activation of the left 
precentral gyrus. 
vide a satisfactory solution to his immediate alethic 
and motivational constraints. 
 
Hypotheses such as these seem amenable to investi-
gation via computational modelling techniques. 
Sahdra and Thagard (2003) have recently applied a 
computational model of emotional coherence to 
successfully simulate a case of self-deception taken 
from Hawthorne’s novel The Scarlet Letter. These 
authors expanded an implementation of the theory 
of explanatory coherence (see Thagard, 2000) by 
allowing units representing propositions in an artifi-
cial neural network to have valences as well as acti-
vations. The resulting system successfully self-
deceived in that it yielded acceptance of false 
propositions, consistent with implemented prefer-
ences. Comparable simulations might be used to 
model the beliefs of our hypothetical hearing-
impaired individual. For example, to simulate a case 
of factor one in the absence of factor two, one might 
utilise an explanatory coherence implementation, 
such that input is simply the evidential propositions 
(e.g. “the voices of my colleagues are at lower than 
normal volume”) and the coherence associations 
between them. To simulate the conjunction of both 
factors, on the other hand, one might assign 
valences to units representing propositions (e.g. a 
negative valence to the proposition “I am deaf”). 
Such speculations denote an area ripe for future re-
search. 
 
7   Conclusion 
 
Baars (2000) argues that the scientific scepticism 
regarding psychodynamics is disproportionate, and 
marvels that “few academic scientists are inclined to 
simply separate the wheat from the chaff in Freu-
dian thought” (p. 13). We have argued that sound 
reasons for scepticism notwithstanding, psychoana-
lytic theories do indeed contain a notion that models 
of delusions may ignore at their peril, namely the 
insight that motives can be potent doxastic forces. 
Taking as our point of departure the two deficit 
model of Coltheart and colleagues, we have ex-
plored a theoretical integration between the motiva-
tional and deficit approaches to delusions, with the 
aim of showing that a single overarching theory is 
not only scientifically desirable, but theoretically 
viable. 
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Abstract 
 
We are presenting a new model on the relationship between "emotion" and "action". Going beyond 
existing hedonic concepts of motivation, the model attempts to clarify the influence of emotion on 
motivation. Here fore, our work contributes to one of the key issues addressed by the Symposium 
“Agents that Want and Like: Motivational Roots of Cognition and Action”. 
 
1   Introduction 
Since ancient Greek philosophy, a general hedonic 
or pleasure principle of motivation has prevailed: 
People are motivated to approach pleasure and to 
avoid pain (see f. i. Cabanac, 1992).  
From fields such as psychoanalysis to early 
empirical motivation psychology, this hedonic 
approach was greeted by many prominent 
researchers. For instance Atkinson (1957) defined a 
motive as "a disposition to strive for a certain kind 
of satisfaction” (p. 36). In continuing these early 
approaches, Mees and Schmitt (2003) distinguished 
between goals and reasons for actions. While a goal 
specifies what action is taken, the reason for an 
action answers questions such as why or what action 
is taken for.  
2   A two-dimensional model of 
meta-telic orientations 
We assume the reasons for actions can be found 
either in the hope that certain positive emotions may 
occur or persist, or in the hope that negative 
emotions can be reduced or avoided. Emotions, or 
more specifically affective states also including 
moods, therefore constitute reasons for actions. In 
more general words: Subjectively, actions have the 
function either to improve or to retain the affective 
quality of the actor's experience or, respectively, to 
avoid or to reduce the worsening of these affective 
qualities of experience. However, not all actions 
must correspond directly or immediately to this 
purpose. 
2.1   Four classes of reasons of action 
We have distinguished four classes of reasons why a 
certain goal is strived for by a person. 
a) A person strives for a goal, because the 
activity the goal pertains to and its outcome are 
judged positively: A person likes to educate children 
or enjoys doing sports, etc. The reason for a 
particular action is the experience of positive, 
agreeable emotions during or as a direct 
consequence of this action. Thus, carrying out this 
action is directly approach-motivated, i.e. the person 
attempts to approach the experience of a desired, 
agreeable emotion by means of the corresponding 
action.  
b) A person acts in a certain manner in order to 
reduce an unpleasant emotion. For instance, one 
does not exercise because it is fun, but rather to 
watch one's figure and to reduce discontent with a 
weight considered too high. By doing sports, a 
person hopes to diminish the disagreeable emotion 
of discontent. The activity "doing sports" thus is 
directly avoidance-motivated. 
c) A person carries out an action because it is 
regarded as the indirect means to a purpose, which 
is connected to the experience of positive emotions. 
For example, a person does sports, because this is 
regarded as a means to the higher goal “to stay fit 
and healthy". If this higher goal is reached, the 
emotion is again pleasant because it increases 
personal well-being, enhances self-consciousness 
etc. Again, we are concerned with approach-
motivation, yet this is an indirect form. Actions are 
carried out in order to achieve something else which 
results in agreeable affective states. 
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In everyday life, why an action is taken is often 
answered with higher goals. To answer the question, 
"Why do you exercise?" it suffices to reply, 
"Because I want to stay fit and healthy". Adding 
“And this increases my well-being" is so evident 
that it seems unnecessary to remark. Nevertheless, 
the desired experience of these positive emotions is 
the actual reason for such instrumental actions.  
d) Finally, a goal-directed activity can also be 
carried out in order to avoid offending, hurting or 
disappointing, etc. significant others. A person 
carrying out a particular action then avoids 
unpleasant emotions not directly but indirectly: The 
action avoids unpleasant emotions in another 
person. The actor anticipates that if significant 
others experience negative emotions this will result 
in negative emotions (such as shame, guilt, fear, 
sorrow etc.) within oneself. The latter will occur at 
the latest if the significant other criticizes or 
reproaches the actor. For example, a person may be 
motivated to go jogging, because a loved one 
suggested to do so to improve his or her figure. The 
motivation to go jogging is indirect avoidance 
motivation: The person does something in order to 
avoid something else, because this would lead to 
one's own negative emotions. 
Indirect avoidance motivation also refers to 
cases in which people take, for example, 
preventative measures against anticipated danger. 
These also do not directly reduce unpleasant 
emotions, but rather indirectly avoid them by 
anticipating their potential occurrence. 
2.2   Telic and metatelic orientations 
We distinguish between two kinds of action 
orientation: telic orientation (derived from the 
Greek word telos = goal) describes an individual's 
intentional orientation towards a certain class of 
equivalent goals (what class of action). By contrast, 
a meta-telic orientation refers to the preference of 
particular classes of reasons for personal actions 
(why the action is taken; derived from meta- = 
beyond; meta-telic = what underlies a telic 
orientation, i.e. its emotional reason).  
Our model integrates important distinctions as 
known in motivation psychology, namely on the one 
hand the difference between approach and 
avoidance motivation (see the regulatory focus 
theory by Higgins, 1997), and between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation (see the self-determination-
theory by Ryan and Deci, 2002) on the other.  
2.3   Some empirical findings 
We (Mees and Schmitt, 2003) constructed a 
questionnaire to record fundamental telic and meta-
telic orientations and tested it with a sample of N = 
267 students. We therefore received respondents' 
values for the four dispositional meta-telic 
orientations regarding sixteen telic orientations or 
sixteen areas, i.e. "partnership", "power and 
prestige", "competence and curiosity", "children and 
family", "sports", "aggression and retaliation", 
"individualism", “health”, “affiliation”, “sex”, 
“tradition”, “teaching”, “art and culture”, 
“religiosity”, “prosocial behaviour” and 
“hedonism”. These sixteen areas have been selected 
according to Reiss (2000) and are the result of a 
factor-analysis. 
Across all the sixteen areas, the four meta-telic 
orientations revealed significant positive 
correlations with each other. This is not astonishing, 
since every meta-telic orientation deals with reasons 
for actions and not for their omission.  
However, only the two avoidance orientations 
revealed significant high negative correlations with 
the neuroticism. Here, the meta-telic orientation for 
direct avoidance showed a higher positive 
correlation (r = .37) with neuroticism than meta-telic 
orientation for indirect avoidance (r = .27) did. In 
contrast, a significant correlation between the two 
approach orientations could not be found with the 
variable "neuroticism".  
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Abstract
So far AI researches in the health care promotion have considered strategies and techniques for making
people aware of their health related problems and helping them to change their behaviour in order to
have a better life style and be healthier. Very few researches though, to our knowledge, have focused on
the deeper meanings behind a behaviour change. We argue that taking into account cognitive aspects,
supported by solid psychological and philosophical theories, might help us to provide the right advice,
to the right person, at the right time.
1 Introduction
This research represents our contribution to PIPS, one
of the leading projects in the health care delivery
arena and funded by the European Union under the
FP61 Integrated Projects. PIPS, Personalised Infor-
mation Platform for life and health Services, is a four
year project started in January 2004 aiming to im-
prove the current health care delivery models. Recog-
nising the importance of personalised and prevention-
focused health care services, PIPS will be providing
the right support to the European public by means
of special Virtual Agents. These agents will also
be in charge of giving health related advice to citi-
zens/patients (helping them to stop smoking, to fol-
low a certain diet, to improve their physical activity
etc.). Our own experience and many scientific studies
(Prochaska et al. (1995) among others) have proven
that changing one’s behaviour is not an easy task and,
sometimes, represents one of the hardest challenges
of our life. Such a change though becomes a critical
step to take when its consequences have an impact on
our health and our well-being.
We seek to create a computational framework of
how changes take place, able to capture and handle
the processes behind a behaviour change. Several
philosophical, psychological and sociological theo-
ries of behaviour change exist and our attempt is to
∗Ph.D. student.
1EU 6th Framework Programme in e-Health, FP6/IST No.
507019.
ground our research in some of the most solid theo-
ries in those areas. Understanding the hidden causes
behind changes will help us not only to model a
more believable agent capable of reasoning about,
and modifying, its own behaviour, but we also be-
lieve it to be essential in order to reason about other
agents’ motivations and emotional states.
In this paper we present an overview of the theo-
ries that seem most appealing to our purposes, then
we introduce our proposal for integrating these theo-
ries and, finally, we offer some preliminary consider-
ations on computational issues.
2 Theoretical Foundations
Research on Medicine and Nutrition give us details of
WHAT needs to be changed in our behaviour in order
to have a healthier life-style, prevent or cure diseases
and so on. Unfortunately though, this information is
not enough for our purposes since they do do not lead
us to understand the dynamics behind a behaviour
change or, in other words, HOW such a change oc-
curs. The Stages of Change Model (Prochaska et al.,
1995) defines, instead, very clearly HOW we deal with
changing our behaviour by presenting six stages ulti-
mately leading to the change and pointing out the im-
portance of applying different techniques tailored to
the particular stage involved. The Stages of Change
Model, recognises that behaviour change is a process,
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Figure 1: Stages of change
a series of steps (Fig.1)2, rather than a one-off event.
While giving scientific evidence of this assertion
by examining how successful self-changers change,
the model identifies stages of change and other fac-
tors that predict treatment outcomes. There are six
stages of change:
• Precontemplation: no intention to change or un-
aware of the problem.
• Contemplation: intention to change but not
ready for the action.
• Preparation: intention to take action within one
month.
• Action: behaviour change.
• Maintenance: consolidate the result.
• Termination: finally out of the problem.
In order to succeed, one must go through all these
stages and in the same order (from Precontempla-
tion to Termination). There is always the possibil-
ity, though, of returning to some prior stages and
this phase is called Relapse. The Stages of Change
Model identifies also nine key ”change processes”
and suggest their use depending upon the particu-
lar stage involved. The basic idea is that all indi-
viduals have the potential to change. Self-motivated
changers are much more effective than guided chang-
ers (Prochaska et al., 1995, pg. 21) but the struc-
ture of this model can certainly strengthen and sig-
nificantly improve the chances of succeeding. We
2Source: http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/physical/starting/
(last updated 6 Feb 2003), Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, Department of Health and Human Services, USA.
strongly believe, though, that the merely knowledge
of WHAT and HOW to change is not enough to create
a believable model of behaviour change; we need to
have some understanding of the reasons behind our
changes or, in other words, WHY we change. Cog-
nitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) proposes
the concept of dissonance as one of the main drive in
our behaviour. For nearly half a century Festinger’s
theory has been representing, and still represents, one
of the most solid and influential theory in social psy-
chology. Its revolutionary idea is that human mind
cannot hold two conflicting thoughts at the same time.
It might look a bit too simplistic, but its implications
and applications are wide and sometimes unexpected.
Most of the smokers, for instance, know that smoking
is unhealthy but, careless, they continue to do it. They
typically deny the gravity of their habit, or find justi-
fications to smoking, because the alternative would
be to face the dissonance between their behaviour
and their knowledge. Studies in Health Psychology
and Medicine have also demonstrated the existence
of relations between various health problems. Peo-
ple who smoke, in fact, are much more likely to de-
velop other bad habits such as poorer diet (Shah et al.,
1993), higher alcohol intake (Morabia and Wynder,
1990) and less physical activity, and even ex-smokers
can develop bad habits (French et al., 1996). These
and many more studies demonstrate how, most of the
times, problem behaviours represent only the tip of
an iceberg and we believe that Cognitive Dissonance
Theory might allow us to understand and fight back
all these problems to their very common root. Fes-
tinger’s theory states that pairs of cognitions, that is
“any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the envi-
ronment, about oneself, or about one’s behaviour”,
can be either relevant or irrelevant to one another.
Moreover, relevant pairs represent either consonant
or dissonant cognitions. Consonant cognitions occur
when they follow from one another, dissonant cogni-
tions occur when the opposite of one of them follows
from the other. The size of the dissonance is mea-
sured by its magnitude and it is proportional to the
importance of the dissonant cognitive elements. This
concept has also been extended to groups of cognitive
element. The first symptom of dissonance is pres-
sure, a feeling of uncomfortable tension, which can
be seen as an attempt of the mind to reduce disso-
nance (or, at least, to avoid further increases). This
Pressure, whose strength is a function of the magni-
tude of the dissonance (Festinger, 1957, pg. 18), is
a very powerful motivator that pushes the individual
towards eliminating the dissonance. According to the
author, dissonance could be seen as a trigger for a dis-
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sonance reduction’s activity as much as hunger trig-
gers a hunger reduction’s activity. The tension can be
released in different ways:
• by changing dissonant cognitions
• by adding new consonant cognitions
• by reducing the importance of dissonant cogni-
tions
Of course “The maximum dissonance which can ex-
ist between two elements is equal to the resistance
to change of the less resistant of the two elements.”
(Festinger, 1957, pg. 266).
Dissonance Theory has been generating slightly
different variations of the theory itself in the past 50
years. All these revisions, though, have reconfirmed
dissonance as a motivation for cognitive changes.
Among these, interestingly Aronson (1968) inter-
preted the theory in terms of the discrepancy between
one’s self-image3 and behaviour.
A complementary theoretical perspective is given
by the concepts of Reciprocal Determinism and Self-
Efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Reciprocal determinism
states that a person’s behaviour, environment, and
psychological processes influence each other in a
“triadic reciprocality” (Fig.2).
Figure 2: Reciprocal Determinism
Self-efficacy is the “people’s beliefs about their
capabilities to produce designated levels of perfor-
mance that exercise influence over events that affect
their lives.” and therefore “Self-efficacy beliefs deter-
mine how people feel, think, motivate themselves and
behave.” (Bandura, 1997).
Cognition, in this view, not only plays a criti-
cal role in people’s capability to adapt, change and
self-regulate, but also contribute to create the reality
around them. In fact, “what people think, believe,
and feel affects how they behave” (Bandura, 1986,
pg. 25). The problem is that, since we are work-
ing with people and not with machines or theorem
provers, we must consider that “people’s level of mo-
tivation, affective states, and actions are based more
3An individual’s conception of himself/herself and his/her own
identity, abilities, worth etc.
on what they believe than on what is objectively true”
(Bandura, 1997, pg. 2).
3 Towards a Cognitive Model of
Change
Putting together these views, we can look at be-
haviour changes from a different perspective: if our
self-image determines the way we behave, this means
that we could change our behaviour by “simply”
changing our self-image. In other words, what we
think of ourselves make us act in a certain way. Co-
herently with the Stages of Change Model, where a
bad behaviour cannot be changed whilst still being
in the earliest stages of Precontemplation, Contem-
plation and Preparation, Dissonance Theory explains
why it is not possible to jump stages and, even if this
happens, why it is not going to last, as the Relapse
stage is always on the doorstep, since the self-image
is not coherent with the action that has been taken.
Dissonance between one’s inner and outer self needs
to be created and amplified in order to modify his/her
behaviour because, as long as one keeps holding an
old picture of himself/herself, he/she will simply and
coherently behave according to that image.
In conclusion, we interpret each move from one
stage to the next one as a cognitive dissonance reduc-
tion process. The Stages of Change Model explains
very well HOW the changes take place, what and in
what order the different phases are, whereas the Cog-
nitive Dissonance Theory focuses its attention on the
particular individual, on one’s self-efficacy, on one’s
ability of changing the outside by changing the inside
first, and move through the stages of change with a
new image, from time to time, targeted to the partic-
ular processes in each stage.
With this in mind, our efforts are concentrated to-
wards formalising a computational cognitive model
of the processes behind a behaviour change. In par-
ticular: the Agent Modelwill be a formalisation of the
Cognitive Dissonance Theory, specialised to the con-
cept of self-image. The Change Modelwill be instead
a formalisation of the Stages of Change Model.
We think of associating different self-images’
stereotypes to the different stages in the Stages of
Change Model. By making assumptions on what the
self-image ought to look like in the next stage the ad-
visory agents will try to help the user in modifying
his/her self-image by producing truly tailored advice.
We expect our formalisation to be an extension of the
classic belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture.
The feasibility of this approach from the computa-
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tional point of view has been reassured by Gawronski
and Strack (2004), who observed the propositional
nature of Cognitive Dissonance Theory.
Moreover, important philosophical studies (Tha-
gard and Verbeurgt, 1998) have proven cognitive dis-
sonance to be essentially a constraint satisfaction
problem. This idea has led (Shultz and Lepper, 1996)
to the formulation of a computational model for cog-
nitive dissonance based on a constraint satisfaction
network. This model might be well out of our inter-
ests, being a connectionist approach rather than a log-
ical approach, but it still represents a tangible proof of
the Cognitive Dissonance theory’s computability.
The cognitive theory for agent communication
pragmatic (Pasquier and Chaib-draa, 2003) applies,
instead, the cognitive dissonance theory to multi-
agent systems in order to give agent communica-
tion more degrees of automation. This computational
framework has been successfully employed in mod-
elling dialogue games and simple attitude change pro-
cesses but, despite being very inspiring, gives only a
partial answer to our problem which is modelling be-
haviour changes in health related domains.
4 Conclusion and Evaluation Is-
sues
In this paper we have presented an overview of some
of the most interesting theories behind behaviour
change, we have also briefly illustrated our proposal
for integrating these theories in a computational cog-
nitive model of change and, finally, we have offered
some preliminary thoughts on computational issues.
The work is very preliminary, but, nevertheless, it
is progressing by taking advantage of various collab-
orations with our partners in PIPS and their diversi-
fied expertise in health, medicine, nutrition and coun-
selling. They will be providing us assurance about
the validity of the theories we refer to and feedback
about our results and conclusions. We also plan to
evaluate our model against real cases in two different
PIPS demonstrators (in Spain and China) before the
end of the project in 2008.
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Abstract
In this paper, a theoretical analysis and a formal model of the influence of motivations and emotions
over belief formation is presented. The basic questions addressed are the following: Whether and
how do the agent’s goals influence her beliefs? Is this influence a mere bias, or there is a rationale
behind it? The inadequacy of current formalisms of belief dynamics in coping with these issues is
highlighted, and an alternative model (Data-oriented Belief Revision, DBR) is shortly outlined.
1   Introduction
In spite of overwhelming evidence on the important
role played by motivation and emotion in belief
formation and change (Festinger, 1957; Kruglanski,
1980; Kunda, 1990; Swann, 1990; Forgas, 1995;
2000; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996; Frijda et al., 2000;
Swann et al., 2002), and regardless current interest
on affective dynamics in computing and multi-agent
systems (Picard, 1997; Cañamero, 2003; Evans et
al., 2003), motivational and emotional features still
fail to be integrated in most of the formal and
computational models of belief dynamics (cf. 2),
such as AGM belief revision, Truth-Maintenance
Systems, and probabilistic approaches. In addition,
all these formalisms suffer from an oversimplified
assumption on the status of belief processing: that is,
they share the view that belief formation is a
straightforward, unique, and highly standardized
procedure. In contrast, psychological research
(Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983;
Kunda, 1990; Forgas, 1995), as well as everyday
experience, provides convincing evidence that there
are indeed several different ways of developing and
assessing our beliefs, which obey to different
dynamics and might result in different outcomes, i.e.
different sets of beliefs (cf. 3).
Aiming to overcome such limitations1 of current
doxastic formalisms, this paper is focused on the
                                                 
1 Similar drawbacks can be held against these formalisms
only as far as they are expected to model belief dynamics in
cognitive agents. However, their original purposes were
often very different (e.g., theory change in the history of
science for the AGM model), and only later on extension to
belief dynamics in cognitive agents was suggested.
most procedural dynamics of belief formation (i.e.
belief selection): a formal and computational model
of this specific type of belief processing is outlined
(cf. 4), in which the effects of motivations and (to a
minor extent) emotions are taken into account. It is
also argued that motivational and emotional
influences at this basic level of belief dynamics have
received so far only marginal attention in the
literature (for a review, see Kunda, 1990). However,
this paper aims to show that motivations and
emotions do play an important role also in the most
procedural instances of belief formation, namely by
determining the relevance and the likeability of the
information being processed by the agent, hence
affecting the outcome of her belief selection (cf. 5
and 6). This in turn raises the issue whether similar
influences are fully rational features of belief
processing, or rather mere distortions that happen to
bias human judgement. In the latter case, formal
models of rational belief change would obviously be
excused for neglecting the role of relevance and
likeability. In section 5, I shortly discuss this issue,
by pointing out that relevance is indeed a rational
feature of human belief dynamics, while likeability
requires more cautious assessment.
2   Belief Dynamics Without
Motivation and Emotion
The most popular formalisms for doxastic dynamics
are AGM belief revision (Alchourrón et al., 1985;
Gärdenfors, 1988; Rott, 2001), Truth-Maintenance
Systems (Huns and Bridgeland, 1991; Doyle, 1992),
and probabilistic models (Berger, 1985; Fagin and
Halpern, 1994; Boutilier, 1998). In spite of several
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significant differences between these approaches
(for technical comparison, see Gärdenfors, 1988;
Doyle, 1992; Friedman and Halpern, 1999), they all
share a disregard for the influence of motivation and
emotion over belief formation and change. These
formal models consider relevant only structural
properties of beliefs, i.e. properties depending on
internal relations within the belief set: namely,
factual credibility in TMS and Bayesian networks
(given a certain belief, how many other beliefs
support it, and how many counter it?), and epistemic
importance in AGM belief revision (how much is
central a given belief in the agent’s belief set?).
While both these criteria are obviously relevant in
belief formation, they are not the only ones to play a
significant role: to include in the picture
motivational and emotional influences as well, a
mapping between beliefs and goals should be
integrated in the model. None of the existing
formalisms takes care of that2: more generally,
motivation is not considered as a driving force in
belief dynamics, if not implicitly and in abstract
terms – e.g., AGM belief revision can be said to be
implicitly driven by the ‘motivation’ of maintaining
a coherent set of beliefs, avoiding contradictions
when faced with new information in contrast with
previous convictions. But the effect of motivation
over belief formation runs much deeper than that,
requiring a model capable of handling specific goals
and their impact on belief dynamics (cf. 4 and 5).
3   Coming to Believe: Several
Paths toward Belief
As a side-effect of neglecting motivation in belief
formation, current doxastic formalisms are led to
assume that belief formation is a rather simple,
unique and standard procedure. However, as soon as
we want to move from the field of formal logic and
computer science to the domain of cognitive and
social psychology, this assumption is shown to be
simplistic and misleading – both on the ground of
experimental evidence (Kruglanski, 1980;
Kruglansk and Ajzen, 1983; Kunda, 1990; Swann,
1990) and concerning theoretical modelling (Forgas,
1995; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 1998; 2000).
                                                 
2 This is not exactly true for probabilistic approaches, since
the connection between decision-making and beliefs is a
well-known topic of interest in Bayesian analyses (Berger,
1985). However, such analyses concern themselves with
setting idealized standards of rationality, hence they keep
utility (motivation) quite separate from probability (belief).
On the contrary, here effects of motivation over beliefs and
their perceived strength are discussed, also to show the deep
rationale behind such influence (cf. 5).
Indeed, it seems that cognitive agents do apply
different procedures and heuristics in assessing their
beliefs, depending (among other factors) on their
own current motivation (cf. 5). This argues against
the adequacy of any generic formalism of doxastic
dynamics, and in favour of more differentiated
models, aiming to capture specific processes of
belief formation within a common framework. Full
discussion of these alternative dynamics of belief
formation lays beyond the scope of this paper: here
only a very broad divide is introduced between more
elaborate and deliberate assessment of beliefs (belief
appraisal), and more procedural and semi-automatic
processes of belief formation (belief selection).
In partial contrast with most of the literature on
motivated reasoning, the following analysis refers
specifically to belief selection, focusing on
motivational influences over procedural dynamics in
belief assessment. In fact, one of the aim is to
highlight and model systematic effects of goals over
belief formation, which do not depend on the agent
paying explicit attention to the current task – as it
happens instead in experimental settings used to test
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; cf. 5).
4   Data-oriented Belief Revision
This section shortly outlines a formal and
computational framework to model belief selection
and change, i.e. Data-Oriented Belief Revision
(from now on, DBR). DBR was first conceived as
an alternative way of modelling belief revision in
agent-based social simulation (Paglieri, 2004;
Paglieri and Castelfranchi, 2004), trying to
overcome several limitations and shortcomings of
AGM-style models (Friedman and Halpern, 1999;
Segerberg, 1999; Pollock and Gillies, 2000;
Wassermann, 2000). Belief formation plays a key
role in DBR, since the whole process of belief
change is conceived as an emergent effect over time
of performing data assessment and belief selection
on different sets of information (Fig. 1).
Belief Change
DATA
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t0
BELIEFS
t1
BELIEFS
Info
Update &
Valuation
Belief
Selection
Belief
Selection
DATA
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Figure 1: Belief change as an emergent effect
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More precisely, in DBR agents can change their
belief set either due to corresponding modification
in the available data, or because they apply new
selection policies over old sets of data: in both
cases, belief revision is rooted in belief formation.
4.1   Data and Beliefs
DBR relies on a basic distinction between data and
beliefs. Data are information gathered by and
available to the agent, stored in her memory as the
result of information update (external sources) or
inferential reasoning (internal sources); in contrast,
beliefs are data accepted as reliable, on the basis of
a selection procedure characteristic of the agent and
based on the informational properties of candidate
data (cf. 4.2 and 4.4). This simple distinction, so far
ignored (AGM) or marginalized (TMS and Bayesian
networks) in formal models of belief change,
immediately yields a fairly complex picture of
doxastic dynamics (Fig. 2).
Info
update
Data
mapping
Storing
Belief
selection
Inferential
reasoning
Focusing
Retrieval
Oblivion
STORED
DATA
ACTIVE
DATA
ACTIVE
BELIEFS
STORED
BELIEFSBELIEFS
DATA
Figure 2: Doxastic processing in DBR
Four properties of data are here introduced and
discussed, capturing and refining Castelfranchi’s
‘reasons to believe’ (1996):
I. Relevance: a measure of the pragmatic utility of
the datum, i.e. the number and values of the
(pursued) goals that depends on that datum;
II. Credibility: a measure of the number and values
of all supporting data, contrasted with all
conflicting data;
III. Impor tance : a measure of the epistemic
connectivity of the datum, i.e. the number and
values of the data that the agent will have to
revise, should she revise that single one;
IV. Likeability: a measure of the motivational appeal
of the datum, i.e. the value of the pursued goal
directly fulfilled by that datum.
Finally, this two-layered model of belief
dynamics also serves to highlight different
functional properties of data and beliefs in DBR, as
summarized in Table I. Here the most prominent
feature of DBR is the integration of sub-symbolic
and symbolic processing of information – the former
at the level of data, the latter concerning beliefs (a
hybrid dynamics quite similar to the one envisioned
in the ACT-R architecture: Anderson, 1996;
Anderson et al., 2004). While data are structured in
networks (cf. 4.3) and their assessment is carried on
as a massively distributed process (cf. 4.4), beliefs
are organized in ordered sets and processed in a
standard sequential fashion, e.g. by selectively
applying inference rules over them.
Table I: Data and beliefs: an overview
DATA BELIEFS
Basic
properties
Relevance, credibility,
importance, likeability
Strength
Organization Networks Ordered sets
Internal
dynamics
Updates, propagation Inferential reasoning
Interaction Belief selection Data mapping
4.2   Belief Selection in DBR
Belief selection is the process that, given a specific
set of available information, determines (1) what
data are to be believed, and (2) which degree of
strength is to be assigned to each of them,
depending on the informational properties of the
corresponding datum. In DBR, belief selection is
handled by a mathematical system, including a
condition C, a threshold k, and a function F.
Condition C and threshold k together express the
minimal informational requirements for a datum to
be selected as belief, while the function F assigns a
value of strength to the accepted beliefs (Paglieri,
2004; Paglieri and Castelfranchi, 2004). Let B
represents the set of the agent’s beliefs, and Bsf
represents the belief f with strength s. Hence the
general form of the selection process is:
C(cf, if, lf) ≤ k ‡  Bsf œ B
C(cf, if, lf) > k ‡  Bsf Œ B with sf = F(cf, if, rf)
The setting of C , F  and k  is an individual
parameter, which might vary in different agents (cf.
4.5). Examples of individual variation in belief
selection are the following:
C: cf > k k: 0.5 F: cf
C: cf > k k: 0.6 F: (cf + if + lf) / 3
C: cf > k ¥ (1 - lf) k: 0.8 F: cf ¥ (if + lf)
All these parametrical settings assign to data
credibility the main role in determining belief
selection, but they do so in widely different ways.
The first parametrical setting expresses a thoroughly
realistic attitude toward belief selection, regardless
of any considerations about importance or
likeability. At the same time, the minimal threshold
is set at a quite tolerant level of credibility (0.5). The
threshold is slightly higher in the second
parametrical setting, and the condition is identical:
on the whole, this reflects a more cautious
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acceptance of reliable data. But once a datum is
indeed accepted as belief, its strength is now
calculated taking into account also importance and
likeability, in contrast to the previous setting. The
same happens in the third parametrical setting,
although along different lines. Here the threshold is
extremely high (0.8), but the condition is influenced
by likeability as well: assuming that likeability
ranges in the interval [0, 1], here the minimal
threshold over credibility is conversely proportional
to the likeability of the datum (e.g. it is 0.08 for a
datum with likeability 0.9 vs. 0.72 for a datum with
likeability 0.1). That expresses a systematic bias
toward the acceptance of likeable (i.e. pleasant)
data, in spite of their credibility. In other words,
these parametrical settings define three agents with
different attitudes, with respect to belief selection: a
tolerant full realist (the first), a prudent open-
minded realist (the second), and a wishful thinking
agent (the third).
4.3   Data Structure and Information
Update
In DBR, data structures are conceived as networks
of nodes (data), linked together by characteristic
relations. For the purposes of the present discussion,
it will suffice to define three different types of data
relations: support, contrast, and union:
I. Support: f supports y  (f  fi  y ) iff cy µ  cf, the
credibility of datum y is directly proportional to
the credibility of datum f.
II. Contrast: f contrasts y (f  ^  y) iff cy µ 1/cf, the
credibility of datum y is conversely proportional
to the credibility of datum f.
III. Union: f and y are united (f & y) iff cy and cf
jointly (not separately) determine the credibility
of another datum g.
Given a data structure, belief change is usually
triggered by information update either on a fact or
on a source: the agent perceives or infers a new
piece of information, rearranges her data structure
accordingly, and possibly changes her belief set,
depending on the belief selection process. In DBR,
information update specifies the way in which a new
input is integrated in the agent’s data structure (Fig.
3), emphasizing that such input (either external or
internal) generates not only a new datum concerning
its content, but also data concerning s o u r c e
attribution and source reliability, and the structural
relations among them (Castelfranchi, 1997; Paglieri,
2004) – allowing, among other things, to implement
in DBR sophisticated model of trust assessment
(Fullam, 2003; Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2004).
The gist here is that the agent memory does not
only store information, but it also keeps track of the
way in which such information was acquired – and
it is exactly because of these ‘structural traces’ that
the agent is usually capable to assess both her
beliefs and the reasons behind them.
Figure 3: Information update in DBR
4.4   Assessment of Data Properties
While the assessment of credibility and importance
is detailed in Paglieri (2004), here the focus is put
on relevance and likeability, i.e. those informational
properties which require a mapping between data
and goals. In-depth technical discussion on the
computational treatment of relevance and likeability
is beyond the aim of this paper, so only the
functional differences in DBR between these two
kinds of mapping are discussed.
To start with, while the assessment of relevance
involves every data supporting the pursued goal
(e.g. data on means-end relations, know-how,
urgency, feasibility, external conditions, etc.;
Castelfranchi, 1995; 1998), the assessment of
likeability requires only a mapping with the contents
of the pursued goal, which by default puts a pressure
(more or less influential, depending on the agent
frame of mind; cf. 4.5 and 5) toward believing that
the desired state of the world is indeed realized. This
requires different mappings (i.e. functions) to assess
these properties: in the case of relevance, the
function will go from goals to sets of data3, while
likeability merely implies a comparison one-to-one
between goals and data. By way of example, let us
take an agent who pursues the goal of “being loved
by his fiancé”: this goal puts a pressure on believing
that indeed his fiancé is in love with him (i.e. it
makes the datum “being loved by his fiancé” more
likeable to him), and in addition it defines a set of
data which are relevant to such purpose, such as
information on her tastes, schedule, future intentions
concerning marriage, expectations about children,
family relationships, and so on.
Once the mapping functions for a given agent
are specified, the value of relevance of a certain
datum at a given time is calculated by (1) checking
of many currently pursued goals require such datum,
                                                 
3 Apart from the technical nuisance of effectively modelling
such mapping, the true problem is to define a proper
rationale for it: according to which criteria is a datum
considered to be relevant for a certain goal? In future works,
this issue will be tackled in DBR by trying to provide an
operational counterpart of Castelfranchi’s theory on the role
of information in goal processing (Castelfranchi, 1997).
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and (2) measuring the value of those goals for the
agent – hence relevance is indeed proportional to the
number and value of the goals for whom the datum
is useful (cf. 4.1). The assessment of likeability is
even more straightforward: if the content of the
datum matches with the content of one of the agent
goals, the likeability of the datum will be
proportional to the value of the corresponding goal;
otherwise, the datum likeability is set to zero.
Clearly enough, different agents might assess
relevance and likeability in slightly different ways:
e.g., some agents might be more thorough than
others in screening useful data for a given goal
(hence picking up a larger set of data as relevant for
that purpose); similarly, given the same goal with
the same value, two agents might differ in their
evaluation of the bearing of such goal over belief
formation (i.e. the corresponding datum might ends
up with different value of likeability in the data
structure of the two agents). As it is customary in
DBR, these individual variations are handled by
specifying agents with different parameters for the
assessment of relevance and likeability (cf. 4.5).
4.5   Individual Variation in DBR
The DBR framework summarized here is based on a
conceptual distinction between principles and
parameters. Principles are general and theoretical in
nature, defining the common features which
characterize doxastic processing in every agent.
Parameters, instead, are individual and operational,
specifying in which fashion and measure each agent
applies belief dynamics. The cognitive and social
framework of the model is captured by its
principles, while individual variation is represented
through parametrical setting (Paglieri and
Castelfranchi, 2004). Some examples were already
discussed in 4.2, to show how parametrical variation
can be effectively exploited to model different
attitudes in belief dynamics. In particular, the
application of individual parameters to motivational
effects have been hinted at in 4.4, and it will be
further developed in 5.
5   Relevance and Likeability:
Motivations in DBR
Motivations are represented in this framework as
pursued goals (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 1998;
2000): hence, relevance expresses the effects of
goal-pursuing over belief selection, while likeability
biases belief selection toward goal-satisfaction, i.e.
conformity between how we consider the world to
be, and how we would like it to be. More noticeably,
in DBR relevance and likeability affect belief
formation at different stages and in different ways.
Relevance determines the sub-set of data taken in
consideration by the agent at a given time (what she
sees, so to speak), while likeability plays a direct
role in the selection process which is being
performed over these candidate data, hence
influencing (to some extent) what she believes. With
reference to Figure 2, relevance intervenes at the
stage of focusing, while likeability might play a role
in belief selection.
Another significant difference between these two
motivational factors is that relevance exerts a
systematic  and constant influence over belief
formation, while likeability affects belief selection
only occasionally and under specific conditions.
One of the obvious trait of cognitive processing
in general is to be resource-bounded, and the same
applies to belief dynamics as well (Cherniak, 1986;
Wassermann, 2000). Among other things, an agent
does not select her current beliefs from the totality
of the data stored in her memory, but rather from a
limited sub-set of it: in DBR, such sub-set is focused
on the basis of data relevance – hence the pervasive
nature of relevance-based effects in belief dynamics.
In contrast, likeability might or might not affect
belief selection, since it expresses a specific attitude
toward motivation that not all agents need to share –
nor the same agent is likely to be always equally
biased toward confirmation of her expectations.
Take for instance the selection policies detailed in
4.2: the first (full realism) is not influenced by
likeability at all, while the second (open-minded
realism) is affected to a very limited extent; only the
third attitude (wishful thinking) is strongly biased by
likeability effects – that is, influence of likeability
depends on the agent parameters for belief selection.
Whatever their functional differences, both
relevance-based effects (contextual influences over
cognitive processing, tunnel vision, framing effects)
and likeability-based effects (self-verification,
avoidance of cognitive dissonance, pathological
denial) are strongly supported by empirical evidence
in several lines of research (Festinger, 1957;
Kruglanski, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kunda,
1990; Swann, 1990; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996;
Frijda et al., 2000; Swann et al., 2002). DBR tries to
reproduce similar dynamics in a formal framework,
with the long-term aim of implementation in
artificial cognitive systems (Paglieri, 2004).
This yields a crucial question: are such
influences adaptive, i.e. do they usually serve well
the agent’s practical purposes? And how is it so?
Answering such problems leads to further stress
the differences, rather than the similarities, between
relevance and likeability in affecting belief selection
(Forgas, 1995; 2000). In fact, while relevance is
clearly a prominent adaptive feature of information
processing, serving to avoid unnecessary
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computational costs for the assessment of useless
information (Cherniak, 1986; Wassermann, 2000),
the adaptive role of likeability is less obvious, and it
rather relates to the agent’s defence mechanisms on
the one hand (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 1998), and
to specific heuristics  on the other (Todd and
Gigerenzer, 2000). In the first case, likeability
effects might help to preserve the affective balance
of the agent, acting as homeostatic device to
maintain a stable level of self-confidence in the face
of an excess of unfavourable evidence: here a
delicate trade-off is drawn between accuracy of
beliefs and moderate degrees of wishful thinking, to
avoid loss of motivation without plunging into utter
self-delusion. As for the heuristic value of
likeability, under certain conditions an overly
optimistic attitude is indeed the most effective way
of achieving a solution to the agent’s need: for
instance, in extreme situations optimism and
stubbornness might help the agent to spot an
opportunity as soon as it arises (e.g., water in the
desert) – besides, accuracy of beliefs does not really
matter here for all those agents that do not survive.
Relevance effects show analogous heuristic value,
although under quite different conditions: e.g., a
maniacal focus over a very narrow set of data (such
as in tunnel vision) is indeed desirable when the
agent is fleeing from some danger or working under
severe time constraints, to avoid being distracted.
Moreover, even when relevance and likeability
fail to serve efficiently the agent purposes and affect
negatively her performance, their characteristic
biases are still remarkably different: relevance-
based biases (e.g., tunnel vision, obsessive
commitment, repeated failure in detecting an
obvious solution) usually testify of some
malfunctioning in the agent’s goal-processing,
rather than in belief formation dynamics – the agent
is usually being obsessed by some specific
motivation, so that she fails to shift her focus toward
more profitable lines of reasoning. On the contrary,
likeability-based biases (e.g., wishful thinking,
pathological denial, self-delusion) generates from
specific shortcomings in belief processing, either in
the assessment of data properties (likeability of a
datum is exaggerated, in comparison to the actual
value of the corresponding goal), or in the belief
selection process (too much weight is given to
likeability, without paying enough attention to other
crucial factors such as pragmatic credibility and
epistemic importance).
Finally, it is quite interesting to discuss some
experimental findings on motivated reasoning
within the framework of DBR. In particular,
different outcomes were observed between
accuracy-driven reasoning and goal-directed
reasoning (Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski and Ajzen,
1983; Kunda, 1990): in the first case, subjects were
explicitly oriented toward a careful and
dispassionate evaluation of the issue at hand for the
sake of accuracy per se, while in the second case
they were provided with a personal motive or
interest to arrive at a particular, directional
conclusion. Accuracy-driven reasoning was
characterized by an increase in the quantity of belief
processing (in terms of more alternatives being
considered in a lengthier fashion; Kruglanski, 1980;
Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983), but also by a different
quality of such processing, with a tendency to use
more sophisticated and deliberate inferential
procedures (Kunda, 1990) – a tendency that DBR
would capture as a parametrical switch (cf. 4.5),
with a fine-tuning of the heuristics applied in belief
selection. In contrast, goal-directed reasoning
showed exactly the kind of biases discussed so far,
with belief processing constrained by the data taken
into account by the agent (relevance-based biases on
focusing; Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski and Ajzen,
1983) and by a pressure toward confirmation and
self-verification (likeability-based biases on belief
formation; Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1990).
However, an additional feature emerged quite
clearly in goal-directed reasoning, as remarked by
Kunda: «The biasing role of goals is […]
constrained by one’s ability to construct a
justification for the desired conclusion: people will
come to believe what they want to believe only to
the extent that reason permits» (1990: 483). This
seems to suggest that direct influence of likeability
on belief formation is usually only provisional and
temporary, since it needs to be backed up by factual
supports (i.e. credibility and importance, in DBR
terms) as soon as possible. Moreover, human agents
seem to be inclined to actively search for such
supports and justification, performing specific
epistemic actions to this purpose. This opens
interesting scenarios for further research on the role
of motivation in belief dynamics (cf. 7).
6   Passionate Believers: Emotions
in DBR
Although so far the modelling of DBR was mainly
aimed to integrate belief dynamics with goals, hence
motivations, some connections with the related field
of emotions can tentatively be highlighted – merely
as suggestions for future work (cf. 7). At present,
the effects of emotions over DBR belief processing
seem to show mainly as:
I. Motivation inducement: this is an indirect and
local effect, due to the fact that emotions are
well-known motivational engines (Ortony et al.,
1988; Frijda et al., 2000), i.e. they often generate
and/or trigger specific motivations in the agent’s
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mind. In turn, such motivations affect the agent’s
beliefs (cf. 5), and it is possible to map the
significant effects of the triggering emotion on
the doxastic dynamics of the agent: for instance,
a sudden feeling of uneasiness and fear, by
inducing the belief that there is some unknown
danger ahead, strongly drives the agent’s
attention toward means of escape, forcing her to
neglect other available information.
II. Parametrical readjustment: this is a direct and
pervasive effect, in which a certain emotion
affects and modifies the whole processing of the
agent. In DBR, this is effectively captured by a
readjustment of one or more of the agent’s
parameters: for instance, in some subjects fear
can induce a lowering of the selection threshold
(i.e., they are ready to take action on less reliable
bases), but also a greater role for credibility in
both condition and function (i.e., they become
much more concerned with factual assessment of
the best course of action, rather than epistemic
importance or likeability; cf. 4.2).
7   Conclusions and Future Work
This work presented a preliminary attempt of
integrating motivation in the formal framework of
DBR, to spell out the influence of goals over
procedural belief formation, and the different role
played by relevance and likeability in such
influence. However, this work is still in progress,
and several aspects remain to be explored in detail.
In particular, future researches will aim to refine
the DBR model and to move toward implementation
in agent-based cognitive and social simulation
(Dragoni and Giorgini, 2003; Paglieri, 2004), to
focus on motivational and emotional effects over
belief formation in a broader perspective (Clore and
Gasper, 2000; Forgas, 2000), and to investigate the
interplay between beliefs, motivations and emotions
in social interaction, e.g. in argumentation (Paglieri
and Castelfranchi, 2004).
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Abstract
In the brain, different levels of neuro-active substances modulate the behaviour of neurons that have
receptors for them, such as sensitivity-to-input, Koch (1999). An artificial neural network is described
that learns which actions have the immediate effect of minimising cost and maximising reward for an
agent. Two versions of the network are compared, one that uses neuromodulation and one that does
not. It is shown that although neuromodulation can decrease performance it agitates the agent and
stops it from over-fitting the environment.
1 Introduction
Fellous (1999) proposes that emotion can be seen
as continuous patterns of neuromodulation of certain
brain structures. It is argued that theories considering
emotions to emanate from certain brain structures and
from non-localised diffuse chemical processes should
be integrated. Three brain structures are considered in
this way; the hypothalamus, amygdala and prefrontal
cortex.
Fellous (2004) further suggests that the focus of
study should be on the function of emotions rather
than on what they are. Seen in this way, animals can
be seen functionally as having emotions, whether or
not we empathise with them. Given this, robots can
functionally have emotions as well. One function of
emotions mentioned that has a robotic counterpart is
to achieve a multi-level communication of simplified
but high impact information.
One way of studying the functionality of emotions,
is to identify the extra functionality provided by neu-
romodulation compared to a non-modulating solu-
tion. Modulation is used here to signal agent needs
in a neural network that is used for the purpose of
action selection. The structures of both solutions are
inherently the same but the modulating version has
the added interaction between neuromodulation and
neural network.
Although neuromodulators and hormones have
been emulated for the purpose of action selection be-
fore, Avila-Garcia and Canamero (2004) Shen and
Chuong (2002), they have not been applied to a
purely neural network solution and have not been
compared to non-modulating versions. Husbands
(1998) evolves controllers inspired by the modulatory
effects of diffusing NO. This speeds up evolutionary
production of successful controllers.
The difficulty is that what can be done with a
modulating network, can also be done with a non-
modulating network if it has been evolved for that
purpose. Therefore the comparison needs to be made
in an environment that the agent has not been evolved
for.
2 Application of the model
An adaptive agent needs a reason to adapt in order
to do so. A common reason is to maximise and retain
resources. In this context a resource is a single contin-
uous scalar value that correlates with a characteristic
of the state of the agent or environment. A resource
can correlate with a single quantifiable level such as
a battery charge level for a physical robot, or be an
estimation of a virtual non-measurable level such as
utility or safety. An adaptive agent is faced with two
tasks when maximising these resources, that of learn-
ing to perform actions which result in an increase in
a resource level, and that of learning not to perform
actions which result in a decrease of resource.
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Here, the Artificial Life animat concept is ab-
stracted to provide the simplest possible context for
testing the effect of neuromodulation applied to an
artificial neural network. The agents have no external
senses to adapt to and can only sense their internal
state. The choice of output directly and immediately
alters the internal state of the agent, which therefore
alters the strength of the input signal to the network.
The agent has a body that requires two resources,
energy and water. It keeps track of the largest increase
and decrease of each. The current change in resource
level is then scaled to these maxima to be within the
range [0,1] before being passed to the network.
The agent is given a set of actions that increase or
decrease by one or two resource points1, or are neu-
tral to, either the energy or water level in the body.
There is one action for each permutation making 10
in total.
3 Implementation
3.1 Topology
The network consists of three layers of adaptive leaky
integrate and fire neurons learning via spike timing-
dependent plasticity, G. Q. Bi (2002). The model
learns which outputs should be most frequently and
strongly fired to minimise the level of input signal.
There is one output neuron per action. The ac-
tion has an effect on the internal state of the agent,
which determines the strength of the input signal to
the network. For the modulating network, the in-
put layer neurons increase modulator strengths when
fired, while the middle layer neurons have receptors
for those modulators.
There are situations in which an effective be-
haviour for an agent may decrease a need but not
satisfy it. For example, if it is in an environment
which is temporarily bereft of resources then waiting
and conserving its current levels may be the optimal
behaviour. Alternatively there may be situations in
which an agent needs to store more resources than it
normally does. In this case the need for the resource
will be signalled despite that need being signalled as
satisfied. An example would be an agent expecting to
find itself in an environment bereft of resources.
For each resource the input layer has two neurons
that output to the middle layer. One neuron signals
the need for the resource and the other neuron signals
the satisfaction of that need. If a previous action per-
formed by the agent results in a decrease in hunger or
1Points are used as it is an arbitrary level that has no correlation
with any real physical quantity.
an increase in resource satiation, then the correspond-
ing input signal is momentarily decreased.
The model uses a feed forward network that can
be iterated over a number of times within a single
turn, after which the winning output neuron is cho-
sen. Which neuron wins is determined by summing
up the total charge of each neuron over all the itera-
tions and choosing the neuron with the greatest sum.
This stops a neuron with strong inputs from losing
because it just has spiked and thus has low activity or
is in a refractory period.
3.2 Modulators
Two variants of the network were created; modulating
and non-modulating. They were the same except that
the modulating network had in addition two modula-
tors, one used to signify hunger and the other thirst.
As used here, a modulator is a global signal that
can influence the behaviour of a neuron if that neu-
ron has receptors for it. The signal decays over time,
specified by the re-uptake rate, and can be increased
by firing neurons that have secretors for it.
Neurons within the middle layer are given a ran-
dom number of receptors. These can be modulated by
neurons in the input layer that have secretors. These
neurons were given a random number of secretors.
The receptors modulate either the neuron’s sensitivity
to input or probability of firing. The extent of this is
determined by the level of the associated modulator
and whether the receptor is inhibitory or excitatory.
The secretors increase an associated modulator. The
modulation rate of the receptors and the increment
rate of the secretors is determined by evolution.
4 Parameter Optimisation
The network has a number of parameters which must
be set correctly for it to adapt successfully. These
are parameters that have no obvious value, such as
the number of neurons in the middle layer, secretion,
modulation rates etc. Automated parameter optimi-
sation was performed for the modulating and non-
modulating agents. Afterwards the parameter sets
were hard-coded and tests were performed upon a
population of agents using them.
The fitness of an agent was determined by
Energy +Water +Age− |Energy −Water|
The difference between the energy and water resource
was subtracted from the fitness as both resources
were essential for the agent to stay alive.
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5 Results
After optimisation, a modulating and a non-
modulating agent were picked for further testing. The
fitness of the genotypes were equivalent and both
were typical of the solutions that were evolved. Be-
cause there was a stochastic mapping from genotype
to phenotype and to provide multiple evaluations, the
agents were hard-coded so that they could be tested
as a population.
Parameter optimisation converged upon a fully
hebbian network for the non-modulating network and
a hybrid anti-hebbian / hebbian network for the mod-
ulating network.
5.1 Initial tests
When viewed over the course of the agent lifetime it
can be seen that a typical agent learns which actions
provide minimal disturbance to its inputs. It initially
chooses a neutral action before settling on the most
rewarding water action. The agent then alternates be-
tween this and the most rewarding energy action; see
figure 1. Figure 2 shows the initial learning process
before one output neuron wins over all the others.
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Figure 1: Actions chosen over lifetime of a single
modulating agent.
The performance of the non-modulating and the
modulating agents were similar although on average
the non-modulating network would reach higher lev-
els of fitness and would be optimised by the parame-
ter search more quickly.
5.2 Extended tests
During parameter optimisation, each genotype was
tested for 1,000 turns before being evaluated. The
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Figure 2: The first 40 cycles of the run in figure 1
showing the initial learning process.
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Figure 3: Non-Modulating agent run over an ex-
tended period of time (10,000 turns).
evaluation was cut short if the agent died prematurely
because a resource had decreased to nothing.
After parameter optimisation, when testing a pop-
ulation of hard-coded non-modulating agents for
longer than 1,000 turns, the activity in the network
ceased over time. The charge of the output neurons
would slowly decay over time with the winning ac-
tion remaining the same each time; see figure 3.
The limited use of artificial evolution for parameter
optimisation had settled upon a brittle strategy which
depended on how long each agent was evaluated for.
A population of hard-coded modulating agents
were then tested for the same extended period of time.
They were shown to continue transitioning between
the same two winning output neurons that caused a
maximum increase in energy and water, with other
neurons very occasionally being chosen; see figure
4. Modulation had prevented the artificial evolution
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Figure 4: Modulating agent run over same extended
period of time.
used for the parameter optimisation from over-fitting
the test environment.
6 Discussion
It was discovered that the network performed most
effectively when the actions it chose could minimise
input activity. Wo¨rgo¨tter and Porr (2004) provide
an overview of the field of temporal sequence learn-
ing. They discuss how the learning paradigm of dis-
turbance minimisation, as opposed to reward max-
imisation, removes the problem of credit structuring
and assignment. The two paradigms are not equiv-
alent. Whereas maximal return is associated with a
few points on a decision surface, minimal disturbance
uses all of the points. Every input into the system
drives the learning and when there are no inputs then
the system is in a desirable, stable state.
Modulation agitates the network, stopping it from
settling into a stable state for too long or letting ac-
tivity decline to a point whereby the network stops
alternating between actions. When tested using an
extended run, the modulating network, unlike the
non-modulating version, continues to alternate be-
tween the actions causing the least input disturbance
throughout its lifetime. Figure 4 shows that other ac-
tions always have a chance of being selected.
When comparing the modulating and non-
modulating agents in environments that they were not
evolved for, in this case evaluated for an extended
length of time, then it is shown that modulation makes
the agent more robust. This robustness carries with it
a performance cost.
This suggests that one functional use of emotions
is to provide agitation to the agent in order to not let it
settle into a stable state. Even though the environment
may allow for it or make this the optimal behaviour.
An explanation for this could be that natural agents
have not evolved for such environments because they
rarely exist and cannot be relied upon to last.
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Abstract
Simulated dramatic story-worlds need to be populated with situated software agents that act in a dra-
matically believable way. In order to provide flexible roleplayers, agent architectures should limit the
required external macro-level control. We present work on an architecture that exploits social embed-
ding and concepts from appraisal theories of emotion to achieve the enactment of simple cliche´ plots.
The interplay of motivational constructs and the subjective evaluative interpretation of changes in an
agent’s environment provide for the causal and emotional connections that can lead to the unfolding of
a story.
1 Introduction
This work is part of the ActAffAct project (Acting
Affectively affecting Acting (Rank, 2004)) that re-
searches a bottom-up approach to imitating emotional
characters that interact in a story-world. The goal is
to achieve the unfolding of a plot-like structure while
limiting the use of external macro-level control—as
exerted by, e.g., a director. The ideal level of ex-
ternal control would be none at all, resulting in the
emergence of plot from the characters’ interaction,
effectively turning the agents into reusable roleplay-
ers. The question that arises is what are the moti-
vating elements in the control architecture of syn-
thetic characters that can provide for a dramatically
appropriate sequence of actions. Our approach views
emotions—as described in appraisal theories (Frijda,
1986; Scherer et al., 2001; Ortony, 2003)—as the
links between actions that render a plot plausible.
Emotions are the essence of a story (Elliott et al.,
1998) and play a central role in engaging drama.
The conflicts between the characters in a play and
the emotions involved in resolving them are the con-
stituents of a dramatic structure, a plot. Drama
can be described as the art that deals with a refined
version of emotional interaction between individu-
als (Vogler, 1996; Egri, 1946). These ideas provide
a starting point and can serve as success criteria for
the creation of dramatic story-worlds, i.e., simula-
tions that are inhabited by software agents for the pur-
pose of enacting dramatically interesting plots. These
worlds present themselves to the single agent as in-
herently social domains, as social interaction is often
crucial for solving problems. In the ideal case the au-
thor of such a story-world would be able to shift from
today’s specification of exact sequences of actions to
the authoring of possible actions, regularities in the
environment, and the setting up of an initial constella-
tion of characters, including their general traits. This
would not necessarily be an easier process of creation
but it could lead to a more flexible, and possibly user-
driven, experience of dramatic structures.
Using an appraisal-based architecture that con-
siders the social and physical lifeworld of an agent
is seen as key to construct emotionally and dramati-
cally believable characters for interactive drama. This
paper highlights aspects of our extensions to a BDI
architecture (belief, desire, intention (Bratman et al.,
1988; Huber, 1999)) that are pertinent to motivating
dramatic actions in a minimal version of a cliche´ sto-
ryline. Situated appraisal of all percepts, a three-
phase model of behaviours, and varied coping be-
haviours have been our first steps towards character-
based narrative.
2 Enacting the Social Lifeworld
You are Embedded In
Contrary to its physical surroundings, the intangi-
ble social lifeworld an agent is embedded in has to
be continually enacted and negotiated. We use the
term social lifeworld in the tradition of Agre and Hor-
swill’s analytic endeavour (Agre and Horswill, 1997)
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to thicken the notion of environment. Our focus on
sociality combines the goal of reducing the cogni-
tive load for individual entities populating the envi-
ronment with emphasising the relevance of coordina-
tive functions (Clancey, 1999) mediating between an
individual and the (potential) current and future op-
portunities and threats to satisfy an individual’s con-
cerns (Frijda, 1986).
The notion of concern is defined as subjective dis-
position to desire occurrence or nonoccurence of a
given kind of situation. This definition, taken from
(Frijda, 1986), is related to but distinct from goals
and motives, as the latter terms induce connota-
tions of activity control. Concerns range from very
concrete considerations—i.e., relating to an agent’s
immediate tasks—to abstract ones—such as feeling
competent—that can lie dormant until an emotionally
pertinent event takes place. The process of appraisal
is described as a fast and possibly only partial evalu-
ation of subjective significance of changes in the en-
vironment according to specific criteria.
By operationalising these theoretical notions, we
de-emphasise the role of high-level cognition (“think-
ing”) in routine functioning (Bargh and Chartrand,
1999) and recognise the opportunity offered by avail-
able structures to constrain high-level function within
tractable bounds. Agre and Horswill (1997) iden-
tify abstract locatedness and functionally significant
relationships grounded in the physical environment.
Analogously, social lifeworld analysis considers the
potential for inter-action with respect to loci of con-
trol at the macro level (e.g., power and status (Kem-
per, 1993)) as well as indirect access to (second and
higher level) resources (e.g., Aube´, 1998).
A situated agent’s dependence on regularities thus
extends beyond the physical world into socio-cultural
constructs, whose maintenance can e.g. be modelled
as an interplay of conventions (social norms) and
evaluative processes (emotions) (Staller and Petta,
2001), with emotions sustaining social norms, and
culturally defined social norms in turn shaping and
regulating emotions (e.g., with feeling rules defining
which emotions are suitable in which situation, and
display rules providing repertoires of how to express
them).
Interpretations of situations and developments in
the social lifeworld are not a given: both within
an individual and in the society, they are the out-
come of negotiations and transactions, captured e.g.
in sociological models (Kemper, 1993) or charac-
terised in terms of personality traits. Purposeful func-
tions such as threatening, sanctioning, and amend-
ing, therefore are intrinsic behavioural requirements,
along with their affective grounding in the social life-
world. Emotional processes (ranging from raw affect
under rough and undifferentiated circumstances, over
fleets of feelings in (yet) unclear scenarios, to fully ar-
ticulated “emotions” as result of detailed perception)
mediate the translation between the subjective worlds
of states, concerns and preferences, the abstract en-
acted shared social lifeworld, and the status and of-
ferings of the physical world.
The enactment of the social lifeworld is the sphere
of activity that is dominant in the context of dramatic
interactions. The mechanisms of emotional processes
for interpreting and sustaining this lifeworld and their
influence on motivation form a fertile ground for
drama.
3 Appraisal-based Architecture
It is a big step from the qualitative appraisal theories
to an actual implementation. Several theoretical ef-
forts investigate agent architectures that incorporate
ideas about emotions (Isla et al., 2001; Frankel, 2002;
Sloman and Scheutz, 2002; Gratch and Marsella,
2004; Marinier and Laird, 2004). The architecture
we implemented uses ideas of TABASCO (Petta,
2003), the implementation effort has been based on
JAM, the Java Agent Model (Huber, 2001). As a BDI
architecture, JAM provides a plan representation lan-
guage, goal- and event-driven (i.e., proactive and re-
active) behaviour, a hierarchical intention structure,
and utility-based action selection.
Figure 1: Four characters in ActAffAct
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For our simple story-world we built a simulation
including a graphical representation of an environ-
ment inhabited by four agents, taking on the roles
of narrative archetypes: a hero, an antagonist, a
mentor, and a victim (Figure 1). To provoke dra-
matic conflict, the agents are initialised with con-
flicting top-level goals (as a first approximation of
concerns) and the social lifeworld is filled with enti-
ties suitable for creating and resolving said conflicts.
The top-level goals include “being loved by some-
one” and “being mean to lovers”, examples of dra-
matic entities—besides the agents themselves—are
a flower; a sword; and the key to a treasure. The
JAMmodel was adapted for concurrent execution and
asynchronous interaction with this world. Apart from
these surface changes, the architecture needed to be
extended to support appraisal of perceptions in rela-
tion to the current goals of the agent, as these are the
motivating structures in JAM. Furthermore, our use
of plans in JAM was specifically tailored to the needs
of an appraisal-based agent. As described in the next
section, we restricted the flexible hierarchy of plans
in JAM’s intention structure to defined levels and im-
plemented a further type of plan suitable for a situated
perception process. Percepts are represented as JAM
facts; as part of the appraisal process, however, they
are reinterpreted by the agent according to its situated
context.
According to the revised OCC model (Ortony,
2003) that incorporates more of the elements as dis-
cussed in e.g. Frijda (1986), appraisal is based on
goals, standards, and preferences of the individual.
The latter two are missing in JAM as explicit enti-
tities, but can be represented as beliefs. A separate
appraisal component was added in the sequential ex-
ecution cycle of the agent to perform the constant
evaluation of percepts. The next section discusses
in more detail elements of this architecture and their
pertinence to appraisal and to motivating believable
behaviour in a character.
4 Motivating Elements
Among our changes to the BDI model of JAM are the
following additions and restrictions:
• Perceptions plans:
These restricted plans are executed for matching
percepts when they are first perceived. They im-
plement the situated reinterpretation of percepts,
translating from an agent-neutral representation
to one that takes the agent’s current context into
account, and can range from asserting that an ob-
ject near the agent is reachable to interpreting
the picking up of a flower by the agent next to
me as the anticipation of the possibility of being
offered a present, thereby forming an expecta-
tion.
This interpretion in the current context can be
seen as the first step of appraising the signifi-
cance of an event. It already takes into account
components necessary for the social aspect of
appraisal, such as determining the agent repon-
sible for a specific change.
• Plan levels:
The space of plans accessible to an agent is
structured in a hierarchy, starting from concerns
at the top level, longer-term activities, and be-
haviours, to simple action packages and plans
dedicated to executing a single act. This restric-
tion in the use of hierarchy in JAM was chosen
as plans of a given level share characteristic pat-
terns. Behaviours in particular have been specif-
ically designed to allow a simple and tractable
implementation of appraisal. They are cate-
gorised as either trying to achieve something,
helping somebody else to achieve something,
or hindering them from achieving it. This re-
duces a part of the task of cognitive appraisal—
namely assessing the relevance of a percept to
one’s own goals—to simple pattern matching
(although more complex forms of relevance as-
sessment are possible and desirable). The same
holds for assessing the conformance of an ac-
tion to the standards of an agent, e.g., the social
norms, as these are expressed in terms of behav-
iours as well.
• Behaviour phases:
Furthermore the execution of behaviours has
been split into three phases of which the first and
the last one are hard to interrupt, in order to sim-
ulate commitment to one’s intentions. (In con-
trast, the utility-driven reasoning of JAM might
possibly drop a just-started behaviour as well as
one that is near its successful completion). A
timed pattern was used for behaviours that in-
fluences the execution depending on the level of
completion. In current work on regulatory influ-
ences on plan execution this capability is consid-
ered as part of a meta-level plan.
• Expression and coping plans:
If the numerical intensity of the appraisal of a
perceived and interpreted fact exceeds a certain
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threshold value it creates a goal to cope with this
situation and another one to express the agent’s
state. Expressive actions that indicate an agent’s
emotional state are in turn perceived and inter-
preted by other agents and trigger appraisals.
This signalling of the current emotional state of
an agent thus serves the purpose of revealing
the elicitation of an emotion directly to others
that are watching (Reisenzein, 2001). Coping
introduces new top-level goals that are the main
source of variation in generated plots. Coping
activities motivate action that, by way of the
emotion process, is causally related to percepts
and concerns of the agent. These plans use the
information made available by the appraisal of
an event to decide on a suitable course of action
to tackle the subjective interpretation. Overall,
this provides for the causal relations needed for
a dramatic plot.
ActAffAct’s simulated domain was tested with dif-
ferent setups of the four characters, one of which ex-
cluded the antagonist and thereby the main source of
conflict. In the no-conflict case the resulting inter-
actions of the characters, not surprisingly, cannot be
described as dramatic. A qualitative evaluation of the
scenario with the full cast, however, leads us to be-
lieve that minimal storylines can indeed be generated
using our approach. A quantitative evaluation was not
yet pursued as this would require a measure of “story-
ness” for the automatic comparison of generated se-
quences of action, a complex research problem on its
own (Charles and Cavazza, 2004). Even so, our ap-
proach shows that rather simple emotional extensions
of a BDI architecture can yield reasonable outcomes
in the distinctively social domain of dramatic interac-
tion.
5 Related Work
Several recent projects that include simulated worlds
target the area of interactive narratives in a wide
sense (Magerko et al., 2004; Mateas and Stern, 2002;
Cavazza et al., 2002), others pursue pedagogical ap-
plications (Machado et al., 2001; Marsella et al.,
2000). A common problem of both types is the nar-
rative paradox, the need to balance the flexibility of
such a world with the control about narrative flow.
As stated above, ActAffAct is designed taking the
rather extreme viewpoint that external control can be
reduced substantially without abandoning the claim
of dramatically appropriate interactions. The cru-
cial point is, to our mind, the reliance on emotional
processes to provide the causal structure of action se-
quences.
EMA (Gratch and Marsella, 2004) is a frame-
work for modelling emotion that tries to be domain-
independent by harnessing concepts from appraisal
theories of emotion. In EMA, coping is defined as
inverse operation of appraisal, i.e., the identification
and influencing of the believed causes for what has
been appraised as significant in the current context.
The main focus of development currently lies on ex-
tending the range of coping strategies (e.g., “mental
disengagement”, “positive reinterpretation”, “further
assess coping potential”, or “planning”) as responses
to emotionally significant events.
Haunt2 (Magerko et al., 2004) is an attempt to
create a game in which AI characters are central to
the game experience. It is realised as a “mod” for
the Unreal game engine. The goal of the game is
to escape a house by influencing other characters in-
directly. The dramatic storyline in Haunt2 is prede-
fined, represented as a kind of partially ordered plan
used by an explicit AI director to send commands to
the different characters while reacting to unexpected
moves by the human player.
A similar approach is used in Fac¸ade1, where the
proclaimed goal is interactive drama in a realtime 3D
world (Mateas and Stern, 2002). Its public release
is (at the moment) announced for spring 2005. In
Fac¸ade there is also a separate component, external to
the story, that arranges story segments (“beats”) into
a coherent story. The characters themselves act au-
tonomously but adhere to the constraints of the estab-
lished current story context. The ActAffAct project,
in contrast, tries to achieve a simpler but similar effect
without external control.
6 Conclusion And Further Work
Although we cannot yet claim to have succeeded in
creating a robust generator of narratives, we never-
theless think that the approach of using emotional
concepts in the control architecture of dramatic char-
acters holds great promises to enrich dramatic story-
worlds. We currently plan on integrating explicit reg-
ulatory strategies into the control architecture of the
agents. The main focus of the effort to implement
emotion regulation is to strengthen the coherence of
a single agent’s actions over longer time periods. In
the context of an effort carried out within the Euro-
pean Network of Excellence HUMAINE2, a broader
1http://www.interactivestory.net/#facade
2http://emotion-research.net
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survey work and steps towards a principled approach
for the integration of affective processes, delibera-
tion, and situated action in viable agent architectures
are being undertaken. The long term goal is to clarify
the systematic relation between the complexity of an
environment including its social characteristics—i.e.,
the social lifeworld—and the characteristics of agent
control architectures that such an environment war-
rants for agents to fulfil specific functions, such as
generating believable dramatic plots.
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Abstract
This paper concerns the possible roles cognition plays with respect to emotion and motivation in rational agents.
The approach we introduce is built around the notion of symbolic object, an object that reminds the agent of
(possibly many) emotionally charged situations in which the agent was involved, so that facing the object and
remembering those situations may operate as a motivator for specific actions concerning the current situation.
1. A symbolic object is an object that reminds an agent
of past situations the agent was involved in, and that the
agent felt were emotionally charged, so that facing that ob-
ject again and remembering those situations may operate as
a motivator for specific actions concerning the current situ-
ation. Symbolic objects, and the symbolic behaviors intro-
duced later, are proposed as cognitive supports for a men-
tal mechanism able to explain emotionally-based motivated
behavior. We present a tentative conceptual framework for
the working of symbolic objects and symbolic behaviors,
and indicate some possible applications in the study of ra-
tional agents.
2. We assume the following sets as primitives: Obj,
a set of objects; Ag ⊆ Obj, a set of agents; Sit, a set
of situations that agents can recognize, concerning objects
and other agents. We leave open the details about the el-
ements of such sets. We just require that Sit, even if
implicitly, encompasses a temporal structure. Situations
are related to objects and agents by the following func-
tions: obj : Sit → ℘(Obj), the function that indicates
the set obj(s) of objects that participate in situation s;
ag : Sit → ℘(Ag), the specialization of obj to the set
Ag, so that ag(s) is the set of agents that participate in s.
Let relationV⊆ Obj×Ag×Sit×Sit be the symboliza-
tion relation, by which an object o in situation s symbolizes
situation t to agent a, denoted s Voa t. Then, we say that
an object o is a symbolic object for an agent a in situation
s if and only if there is a situation t 6= s such that s Voa t.
An object o ∈ obj(s) is said to remind an agent a of a situ-
ation t, in situation s, if and only if sVoa t and o ∈ obj(t).
Thus, reminding is conceived as justified symbolization.
3. Agents recognize situations by recognizing the ob-
∗This work was partially supported by CNPq and FAPERGS.
jects (and agents) that participate in them, but they do that
under the influence of symbolic objects, and the emotional
charges that they convey. Thus, agents may be unable to
tell situations completely apart. Situations that cannot be
completely told apart by a given agent, due to the symbolic
character of some objects participating in them, are said to
be symbolically similar to that agent.
Let≈⊆ Ag×Sit×Sit×Obj be the symbolic similarity
relation, by which an agent a considers situation s similar
to situation t by virtue of the presence in s and t of the ob-
ject o. Denote s ≈oa t such relationship. We require that≈oa
be reflexive and symmetric. Let EmCh be a set of values,
called emotional charges, and emch : Ag×Sit→ EmCh
be the function that gives the emotional charge of any sit-
uation s for any agent a, denoted emcha(s). We require
that: there is a null emotional charge, denoted 0 ∈ EmCh;
there is a relation ≤ between emotional charges, so that
(EmCh,≤) is a partially ordered set. We also require that
if a ∈ ag(s) and s ≈oa t then emcha(t) 6= 0, so that only
situations where agents are not involved, neither directly
nor by association, are without emotional charges for them.
4. We consider agent behaviors to be coordinated sets of
actions, performed by agents in the pursuit of goals. That
is, we take into account only goal-directed behavior.
Let Beh be the set of all possible behaviors that agents
may have. Let beh : Ag × Sit → Beh the function that
determines the behavior each agent a has in each situation
s, denoted beha(s). Let Goal ⊆ Sit be the set of all goals
that agents may have. Let gl : Ag×Sit→ ℘(Goal) be the
function that determines the goals an agent may have at a
given situation, denoted gla(s). Let→⊆ Sit×Beh× Sit
be the relation that determines, for a situation s, that an
agent behavior b may attain a situation t, denoted s b→ t.
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Then, for any rational agent a, goal t, and situation s: t ∈
gla(s) if and only if beha(s) = b and s
b→ t.
5. In the set of possible situations in which an agent may
find itself, some will be felt as emotionally acceptable, oth-
ers as emotionally unacceptable. The favorable situations
are those situations s whose emotional charges are positive
(emcha(s) > 0), while the unfavorable ones are those with
negative emotional charges (emcha(s) < 0).
6. A goal t is an emotional motivation for a behavior b
of an agent a in situation s, if and only if emcha(t) > 0
and s b→ t. An emotional goal is a goal generated only for
the sake of the emotional charge it carries with it. A behav-
ior is an emotionally defensive behavior in a situation if the
situation is emotionally unacceptable to the agent and the
behavior is performed only for the sake of taking the agent
to another, emotionally acceptable situation. An agent acts
in a purely emotional way when it changes from one be-
havior to another just for the sake of the bigger emotional
charge implied by the new behavior.
7. An interaction between two agents is a coordinated
performance of behaviors, so that rational relationships of
dependence and causality are established among the behav-
iors that constitute the interaction. The set of rational rela-
tionships is called the rational structure of the interaction.
During an interaction, agents change their behaviors ac-
cording to the changes in the situations in which they find
themselves. Thus, through changes in situations, behav-
iors of an agent cause changes in the behavior of the other
agent. An interaction is said to be an emotional interaction
if the emotional charges of the situations involved in the
interaction play a role in the causation of the behaviors of
the agents, in superposition to the causation determined by
the interaction’s rational structure.
Let a and a′ be two interacting agents. Let bi =
beha(si) and b′i = beha′(si) be the successive behaviors
of a and a′ during the successive situations s1, . . . , sn. A
stage of the interaction is any pair of behaviors (bi, b′i) per-
formed by the agents that participate in the interaction. The
interaction stage (bi, b′i) is said to be emotionally favor-
able for agent a (resp., a′) in situation si if and only if
emcha(si) < 0 (resp., emcha′(si) < 0), emcha(si+i) >
0 (resp., emcha′(si+i) > 0), and si (bi,b
′
i)→ si+1 .
8. Two agents are said to be friendly to each other in a
situation s, which is emotionally unacceptable for one of
them, if and only if they perform an interaction that leads
them to a resulting situation which is emotionally accept-
able for both. Only rational agents capable of emotionally
motivated behaviors can be friendly to each other.
A sequence of stages (bj , b′j), . . . , (bk, b′k), starting in
a situation sj and ending in situation sk, is said to be a
friendly interaction in sj if and only if emcha(sj) < 0
or emcha′(sj) < 0, and the both emcha(sk) > 0 and
emcha′(sk) > 0.
9. We extend the relation of symbolization to encom-
pass behaviors. LetV⊆ Ag × (Obj ∪ Beh) × Sit × Sit
be the symbolization relation extended to encompass sym-
bolic behaviors, as well as symbolic objects. A symbolic
behavior is one that is perceived symbolically by an agent:
a behavior b′ = beha′(s) of an agent a′ in situation s is a
symbolic behavior for an agent a in s if and only if there
exists a situation t 6= s such that sVb′a t.
10. A situation s is an emotionally misleading situation
for agents a and a′ if and only if there is an element x (ei-
ther an object o ∈ obj(s), or a behavior b = beha(s) or
b′ = beha′(s)) that symbolizes different situations for the
two agents: s Vxa t, s Vxa′ t′, and t 6= t′. If s is a stage in
an interaction and it happens that either a or a′ (or for both)
emotionally react to s, it is possible that such reactions, due
to their lack of rational connection to the rest of the interac-
tion, make the interaction depart from its rational structure.
We call emotionally misleading interaction any interaction
that has at least one emotionally misleading stage.
Conclusion. This paper sketched in a tentative way a
conceptual framework for symbolic objects and symbolic
behaviors as cognitive supports for emotions and motiva-
tions. We think that the elaboration of this framework may
further the study of rational agents in at least two direc-
tions: it may help agents to reason adequately about their
own emotional behaviors, and about those of their (human
and artificial) partners; and it may help artificial agents to
better simulate human agents.
The few ideas presented here are certainly not enough to
support such aims, and many main and auxiliary ideas are
still missing; e.g., a relation of similarity between objects
(and between behaviors), so that the symbolization relation
may be based on similar, not necessarily equal, objects (or
behaviors), avoiding the requirement that objects (and be-
haviors) be present in exactly the same form, in different
situations, to become symbolic.
Finally, we note that our approach originated from a
critical view of the area of AI by the first author, a criti-
cal view of the theory and practice of Psychoanalysis by
the second author, and from our joint idea that the time is
ripe for the development of useful formal theories based on
Freud’s work (see, e.g., Freud (1976, 1989)).
References
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Abstract 
 
The goal of our work aims at implementing progressively an action selection affective model for 
virtual humans that should be in the end autonomous, adaptive and sociable. Affect, traditionally 
distinguished from "cold" cognition, regroups emotions and motivations which are highly inter-
twined. We present a bottom-up approach by implementing first a motivational model of action se-
lection to obtain motivationally autonomous virtual humans. For the adaptability of virtual humans 
and completeness of our affective model of action selection, we will define the interactions between 
motivations and emotions in order to integrate an emotional layer. In order to understand how they 
affect decision making in virtual humans, the motivations should represent more quantitative aspect 
of the decision making whereas emotions should be more qualitative one. 
 
1   Introduction 
One of the main problem to solve, when a moti-
vational decision making for individual virtual hu-
mans is designed, is the action selection problem: 
“how to choose the appropriate behavior at each 
point in time so as to work towards the satisfaction 
of the current goal (its most urgent need), paying 
attention at the same time to the demands and op-
portunities coming from the environment, and with-
out neglecting, in the long term, the satisfaction of 
the other active needs” (Cañamero, 2000).  
In a bottom-up approach, we decide to imple-
ment first a motivational model of action selection 
because motivations are directly implied in the goal-
oriented behaviours. Next we will add an emotional 
layer for the flexibility and the realism of the behav-
iours. The emotions stay longer in time than the 
motivations which need to be satisfied rapidly and 
can modify and modulate motivations according to 
Frijda (1995): “emotions alert us to unexpected 
threats, interruptions, and opportunities”. 
In this paper, we describe first our motivational 
model of action selection for virtual humans with 
his functionalities for the flexibility and the coher-
ence of the decision making. We created a simulated 
environment for testing the model in real-time. Fi-
nally we explain how an emotion layer could be 
added to obtain an affective model of action selec-
tion. 
 
2   The motivational model of ac-
tion selection 
 
Figure 1: A hierarchical decision graph for one mo-
tivation connecting with others decision graphs 
 
Our model is based on hierarchical classifier sys-
tems (Donnart and Meyer, 1994) (HCS, one per 
motivation) working in parallel to obtain goal-
oriented behaviors for virtual humans. For the 
adaptability and reactivity of virtual humans in deci-
sion making, the HCS are associated with the func-
tionalities of a free flow hierarchy (Tyrrell, 1993) 
such as compromise and opportunist behaviors. This 
model contains four levels per motivation: 
- Internal variables represent the internal state of 
the virtual human and evolve according to the ef-
fects of actions. 
Motivation
Internal 
Variable
Motivated 
Behavior(s)
Motivated 
Action(s) 
Locomotion 
Action(s) 
Environment 
Information 
Others Motivations 
- +
HCS Motivated 
Behaviors
Actions 
Internal 
Variables
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- Motivations correspond to a “subjective evalua-
tion” of the internal variables and environment in-
formation due to a threshold system and a hystere-
sis. 
- Motivated behaviors represent sequences of lo-
comotion actions, generated thanks to the hierarchi-
cal classifier system, to reach locations where the 
virtual human should go to satisfy motivations. 
- Actions are separated into two types. Locomo-
tion actions are only used for moving the virtual 
human to a specific place, where motivated actions 
can satisfy one or several motivations. Both have a 
retro-action on internal variable(s). Locomotion 
actions increase them, whereas motivated actions 
decrease them. 
The motivational model is composed of many 
hierarchical classifier systems running in parallel. 
The number of motivations is not limited. Selection 
of the most activated node is not carried out at each 
layer, as in classical hierarchy, but only in the end, 
as in a free flow hierarchy (the action layer). Finally 
the action chosen is the most activated permitting 
flexibility and reactivity in decision making of vir-
tual human. 
 
2.1 Evaluation of motivations  
 
Figure 2: “Subjective” evaluation of one motivation 
from the values of the internal variable. 
 
The “subjective evaluation” of motivations cor-
responds to a non-linear model of motivation evolu-
tion. A threshold system, specific to each motiva-
tion, reduces or enhances the motivation values, 
according to the internal variable values. This can be 
assimilated with levels of attention which limit and 
select information to reduce the complexity of the 
decision making task (Bryson, 2002). It helps the 
action selection mechanism to choose the most ap-
propriate behavior at any time.  
 
 
 
If the internal variable lies beneath the threshold 
T1 (comfort zone), the virtual human doesn’t take 
the motivation into account. If the internal variable 
is beyond the second threshold T2 (danger zone), 
the value of the motivation is amplified in compari-
son with the internal variable. In this case, the corre-
sponding action has more chances to be chosen by 
the action selection mechanism, to decrease                        
the internal variable. 
Moreover a hysteresis has been implemented, 
specific to each motivation, to keep at each step a 
portion of the motivation from the previous itera-
tion, therefore permitting the persistence of moti-
vated actions: 
 
 
 
The hyteresis maintain the activity of the moti-
vations and the corresponding motivated actions for 
a while, even though the activity of internal vari-
ables decreases. Indeed, the chosen action must re-
main the most activated until the internal variables 
have returned within their comfort zone. The hys-
teresis limits the risk of action selection oscillations 
between motivations and permits the persistence of 
motivated actions and the coherence in decision 
making. 
 
2.2 Behavioral planner 
To reach the specific locations where the virtual 
human can satisfy his motivations, goal-oriented 
behaviors (sequences of locomotion actions) need to 
be generated, according to environment information 
and internal context of the hierarchical classifier 
system. It can be use also for the complex actions as 
cooking which need to follow order in the sequence 
of actions. Moreover a learning or evolution process 
can be implemented thanks to weights of classifiers 
to optimize behaviors.  
Table 1: Simple example for generating a sequence 
of action using a hierarchical classifier system. 
 
Time steps t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
Environment 
information 
known food location, but 
remote 
Near 
food 
Food 
near 
mouth
No 
food
hunger  Internal context 
(Message List)   reach food location   
Actions 
    
Go to 
food 
Take 
food  Eat  
Activated  rules  R0 R1 R2 R3 R4  
Motivations 
Internal variables T1 T2 
Tolerance 
zone 
Comfort 
zone 
Danger 
zone 
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In the example (table 1), hunger is the highest 
motivation and must remain so until the nutritional 
state is returned within the comfort zone. The be-
havioral sequence of actions for eating needs two 
internal classifiers (modifying internal context):  
R0: if known food location and the nutritional state is high, 
then hunger.       
R1: if known food is remote and hunger, then reach food lo-
cation. 
and three external classifiers (activating actions): 
R2: if reach food location and known food is remote, then go 
to food.           
R3: if near food and reach food location, then take food. 
R4: if food near mouth and hunger, then eat. 
 
Here, the virtual human should go to a known 
food location where he can satisfy his hunger, but 
needs to generate a sequence of locomotion actions 
to reach that place. In this case, two internal mes-
sages “hunger” and “reach food location” are added 
to the message list, thanks to the internal classifiers 
R0, then R1. They represent the internal state for the 
rules and remain until they are realized. To reach the 
known food location, two external classifiers (R2 
and R3) activate locomotion actions (as many times 
as necessary). When the virtual human is near the 
food, the internal message “reach food location” is 
deleted from the message list and the last external 
classifier R4 activates the motivated action “eat”, 
decreasing the nutritional state. Thereafter the inter-
nal message “hunger” is deleted from the message 
list, the food has been eaten and the nutritional state 
is returned within the comfort zone for a while. 
 
2.3 Reactive architecture 
As activity is propagated throughout the model 
according to the free flow hierarchy, and the choice 
is only made at the level of actions, the most acti-
vated action is chosen according to motivations and 
environment information. A greater flexibility and 
reactivity in the behavior, such as compromise and 
opportunist behaviors are then possible in spite of 
behavioral planner. 
 
Figure 3: Compromise behavior (green): the virtual 
human goes where he can eat and drink instead of 
just drinking. Opportunist behavior (yellow): he 
stops to rest when he sees the sofa. 
 
Compromise behaviors have more chances of 
being chosen by the action selection mechanism, 
since they can group activities coming from several 
motivations and can satisfy them at the same time. 
Opportunist behaviors occur when the virtual human 
perceives objects that can satisfy his motivations. 
These motivations are proportionally increased 
compared to the distance between objects and the 
virtual human. For these two beviahors, the propa-
gated value in the model can be modified at two 
levels: at the motivations and motivated behaviors 
levels (see figure 1). If the current behaviour is ex-
ceeded, it is interrupted and a new sequence of lo-
comotion actions is generated in order to reach the 
location where he can satisfy the new motivation. 
 
3   Testing the model in a simu-
lated environment 
 
Figure 4: Top view of the simulated environment 
(apartment) in the 3D viewer. 
 
We choose to simulate a virtual human in an 
apartment where he can “live” autonomously by 
perceiving his environment and satisfying several 
motivations. We arbitrarily define fourteen conflict-
ing motivations (the number is not limited) that a 
human can have in this environment with their spe-
cific locations and the associated motivated actions. 
 
motivations locations action 
hunger table eat 
thirst sink, table drink 
toilet toilet satisfy 
resting sofa rest 
sleeping bed sleep 
washing bath wash 
cooking oven cook 
cleaning worktop, shelf clean 
reading bookshelf read 
communicating computer, phone communicate 
exercise living, hall, room do push-up 
watering plant water 
Watching (default) sofa watch TV 
… … … 
 
Table 2: all available motivations with associated 
actions and their locations. 
Path-planning map 
Thirst → high 
Hunger and rest → medium  
1 - Food and water 
2 - Water 
3 - Sofa 
Original behavior 
Compromise behavior 
Opportunist behavior 
 
1 
2 
3 
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At any time, the virtual human has to choose the 
most appropriate action to satisfy the highest moti-
vation between conflicting ones according to envi-
ronmental information. Then he goes to the specific 
place in the apartment where he can satisfy this mo-
tivation. Compromise behaviors are possible, for 
example the virtual human can drink and eat at the 
table. However he can perform different actions in 
the same place but not at the same time. The virtual 
human can also perform the same action in different 
places: for example clean at the worktop or at the 
shelf. Moreover he has a perception system to per-
mit opportunist behaviors. The default action is 
watching television in the living room.  
The users can add new motivations at the begin-
ning, change all the parameters and monitor the dif-
ferent model level during the simulation.  
 
4   Concluding remarks 
The test application simulates in a 3D graphics 
engine (Ponder, 2003) a virtual human in an apart-
ment, making decisions using the motivational 
model according to the motivations and the envi-
ronment information. As a whole the action selec-
tion architecture doesn’t oscillate between several 
motivations, managing the fourteen conflicting mo-
tivations, thanks to the hysteresis and the behavioral 
planner, and have also reactive behaviors such as 
compromise and opportunist behaviors. In the end 
the virtual human “lives” autonomously and adap-
tively in his apartment. Furthermore, the number of 
motivations in the model is not limited and can eas-
ily be extended. 
The model has some limitations, though. For the 
time being, each motivation has the same impor-
tance in the decision-making process, although we 
know that some motivations are more important 
than others in real life. Here, the virtual human also 
always carries out the most activated action in any 
case. However, some actions should sometimes be 
delayed according to context.  
 
5   Future work 
 
Integrating emotions in the motivational model 
of action selection can reduce these limitations. First 
we plan to define the interactions between motiva-
tions, emotions and personalities to understand how 
they affect decision making in virtual humans. The 
main problem is to connect the emotional layer with 
the rest of the architecture. It could be made by a 
sort of synthetic physiology (Avila-Garcia and 
Cañamero, 2004). The motivations should be more 
quantitative aspect of the decision making whereas 
emotions should be the more qualitative one. The 
low level part of the architecture should be more 
automatic whereas the high level part should be 
more specified in real time by the users. The emo-
tions will be independent from the motivations but 
influence them at the level of length, perception, 
activation and interruption. In the end we plan also 
to manage basic social interactions by adding an-
other virtual humans in the apartment or/and by in-
teracting directly with virtual reality devices in the 
next future.  
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Abstract  
This paper presents a framework that integrates domain-independent strategies into an 
emotionally sound affective (ESA) framework for an intelligent learning environment.  The 
integration is an extension to current affective learning frameworks that consider only domain-
dependent strategies to help student manage their emotional or affective states. It is 
hypothesised by helping students to manage their emotional or affective states, and hence, 
improve their performance in learning will improve.   
 
Keywords: Domain-independent strategies, emotionally sound affective framework  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Despite the fact that emotions play an important 
role in learning, few attempts have been made to 
study emotions in Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
(ITS) though it is an area gaining increasing 
attention (e.g.  Conati, 2002; del Soldato & du 
Boulay, 1995; Kort & Reilly, 2001; Lester et al., 
1999a). Traditionally, affective learning 
frameworks use only domain-dependent strategies 
to help students manage their negative emotional or 
affective states. (e.g Conati, 2002; del Soldato & 
du Boulay,1995; Kort & Reilly, 2001; Lester et al., 
1999a; Jaquas et al., 2002), for example by making 
the lesson easier if it is believed that the student 
needs some experience of success. However, 
emotion regulation theories have suggested that 
there are two strategies used to manage individual 
emotional or affective states: emotion-focused 
strategies, which are domain-independent and 
problem-focused strategies that are domain-
dependent (Lazarus, 1991; Gross, 1999). 
 
In this paper, we propose an emotionally sound 
affective (ESA) framework that integrates both 
domain-dependent and domain independent 
strategies. The ESA framework consists of two 
phases: 1) the appraisal phase, which attempts to 
appraise students’ emotional state and 2) the 
reaction phase, which proposes to use adaptive 
strategies and activities, in order to help students 
manage their emotions (Yusoff, 2004).  
 
The first phase of the ESA framework which 
appraises students’ emotional states is introduced  
at two learning stages. The primary appraisal, 
which uses the PANAS questionnaire (Watson, 
Clerk & Tellegen, 1988) appraises students’ 
emotional states at the beginning of a lesson. The 
primary appraisal establishes  students’ emotional 
states with regard to their personal beliefs and goal 
commitments. The secondary appraisal of this 
framework, on the other hand, appraises students’ 
emotional states during the lesson. It uses students’ 
reactions to two eliciting factors to appraise 
students’ emotion. These eliciting factors are:  the 
difficulty level  of the lesson which is based on the 
nature of the lesson and  the students’ control over 
the lesson.  
 
The students’ Control over the lesson is 
modelled using student-computer interactions that 
are based on three methods:  1) by on-line 
communication with students during the 
interaction, 2) by monitoring students’ request for 
help to complete a lesson and 3) students’ self-
reporting.  In the ESA framework, asking for help, 
completing a lesson and, giving up are examples of 
the student-computer interactions. The intensity of 
the Control eliciting factor is determined by its 
three eliciting variables: Independence, Effort and 
Competence,  that are derived from students’ 
motivation modelling techniques in learning (e.g 
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del Soldato & du Boulay, 1995; De Vincente & 
Pain, 1999).  
 
Independence is defined as the degree that 
students prefer to work without asking others for 
help. It has been widely used as an important 
parameter to detect students’ affective states in 
affective learning environments (del Soldato & du 
Boulay, 1995; De Vincente & Pain, (1999); Jaques 
et al., 2003). In the ESA framework, Independence 
is modelled by the frequency of requests. A low 
request frequency corresponds to a high level of 
independence and high request frequency means a 
low level of independence.  
      
Effort is another popular parameter used to 
detect students’ affective states in an affective 
learning environment (e.g del Soldato & du 
Boulay, 1995; De Vincente & Pain, 1999). Effort is 
defined as the degree of engagement that students 
display to accomplish a task.  In this framework, 
Effort is represented by the frequency of 
interactions between a student and the system, such 
as clicking on a mouse or pressing a key. A high 
number of interactions indicates a high level of 
effort, and a low number of interactions indicates 
otherwise.   
 
Competence is the third variable that can 
influence the Control eliciting factor. It is a 
measure of the students’ knowledge and skills to 
perform a lesson task proficiently. The framework 
represents Competence by a ratio of the number of 
errors to the number of attempts made to solve a 
problem. A low ratio corresponds to a high level of 
competence, and a high ratio implies otherwise. 
 
Just as for the appraisal phase, the ESA 
framework implements the reaction phase at two 
learning stages: 1) at the beginning of a lesson and 
2) during the lesson. Its main objective is to help 
students manage their emotions, especially after 
experiencing negative emotions, by using two 
underpinning strategies:  domain independent or 
emotion-focused strategies and domain-dependent 
or problem-focused strategies.  
 
The first strategies employed in the ESA 
framework  in this reaction phase  are  the domain-
dependent strategies. They help students by 
providing suitable suggestions and strategies that 
are adapted to the students’ elicited emotional state 
and are based on the premise that students in a 
positive emotional state are more capable of 
mastering their lesson (Fredrickson, 1998).  
 
 
In addition to the domain-dependent strategies, 
the domain independent or emotion-focused 
strategies are implemented to help student manage 
their emotions. Coping statements and relaxation 
exercises are examples of domain independent 
strategies.  Statements   such as “I can make things 
happen” are used to maintain students’ happiness 
while statements like “I can see this problem from 
another perspective to make it seem more 
bearable” are used to reduce students’ nervousness. 
Apart from coping statements, relaxation activities 
such as muscle and head exercises are employed to 
help students manage their emotions.   
 
The focus of this paper is on the use of domain-
independent strategies in the reaction phase of the 
ESA framework as a way to help students manage 
their negative emotional or affective states. 
Domain-independent strategies refer to strategies 
and techniques that are unrelated to the  lesson 
domain. Coping statements and relaxation 
exercises are examples of domain-independent 
strategies. In contrast, traditional affective 
frameworks help students by adapting domain-
dependent strategies to their emotional or affective 
states (e.g Conati, 2002; del Soldato & du 
Boulay,1995; Kort & Reilly, 2001; Lester et al., 
1999a; Jaquas et al., 2003).  
 
We postulate that the integration of domain-
independent strategies into the ESA framework 
helps students to manage their emotional states 
better and hence improves their performance in 
learning. The complete flowchart the integration of 
both   domain-independent and domain-dependent 
strategies is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The flowchart of an emotionally 
sound affective (ESA) framework 
 
2. Domain-independent strategies  
To model the domain-independent strategies in the 
ESA framework, we refer to emotion regulation 
theories that are used to help individuals manage 
their emotional states (e.g Gross, 1999; Lazarus, 
1991). Gross (1999)  defines emotion regulation as 
a process  by which individuals influence which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and 
how they experience and express these emotions. 
From Lazarus’ (1991) viewpoint, emotion 
regulation consists of behaviour or cognitive 
responses or strategies that are designed to reduce, 
overcome, or tolerate the demands placed on the 
individual. These strategies are classified into two 
major categories: emotion-focused strategies and 
problem- focused strategies.  
 
Emotion-focused strategies refer to thought or 
actions whose goal is to relieve the emotional 
impact of stress. There are apt to be mainly 
palliative in the sense that such strategies for 
coping do not actually alter the threatening or 
damaging conditions but make the person feel 
better. Examples are avoiding thinking about 
trouble, denying that anything is wrong, distancing 
or detaching oneself as in joking about what makes 
one feel distressed, or attempting to relax. 
 
Problem-focused strategies, on the other hand, 
refer to efforts to improve the troubled person-
environment relationship by changing things, for 
example, by seeking information about what to do, 
by holding back from impulsive and premature 
actions, and by confronting the person or persons 
responsible for one’s difficulty 
 
Therefore, we postulate that an emotionally 
sound affective framework must employ both 
domain-dependent and domain-independent in 
order to help students manage   their negative 
emotional or affective states in learning. 
 
3. Implementation of domain-
independent strategies in ESA 
framework 
The emphasis of this framework is not to regulate 
student emotions completely, but more 
appropriately, to help students manage their 
emotions. Domain-independent strategies involve 
applying several strategies and techniques that are 
unrelated to lesson activities. Coping statements 
and relaxation exercises are examples of domain 
independent strategies.  For example, for a nervous 
student, who has given up on a difficult lesson task, 
this framework suggests that he  takes   a deep 
breath several times, imagines a pleasurable and 
relaxing scene, and reads    an effective coping 
statement such as “I won’t let my sadness affect 
my performance” to reduce his nervousness. Apart 
from coping statements, relaxation activities such 
as muscle and head exercises are used to help 
students manage their emotions. As a result, 
students will feel better and, consequently help the 
student to learn better.  
 
To implement the domain-independent 
efficiently in this framework, a general algorithm is 
being designed that combines several domain-
independent strategies and is summarised as 
follows:  
1. Getting loose ( comfortable position )  
2. Breathing exercises.  
3. Doing muscles (head and eyes) 
relaxation exercises. 
4. Reading  coping statements.   
 
 
 
 
 
Primary appraisal   
Primary reaction 
Secondary reactions  
Secondary appraisal   
Better Performance  
Domain-
independent  
Strategies       
Domain-
dependent  
Strategies       
Learning 
activities
Domain-
independent  
Strategies       
Domain-dependent 
Strategies       
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An initial survey among 21 Sussex University 
students has indicated that  besides domain 
dependent strategies, domain independent 
strategies  are seen to be equally important in order 
to help them  manage their negative emotions as 
shown in Table 1.    
 
Table 1:  The strategies preferred  by  Sussex 
University students in managing their  negative 
emotion in learning.  
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Do Easier
task
coping
statement
exercises Breathing Other 
 
 
4. Discussion  
This paper emphasises more on the integration of 
domain-independent strategies  into an affective 
learning framework which are derived  from 
emotions regulations theories (Gross, 1999; 
Lazarus, 1991). Our initial finding, working   with 
UK and Malaysian students, suggested that these 
domain independent strategies are helping   them to 
manage their emotional states.  By contrast, current 
affective learning frameworks use only domain-
dependent strategies to help students manage their 
negative affective state. (e.g Conati, 2002; del 
Soldato & du Boulay,1995; Kort & Reilly, 2001; 
Lester et al., 1999a; Jaquas et al., 2002).   
 
An empirical study to find more evidence of the 
efficiency of  domain-independent strategies in 
laboratory environments without affecting their 
learning focus will be conducted as future work. 
Apart from finding empirical evidence of  the 
domain-independent strategies efficiency in 
laboratory environments, cultural differences 
among students is another important issue to be 
explored in future. Initial work with UK and 
Malaysian students has shown that domain-
independent strategies such as  the use of coping 
statements are cultural dependent, and thus, 
indicated that it is important to establish which 
strategies are best suited in multi culture learning 
environments.  
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